1. Mr. Conlan has argued that we are bound by the ruling of this Court in Madho Prasad v. Hansa Kuar I.L.R. 5 All. 314 to revise the order of the Subordinate Judge in this case, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to alter the sale-certificate, or to dispute the entries contained therein as to the amount of property sold. We have considered this argument, but we are of opinion that, with reference to the second paragraph of Rule 19 of the Rules framed by the Local Government under Section 320 of the Civil Procedure Code, regarding the transmission, execution, and re-transmission of decrees, and published in the N.W.P. and Oudh Gazette of the 4th September 1880, the matter of delivery to the purchaser was within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge, notwithstanding the terms of Section 320, and notwithstanding the Full Bench ruling to which Mr. Conlan has referred. It may be (though as to this I express no opinion) that the Subordinate Judge's order of the 1st March 1884, was erroneous upon the merits. But we hold that he had jurisdiction to pass the order, and even if his order was erroneous, the matter does not fall within Section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, so as to call for the interference of this Court in revision. Any other view would lead to the conclusion that Section 622 virtually gives a right of appeal in cases where the Legislature distinctly intended the decision to be final. This I regard as erroneous. I agree in the principles laid down by West, J., in the Bombay Full Bench case of Shivanathaji v. Joma Kashinath I.L.R. 7 Bom. 341 in which the other Judges of the Bombay High Court concurred, and in particular with the following observations reported at p. 372: 'Where a decree or order of a subordinate Court is declared by the law to be, for its own purposes, final or conclusive, though in its nature provisional, as subject to displacement by the decree in another more formal suit, the Court will have regard to the intention of the Legislature that promptness and certainty should, in such cases, be in some measure accepted, instead of juridical perfection. It will rectify the proceedings of the inferior Court where the extrinsic conditions of its legal activity have plainly been infringed; but where the alleged or apparent error consists in a misappreciation of evidence, or misconstruction of the law, intrinsic to the injury and decision, it will respect the intended finality, and will intervene peremptorily only when it is manifest that, by the ordinary and prescribed method, an adequate remedy, or the intended remedy cannot be had.' In the present case, it is not contended that if the petitioner has really been aggrieved, he has no remedy by bringing a regular suit.
2. A similar view of Section 622 appears to have been taken by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the recent case of Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh I.L.R. 11 Cal. 6. That was an appeal from a decision of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh reversing the concurrent judgments of two lower Courts. By Section 21 of Act XIII of 1879 (the Oudh Civil Courts Act), such reversal was only possible by exercise of the powers conferred by Section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. In allowing the appeal, their Lordships made the following observations: 'The question then is, did the Judges of the lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material irregularity? It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them, and they did decide it. Whether they decided it rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case, and, even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.'
3. This appears to me to settle the question. I have already said that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to decide the present matter; and that, although be may have decided wrongly, the petitioner would not be deprived of his remedy by a regular suit. I am therefore of opinion that no sufficient ground for interference in revision has been established, and that consequently the application should be dismissed with costs.