S.N. Singh, J.
1. The above three cases have come before this Bench in view of an apparent conflict between the decisions of two Division Benches of this Court (L, D. Meston School Society v. Kashi Nath Misra : AIR1951All558 and Raja Deo Singh v. Kr. Shambho Krishna Narain, 1960 All LJ 124.) Before adverting to the question of law involved in these three cases it is necessary to give in brief the facts of each case.
2. First Appeal from Order No. 152 of 1967 arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff who claims to be an Abhi-yanta in the service of Zila Parishad, Budaun for a perpetual injunction requiring the defendants not to enforce an order of suspension dated the 29th of April 1967 said to have been issued under the signature of Adhyaksh, Zila Pari-ehad, Budaun. It was also prayed that the defendants be restrained from Interfering in the discharge of his duty as Abhiyanta of the Parishad, In this suit the plaintiff moved an application supported by an affidavit for the issue of an ad interim, injunction under Order 39, C.P.C. The 'Civil Judge considered this application and passed the following order:
'Issue notice to the defendants, their employees, agents, workmen etc. to show cause why they should not be restrained from enforcing the order of suspension dated 29-4-1967 and from interfering in the discharge of the plaintiff's duty as Engineer and from calling upon the plaintiff to hand over charge of his post of Engineer.
In the meantime the defendants, their employees, agents, workmen etc. are restrained pending the disposal of the suit from enforcing the order of suspension dated 29-4-1967 from interfering in the discharge of the plaintiff's duties as Abhiyanta of the Zila Parishad and from calling upon the plaintiff to hand over charge of the post of Abhiyanta. The plaintiff will continue to receive his pay and allowances from the Zila Parishad as admissible under the rules'.
3. Against the above ex parte order passed by the Civil Judge, Budaun, First Appeal from Order No. 152 of 1967 was filed in this Court. When this appeal was listed for hearing, one of us (S. N. Singh, J.) finding apparent conflict between the two Division Bench cases mentioned above referred the following questions to a larger Bench:--
(l) Whether the ex parte order issuing injunction against the defendants is ap-pealable in the circumstances of this case?
(2) If the order is appealable can the appellant rely on fresh evidence which was not before the trial Court?
4. First Appeal from Order No. 170 of 1966 arises out of Suit No. 14 of 3966 which was instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants for possession over the cinema house Sunder Talkies along with its machinery and furniture and for a decree for Rs. 10,600/- as arrears of lease money and also for a decree for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1,000/-per month from 1st April 1966 in the Court of Civil Judge, Basti. In this suit the plaintiffs filed an application for injunction supported by an affidavit andprayed that an ad Interim injunction be issued restraining the defendants from using the cinema house, machinery and furniture and holding the cinema shows. They also prayed for the appointment of a commissioner to make an inventory of all the articles and for giving the same in Supurdagi of some reliable person.
5. The Civil Judge, Basti, passed the following order:
'Let ad interim injunction, as prayed, be issued restraining the defendants first set from using the cinema house, its machinery and furniture and from performing the cinema show till further orders as mentioned in the application 9-C'.
Against this ex parte order First Appeal from Order No. 170 of 1966 was filed in this Court and it came for hearing before one of us (Kirty, J.). In this case a preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of the appeal. Finding apparent conflict between the two Division Bench cases referred to above this case was also directed to be listed along with First Appeal from Order No. 152 of 1967 for the decision of the preliminary point raised.
6. Civil Revision No, 1625 of 1965 was instituted against an order of the District Judge, Saharanpur, who dismissed an appeal against an ex parte injunction order passed by the Munsif as not maintainable in view of the case of 1960 All LJ 124. This revision was also connected with First Appeal from Orders Nos. 152 of 1967 and 170 of 1966.
7. AH the above three cases raise the common question as to whether an appeal lies against an ex parte ad interim injunction, order or not. Before answering the question raised, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of law on the point. Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders. Under the heading 'temporary injunctions' we find that Rules 1 to 5 have been mentioned. Temporary injunctions are issued under Rules 1 and 2. The relevant portions of these rules are given below:
'1. Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise:--
(a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or
(b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors.
the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property as the Courtthinks fit, 'until the disposal of the suit or until further orders'.' (emphasis (here into ' ') added).
'2. (1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary Injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.
