Onkar Singh, J.
1. This second appeal has been filed by defendants 2 and 3 who are sub-tenants and is directed against the concurrent decisions of the courts below decreeing the plaintiff's suit for ejectment and recovery of Rs. 175/- as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation for the period from 1-4-1967 to 15-9-1968.
2. Plaintiff-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent in respect of two shops against the appellants and respondent No. 3 on the allegations that respondent No. 3 Laukush was the tenant-in-chief of the two shops in dispute on a rent of Rs. 10/- per month and that he had sublet the shops in question to the appellants. It was alleged that defendant No. 3 was defaulter in payment of rent and he had illegally sublet the premises and, as such, was liable to ejectment. Plaintiffs-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 purchased the shops in suit from Indra Narain Khanna, the previous landlord. The plaintiffs had served a notice on respondent No. 3 alone terminating his tenancy but he failed to vacate the shops.
3. The suit was resisted by defendant No. 1 and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who filed separate written statements. Defendant No. 1 pleaded that he was never tenant of the shops in dispute and had nothing to do with them. He also challenged the validity of the notice served upon him.
4. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 (appellants) pleaded, inter alia, that defendant No. 1 was not the tenant of the shops in dispute, that defendant No. 2 was the tenant of the western portion of the shop for the last twelve years on a rent of Rs. 10/- per month and defendant No. 3 was the tenant of the eastern portion of the shop in dispute on a rent of Rs. 7/- per month and that sometimes rent was also sent through defendant No. 1 to Indra Narain Khanna as defendant No. 1 was friendly with him.
5. Defendant No. 1 filed a compromise admitting the plaintiff's claim.
6. The trial Court held that defendant No. 1 was the tenant of the shops in dispute, that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were subtenants of defendant No. 1 and that defendant No. 1 had committed default in payment of the rent. It accordingly decreed the suit for ejectment against all the defendants and for recovery of Rs. 175/- as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation against defendant No. 1,
7. On appeal by defendant Nos. 2 and 3 the appellate Court affirmed the findings of the trial Court and confirmed the judgment and decree.
8. Two points have been urged in support of this appeal by the learned counsel for the appellants. Firstly, he contended that the concurrent findings of the two courts below that defendant No. 1, and not defendants 2 and 3, was the tenant of the shops in question was erroneous and the courts below did not take into consideration the entire evidence filed by the appellants. Secondly, he contended that the notice was invalid as it did not specially terminate the tenancy.
9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. In my opinion there is no force in the above contentions. Plaintiffs-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have relied on the rent note Ext. 3 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of Indra Narain Khanna, the landlord. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs have purchased the two shops in dispute from Indra Narain Khanna by means of sale deed Ext. 2 dated 10-7-1968. The rent note Ext. 3 clearly shows that defendant No. 1 had taken on lease the two shops on rent of Rs. 10/- per month. In the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs there is also a clear recital to the effect that defendant No. 1 was the tenant of the two shops in dispute. The oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs-respondents was also to the same effect. On the other hand, there is no evidence on the record to show that the appellants were the tenants of Indra Narain Khanna. Defendant No. 2 alone has examined herself while defendant No. 3 did not enter the witness-box. Defendant No. 2 stated in cross-examination that the shop was given to defendant No. 3 in her presence as well as in the presence of one Balli who has not been examined. She further stated that the shop was let out to her in the presence of ode Qamruddin who too was not examined. The appellants relied on two papers Nos. 25/iA-l and 25/2 A-2 which are receipts showing that on 1-7-1968 defendant No. 2 had remitted Rs. 50/- to Indra Narain Khanna and that Rs. 14/- were remitted by defendant No. 3 on 23-5-1968. These documents have been filed by the appellants to show that Indra Narain Khanna had accepted rent from them admitting them to be the tenants of the shops in suit. However, the aforesaid papers show that the amounts were received by Vishnu Narain Khanna