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P, a Pleader, Bansi Vs. Judges of the High Court of Allahabad - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1937All167
AppellantP, a Pleader, Bansi
RespondentJudges of the High Court of Allahabad
Excerpt:
- - 227 their lordships, after referring to sections 595 and 600 of the old code, providing for the granting of an appeal where the high court certified that the case was fit for appeal otherwise, observed that it is clearly intended to meet special cases such, for example, as those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance. there are questions, as for example, those relating to religious-rites and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, or such matters as the reduction of the capital of companies as well as questions of wide public importance in which the subject matter in dispute cannot be reduced into actual terms of money......a.i.r. 1930 p.c. 60 was a case of a pleader who had been suspended from practice for four years. leave to appeal to his majesty in council was allowed and no objection was taken before their lordships that the order allowing such leave was illegal. indeed their lordships actually accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the high court in that case. again in t.c.a. anandalawan v. judges of madras high court , a vakil had been struck off the roll of vakils. their lordships accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the high court. in both these cases the practitioners concerned were governed by the legal practitioners' act and not the. bar councils act. as regards advocates, there have been two recent decisions of this court that an appeal lies : see bahadur lal v. judges of.....
Judgment:
ORDER

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from an order of a Bench of this Court striking off the name of the applicant who is a pleader from the roll of the pleaders on the ground of misconduct. Although the Calcutta and Patna High Courts have taken a different view, it has been the practice in this Court to treat such orders as falling under Section 109(c), Civil P.C. The case in Asbarfi Lal v. Judges of Allahabad High Court A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 60 was a case of a pleader who had been suspended from practice for four years. Leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was allowed and no objection was taken before their Lordships that the order allowing such leave was illegal. Indeed their Lordships actually accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court in that case. Again in T.C.A. Anandalawan v. Judges of Madras High Court , a vakil had been struck off the roll of vakils. Their Lordships accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. In both these cases the practitioners concerned were governed by the Legal Practitioners' Act and not the. Bar Councils Act. As regards advocates, there have been two recent decisions of this Court that an appeal lies : see Bahadur Lal v. Judges of Allahabad High Court : AIR1933All18 and Shiva Narain v. Judges of Allahabad High Court : AIR1934All898 . In the latter case it was pointed out by this High Court that the Calcutta and the Patna High Courts had taken a contrary view, which was not followed by this Court. Their Lordships in their judgment did not make any adverse comment on this. But leave under Section 109(c) cannot be granted as a matter of course and the applicant has to satisfy us that the case is otherwise a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. In Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishen Narain (1901) 23 All. 227 their Lordships, after referring to Sections 595 and 600 of the old Code, providing for the granting of an appeal where the High Court certified that the case was fit for appeal otherwise, observed that it is

clearly intended to meet special cases such, for example, as those in which the point in dispute is not measurable by money, though it may be of great public or private importance. To certify that a case is of that kind, though it is left entirely in the discretion of the Court, is a judicial process which could not be performed without special exercise of that discretion, evinced by the fitting certificate.

2. The same point was again emphasized in Radha Krishn v. Rai Krishn Chand (1901) 23 All. 415 at p. 184, and it was pointed out that the prevailing impression in the Indian High Courts that the mere-existence of a substantial question of law was sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to give leave to appeal was a mistake,, if the amount of Rs. 10,000 or more is not in dispute, either directly or indirectly. The point was again explained by their Lordships in Radha Krishna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 25, at p. 33. The requirement of Section 110

does not cover the whole grounds of appeal, because it is plain that there may be certain cases in which it is impossible to define in money value the exact character of the dispute; there are questions, as for example, those relating to religious-rites and ceremonies, to caste and family rights, or such matters as the reduction of the capital of companies as well as questions of wide public importance in which the subject matter in dispute cannot be reduced into actual terms of money.

3. The same principle appears to have been applied by their Lordships in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi , where the words in Sub-section 2, Section 66(A), of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, were textually the same as the concluding words of Section 109(c), Civil P.C. It would therefore seem to follow that the certificate is not to be granted as a matter of course, but can be granted where the case is otherwise a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. We think that the conditions1 laid down by their Lordships in the first case in Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishen Narain (1901) 23 All. 227 are fulfilled in this case. This is an appeal from an order striking off the name of a pleader from the roll of pleaders, and the point in dispute is not measurable by money and it is of great private importance to the applicant. There are some points of law also raised in this case. We therefore think that this can be; treated as one of the special cases mentioned by their Lordships in their judgment. We accordingly certify under Section 109(c) that this case is a fit one for; appeal to His Majesty in Council. We allow the applicant to furnish security by hypothecating sufficient immoveable property.


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