1. This second appeal arises from a somewhat peculiar suit. The plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a contract by which the plaintiff undertook to perform some kind of 'puja' which is referred to as 'anushthan' in order to cause the defendant to be successful in a suit which he had before the Courts. In the event of his success the plaintiff was to get one-tenth of the decree money. The plaintiff partially, at any rate, carried out his part of the contract and the defendant was successful in his suit. The plaintiff, therefore, brought the present suit to enforce the payment of one-tenth of the decree money. The trial Court decreed the plaintiff's claim in part, but the lower appellate Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the agreement entered into between the parties was contrary to public policy.
2. The question of whether this agreement was contrary to public policy is the only one that has been argued before us in second appeal. It has been argued on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the grounds on which a suit is barred by public policy have been very strictly limited, and that it is unsafe to make any addition to the class of suits that can be so barred. It is urged that it cannot be against public policy to pray for success in a suit and that in effect this was what the plaintiff undertook to do on behalf of the defendant. The finding of the Court below is that the plaintiff undertook by prayer ('prarthana') to bring extraneous influence on the mind of the Court trying the defendant's suit. We think that the circumstances of this case distinguish it from one in which one person should merely have undertaken to pray to a righteous deity for the success of another's suit for in such a case the deity being righteous would be understood only to exercise an influence in a just cause. In the present case the intention of the parties evidently was that the plaintiff should exercise some influence unauthorized by law on the mind of the Court, whether righteous or the reverse, and whether through any particular deity or not, at any rate with the object of bringing about the success of the defendant in those proceedings. We think that such an agreement must be held to be contrary to public policy. It is true that no similar case has been quoted to us from the Indian or English Courts to fortify our decision, but such a case as the present could not now occur in England and it may be doubted whether such a case has ever come before an English Court nor have we been referred to a similar Indian case.
3. The appeal is dismissed with costs.