(2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, 'on such terms as to the duration of the injunction', keeping an account giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit. (3) x x x x (4) x x x x'
(Emphasis (here into ' ') added).
8. Rule 3 provides that notice will be issued before the grant of injunction unless the Court considers that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay in issuing notice. Rule 4 gives a right to the defendant to get an injunction discharged, varied or set aside by moving an application after the grant of an ad interim injunction.
9. Order 43, Rule 1 (r) pertinently reads:
'An appeal shall lie from .....anorder under Rule 1, Rule 2.....of Order XXXIX.'
10. Re. Question (1): It is now to be seen whether an ex parte order of Injunction falls within the purview of Rule l(r) of Order 43.
11. Two things deserve notice at threshold. Firstly, the language of Rule l(r) is unhedged and broad. Secondly, courts should lean in favour of an interpretation which expands rather than shrinks a remedial right. A remedial provision of law is generally construed liberally. Rule 1 (r) creates a remedial right of appeal for protection of substantial and substantive rights.
12. An ad interim injunction may be granted under Order XXXIX or Section 151 in some cases. No appeal lies against an order under Section 151. be it ex parte or otherwise. An ex parte order of injunction made under Order XXXIX will fall either under Rule 1 or Rule 2. There is no other provision under which such an order can be made. Rule 1 (r) of Order 43 does not say that an appeal shall lie from a final order under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order XXXIX. No adequate reason is shown for interpolating the word 'final' before 'order' in Rule l(r). Courts do not ordinarily make additionsin enactments. That is a legislative function.
13. Let us now examine the scheme of Rules 1 to 4 of Order XXXIX. Rules 1 and 2 provide for the making of an interim order of injunction. Rule 3 firstly provides that an interim injunction should ordinarily be granted after notice to the adversary party. Secondly, it provides that notice may be dispensed with where the court is satisfied that it would defeat the purpose of granting an injunction. Rule 4 provides that an order of injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside on an application made by the party dissatisfied with such order.
14. Three things follow from these provisions. The law does not require the issue of notice when an ex parte injunction is made, although courts, as a matter of caution, issue a notice. The service of the ex parte order of injunrtion itself is adequate notice. Again, Rule 4 shows that an order of injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of the adversary party. Such application may be given when the order is ex parte or even after it has been made absolute. Until it is discharged or varied or set aside on such an application, either written or oral, the ex parte order operates with full vigour and stands on its own feet, provided it has not expired earlier. Thirdly, the provisions of Order XXXIX do not classify orders of injunction into (1) an ex parte order of injunction and (2) a final order of injunction. Courts have coined this dichotomy for the sake of convenience of speech and expressions. In the eye of law an 'ex parte' order is as much an order under Rule 1 or 2 as a 'final' order. Both orders last for the period each is granted or till each of them is discharged or varied or set aside under Rule 4. The temporal life of each may be shorter than the life of the suit.
15. An injunction Interferes with substantial and substantive rights of a person. The object of Rule l(r) of Order 43 is to provide a remedy for improper or invalid interference with his rights. If we restrict this rule to only final orders of injunction, the object of the rule will not be fully achieved. For instance, where a grievance of the party affected by the ex parte interim injunction is that the court granting it has also acted from bias against him it is meaningless to force him to go to that very Court in the first instance. It shall only prolong the suspension of his valuable rights. In many cases he may get no relief in the end. Similarly, where the order of injunction is founded on an Act challenged as unconstitutional, appeal may yield quicker relief.
16. The language and the object of Rule 1(r) of Order 43 and the scheme otRules 1 to 4 of Order 39 show that an appeal also lies against the ex parte order of injunction. As soon as an interim injunction is issued and the party affected thereby is apprised of it, he has two remedies: (1) he can either get the ex parte injunction order discharged or varied or set aside under Rule 4 of Order 39 and if unsuccessful avail the right of appeal as provided for under Order 43, Rule 1 (r), or (2) straightway file an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) against the injunction order passed under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. C.P.C. It is not unusual to provide for alternative remedies. For instance, when an ex parte decree is passed against a person, he has two remedies: either he may go up in appeal against the ex parte decree or he may seek to get the ex parte decree set aside by the same court.
17. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents in the two first appeals from order that an appeal is contemplated only from a final order disposing of an application for ad interim injunction after contest. According to the learned counsel when notice is issued and the Court Invites objections, the Court keeps the injunction application pending and passes the final order only after contest by the adversary party. It is only the passing of the final order which gives a right of appeal to the aggrieved party. According to the learned counsel the ex parte interim order is merely an interlocutory order not subject to appeal. Learned counsel invited our attention to Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that an ex parte interim order does not fall under Section 2(14). It should not therefore be considered to be an order under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. Reliance was placed on the State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey : 1957CriLJ567 , Shanker Lal Aggarwal v. Shankarlal Poddar : 1SCR717 and the Central Bank of India Ltd, v. Gokal Chand : 1SCR310 .
18. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents. As already discussed above, once the Court, after perusing the application and affidavit, comes to the conclusion that the case is a fit one in which temporary injunction should be issued ex parte the Court takes a final decision in the matter for the time being and the expression of this decision in our opinion is a final order for the duration it is passed. Such an order is contemplated by Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39, C.P.C. We have looked into the authorities referred to above, but they are not applicable to the facts of this case and they have little bearing on the precise point raised by the learned counsel for the respondents.
19. The question of the appealability of an ex parte order was the subjectmatter of decision by this Court as well as by other courts and consensus of opinion is in favour of the appealability of such an order. The cases which have held such orders to be appealable are Amolak Ham v. Sahib Singh, (1885) ILR 7 All 550; Lachmi Narain v. Ram Charan Das, (1913) ILR 35 All 425; Ganesh Prasad Sahu v. Dukh Haran Sahu, AIR 1922 All 441 (1): District Board of Farrukha-bad v. Ikhlaque Husain. : AIR1933All86 ; : AIR1951All558 ; Shyam Bebari Singh v. Biseswar Daval Singh, AIR 1924 Pat 713: Balabh Das v. Muhammad Ishaq, AIR 1933 Lah 282; Devasahayam v. Aru-mukhan, AIR 1953 Trav Co 240 and Ramulu v. Ganga Ram, AIR 1953 Hyd 138. We are in agreement with the view expressed hi the above cases.
20. The contrary view has been taken In the cases of 1960 All LJ 124 and Hari Chand v. Durga Devi, AIR 1934 Lah 79 (2). We have looked into these two cases and find that in the case of 1960 All LJ 124 the decisions of this Court ranging from the rase of ILR 7 All 550 to the case of : AIR1951All558 referred to above were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench which decided this case. In this case the relevant provisions bearing on the subiect have also not been noticed or discussed. This decision, in our opinion, does not lay down correct law. The case of AIR 1934 Lah 79 (2) is clearly distinguishable on fact. In that case it was held that the impugned order fell not under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39, C.P.C. but under Section 151, C.P.C. It is obvious that if an order is passed under Section 151. C.P.C. no appeal lies.
21. On a review of the authorities mentioned above and the relevant provisions of Order 39. Rules 1 and 2 and Order 43, Rule l(r), C.P.C. we are of opinion that the case of : AIR1951All558 lays down the correct law on the point and that the case of 1960 All LJ 124 does not lay down the correct law.
22. Re. Question 2: Ordinarily an appellant is confined to the evidence already on record prepared by the lower Court. It is open to him to request the appellate Court to admit fresh evidence under Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. C. Where permission is granted and fresh evidence is admitted under the aforesaid provision, the appellant can rely on that evidence as well. Learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to cite any authority to show that an appellant as of right, can rely on fresh or additional evidence in appeal from an ex parte order passed under Order 39, Rule 1 or 2, C.P.C.
23. In view of the above discussion our answer to the first question formulated in First Appeal from Order No. 152 of 1967 is in the 'affirmative'. Our answer to question No. 2 is as follows:--
'The appellant as a matter of right cannot rely on fresh evidence in appeal which was not before the trial Court until it is admitted by the appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C.
24. As a result of the answers given above the two First Appeals from Orders Nos. 152 of 1967 and 170 of 1966 will be listed before the respective Benches for final disposal. Civil Revision No. 1625 of 1965 is hereby allowed but without costs. The order of the District Judge, Saharan-pur, dated 11th October 1965, is set aside and the case is remanded to the District Judge with a direction to readmit , the appeal to its original number and decide the same on merits in accordance with law.