George Knox and Richards, JJ.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Municipal Board of Najibabad through the Chairman of the Board against one Sheo Narain, who, according to the allegations made in the plaint, had entered into a contract for storing and consolidating kankar with the Municipal Board. The plaint states that the respondent had not carried out the terms of the contract, which caused loss to the Board, hence the suit for damages. The Court of first instance decreed the claim. The respondent before us appealed to the lower appellate Court. There were no less than eighteen grounds in the memorandum of appeal, but the lower appellate Court decided the appeal upon, a preliminary point which is neither contained in, nor covered by, the written statement of the respondent or the memorandum of appeal to the lower appellate Court. The point seems to have been suggested by a ruling of this Court in Radha Kishan Das v. The Municipal Board of Benares Weekly Notes, 1905, p, 111 namely, that the contract was not signed by the Chairman or a Vice-Chairman and the Secretary. The Municipal Board of Najibabad were evidently taken by surprise and one of the grounds in appeal to us is that the raising of this new plea should not have received the permission of the Court. The learned District Judge and the parties appear to have assumed that the formalities insisted on in Section 47 of the Municipalities Act had been disregarded. Upon this point he dismissed the claim brought by the Municipality. In appeal before us it is contended that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 47 of the Municipalities Act, as the resolution sanctioning the agreement is signed by the Chairman and the Secretary. We allowed time for the production of the resolution and the contract. It was then discovered that the contract was on the file. We have examined it. We find that it is signed by the defendant, and on the back arc endorsed the signatures of both the Secretary and the Vice-Chairman, and this endorsement refers to the contents of the contract and its confirmation. In our judgment this is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 47 of the Municipalities Act. We decree the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court on this preliminary point, and direct that Court to re-admit the appeal upon its file of pending appeals and dispose of it according to law. Costs here and hitherto will abide the event.