Satish Chandra, J.
1. For 4 vacancies created by the Regional Transport Authority for Deoband Ambehta route, a large number of persons applied for the grant of stage carriage permits. The petitioner as well as respondents 3 to 7 were also among the applicants. On 10th January. 1966, the Regional Transport Authority, Dehra-dun, considered the various applications and granted four permits to respondents Nos. 3 to 6. The rest of the applicationswere rejected. The petitioner felt as-grieved, and filed an appeal. Four other persons also filed appeals. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 13th December. 1968, dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground that it was barred by time. It stated that the fact that the appeal was time-barred was not contested by the appellant. This order is challenged in the present writ petition.
2. The petitioner received a copy of the order of the Regional Transport Authority rejecting his application, on 18th September. 1966. He sent the memorandum of appeal by post which was received in the office of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 18th October, 1966. Rule 72 of the Motor Vehicles Rules provides that any person aggrieved against an order of the Regional Transport Authority may, within thirty days of the receipt of such order, prefer an appeal either in person or by post, to the Secretary. State Transport Appellate Tribunal. So, the appeal could be filed within 30 days of the receipt of the order. In my opinion, the phrase 'within 30 days of the receipt of such order' gives clear 30 days time to the appellant, with the result that the date on which the copy of the order was received by him was to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. This view is supported by several decisions. In Kashi Nath Pande v. Shibban Lal Saxena. AIR 1959 All 54, it was held that when Section 110(3)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provided that an application for substitution has to be presented 'within 14 days of the publication of the notice of withdrawal', it imported the applicability of the principle underlying Section 12(1) Limitation Act and Section 9. General Clauses Act, with the result that the date from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned has to be excluded. In Padma Charan Mahapatra v. Superintendent of Police. AIR 1965 Orissa 71 it was held that the expression 'within 15 days' occurring in Section 12-A of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 1930, means 15 clear days, which would necessarily exclude the due date of payment in M/s. N. M. Hussain and Co. v. S. D. Ranguwala, AIR 1953 Mad 602. the phrase 'within a week' occurring in Section 3 of the Madras Act 25 of 1949, was held to mean a clear one week, with the result that in computing the period of one week, the date of the occurrence was to be excluded.
3. The petitioner received a copy of the order on 18th September, 1966. That day had to be excluded. After excluding it, he had 30 days' time to prefer the appeal. The memorandum of appeal reached the office of the StateTransport Appellate Trbiunal on 18th October. 1966, which was the 30th day, The appeal was hence within the prescribed period of limitation. It was not barred by time.
4. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that since the petitioner did not contest the fact that the appeal was barred by time before the Appellate Tribunal, this Court should not exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The error made by the appellant was not on facts. The error was in law, in thinking that the appeal was barred by time. It is well-settled that admission on a point of law does not bind a litigant (See Shiv Singh v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal. AIR 1969 All 14 para 16.) This would, therefore, not be a sufficient ground for throwing out the writ petition.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents then urged that the appeal filed by respondent No. 7, Chaman Lal was later on allowed by the Tribunal on the merits and he was granted a permit. If the petitioners' appeal is now heard on the merits, it will create complications inasmuch as Chaman Lal being not a party to the petitioner's appeal before the Tribunal, the permit granted to him cannot now be revoked. The petitioner's case cannot be considered on the merits in comparison to the case of Chaman Lal, with the result that the other respondents Nos. 3 to 6 will be hard-put in defending their permits. It was urged that in this situation, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to either implead Chaman Lal in his appeal or somehow to get the order allowing Chaman Lal's appeal set aside, so that Chaman Lal's appeal could also be heard along with the petitioner's appeal. In my opinion, these matters are outside the purview of the present writ petition. The order dismissing the petitioner's appeal is patently erroneous. That order has to be set aside. Thereafter what steps a particular litigant may or may not take is a matter on which I cannot speculate or give any direction. It will be open to the parties to safeguard their interests in the best manner possible, in accordance with law.
6. In the result, the petition succeeds, and is allowed. The impugned order dated 13-12-1968 In so far as it dismissed the petitioner's appeal No. 490 of 1966, is quashed. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal will proceed to hear the petitioner's appeal in accordance with law. The petitioner would get his costs from the contesting respondents.