O.H. Mootham, C.J.
1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of this Court dated the 2nd April 1957. The respondent was a Sub-Inspector of Police, and in September, 1951 he was charged under Section 7 of the Police Act with being remiss in and unfit for the discharge of his duty in that he had committed thirteen specific acts of misconduct which were therein set out. Aft the ensuing departmental enquiry the Superintendent of Police who conducted it held that four of these charges had been satisfactorily proved and that a fifth had been partially proven.
The finding of the Superintendent of Police in respect of the first four of these five charges was confirmed by the Deputy Inspector , General of Police, 'S' Range, who by an order dated the 17th July, 1952, dismissed the respondent from service. From this order the respondent appealed to the Inspector General of Police but that appeal was dismissed on the 24th June, 1953. The respondent then applied unsuccessfully to the State Government for the revision of the order of dismissal, his application being rejected on the 22nd November, 1954.
This Court by the order which is the subject of the present application was of opinion that there was no evidence produced at the enquiry which could establish the charges which had been held to have been proved, and although as it pointed out it dons not ordinarily interfere with a matter of discipline in the police force, it directed the issue of a writ quashing the order of the Inspector General of Police dated the 24th June, 1953.
2. It is now urged on behalf of the applicants that the proceedings at the departmental enquiry were purely of a departmental nature and that the Tribunal was entitled to base its conclusions on such material as it thought fit, including in particular hearsay evidence and documentary evidence the authenticity of which has not been established.
In support of his submission the learned Standing Counsel invited our attention to Local Government Board v. Arlidge 1915 AC 120 Exparte Frv, 1954-2 All ER 118 andJagannath Prasad v. State of U. P.. AIR 1954All 629. We however think it unnecessaryin this case to consider these authorities for ithas to be borne that the dismissal of the respondentwas ordered by the Deputy Inspector General ofPolice and that that order was confirmed by theInspector General of Police, in exercise of thepowers vested in them by Section 7 of the Police Act.Now, that section so far as is material reads thus:
'Subject to such rules as the State Government may from time to time make under this Act, the Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General, Assistant Inspector General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the subordinate ranks whom they shall think remiss or neglect in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for the same.'
This section makes it clear that the powers conferred upon the officers named therein are to be exercised subject to such rules as the State Government may make; and it is not in dispute that regulations 489 to 494 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations are rules made by the State Government under that section with regard to the conduct of departmental trials. We think therefore that the owers of punishment vested in a police officer by Section 7 of the Police Act are dependent upon the observance at the departmental enquiry of the provisions of these regulations.
Rules 1 and 3, so far as they are material, of regulation 490 provide that:
'1. As much evidence must first be placed on record as the Superintendent of Police considers necessary to establish a charge under Section 7 of the Police Act. This evidence may be either oral or documentary and must be material to the charge. If oral--
(a) it must be direct, i.e., if it is a fact which could be seen or otherwise perceived it must be the evidence of the person who said he saw or otherwise perceived it;..........
3.........Documents should not be put in as exhibits when their contents are inadmissible as evidence under Rule 1(a) and (b) above; for example statements of witnesses made to subordinate officers and reports of the findings and opinions of such officers are not evidence..........
(b) Certified copies of public records need not be proved.........
(d) Documentary evidence of experts of a formal nature should be admitted without the necessity of having to- comply with the provisions of the Evidence Act..........'
3. These rules in our opinion make it sufficiently clear that hearsay evidence is inadmissible and that documents which it is proposed to make exhibits (unless they are certified copies of public records, or are of a formal nature or are admitted) must be proved. This Court in the impugned order was of the opinion that the finding that the respondent had committed the acts which the Tribunal held to be established was founded on inadmissible evidence, and that accordingly the finding could not be sustained.
4. The question of the procedure to be followed at the departmental enquiry under the PoliceRegulations is no doubt of importance, but theredoes not appear to us to be sufficient doubt as tothe legal position to justify this Court in grantinga certificate under Articles 132 or 133 of the Constitution.The application is accordingly dismissed withcosts.