and Lakshmi Narain Khanna on behalf of Indra Narain Khanna. There is another receipt, paper No. 25/3 A-l filed by the appellants which shows that Indra Narain Khanna had returned the amount of Rs. 14/- to defendant No. 3 saying that rent had been inadvertently accepted by his son and that no rent should be sent in future. This clearly shows that out of two amounts of Rs. 50/-and Rs. 14/- which were accepted on behalf of Indra Narain Khanna by his sons, one amount of Rs. 14/- was returned by him. The appellants also filed some letters purporting to have been written by Indra Narain Khanna to them. These letters were not proved but have been taken into consideration by the appellate Court. These letters also do not support the appellants' case that Indra Narain Khanna had accepted them as tenants of the shops in question. The first letter is dated 13-5-1968 written by Indra Narain Khanna to Kalian and Ganga. The latter is not the tenant of these shops. It was clearly stated in this letter that defendant No. 1 Laukusb had not sent rent for about a year and Kalian and Ganga were, therefore, asked to send rent direct to him and he would then execute separate rent notes in their favour. This recital in the letter clearly shows that till 13-5-1968 defendant No. 1 was the tenant and the appellants had nothing to do with the tenancy. The second letter is dated 26-5-1968 addressed to defendant No. 3 in which it was mentioned that he had received the money order on account of rent and that the other tenant should also be directed to send the rent by money order. It was also mentioned that he wanted to sell these shops. There is, however, nothing in these letters to show that any tenancy rights were conferred on the appellants particularly when the appellants themselves had fifed the receipt showing that Tndra Narain Khanna had returned the amount of Rs. 14/-sent by defendant No. 3 and had asked him not to send any rent in future. As mentioned above, those amounts were accepted by his sons and not by Indra Narain Khanna. These documents at the most indicate that Indra Narain Khanna was contemplating to confer tenancy rights upon the appellants but actually did not confer these rights and the rent received by his son in one case was sent back to one of the appellants. In para 16 of the written statement the defendants have admitted having sent to Indra Narain Khanna through Laukush defendant No. 1. It was alleged that since Laukush was friendly with Indra Narain Khanna, the rent was sent through him. There is no evidence on the record to show that defendant No. 1 was friendly with Indra Narain Khanna. This also shows that defendant No. 1 was the tenant of the shops in dispute. Ext. 6 is reply of defendant No. 1 to the notice served on him by the plaintiffs in which he did not deny the tenancy but clearly stated that he was no longer the tenant of the shops in dispute as he had vacated them about 14 months before. This reply was given by him on 27-8-1968. On a consideration of the above evidence on the record I am of the opinion that the finding of the courts below that defendant No. 1 was the tenant of the shops in dispute is correct.
10. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the notice sent by plaintiffs respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to defendant No. 1 (respondent No. 3) was invalid, no issue was framed by the trial Court. Issue No. 4 framed by the trial Court was whether notice was necessary to contesting defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and it held that since defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were the sub-tenants, no notice was required to be given to them under the law. Since the plea was taken by defendant No. 1 and the point being essentially the point of law I have allowed the appellant's counsel to address on that point. The learned counsel for the appellants has strongly contended that the notice was invalid as it did not expressly say that the tenancy was being terminated. Reliance was placed on the case of Farooq Ahmad v. Muneshwar Bux, AIR 1972 All 155. In that case it was held that if the notice is only for the vacation of the premises and not for termination of the tenancy, it is invalid. In that case notice was not on the record and it was held that onus to prove its invalidity is on defendant. If there is nothing to the contrary, he can rely on the plaint averments to discharge that onus, On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents contended, relying on the terms of the notice that it gave clear indication to terminate the tenancy on the expiry of the period of thirty days. In the instant case the notice reads as follows :--
'Merey movakilan aap to kiriya par abad nahin rakhna chahte hain. Atah aap notice milne ke 30 din guzarne tak dookanat mazkooran khali kar ke mere movakilan ke qabza dakhal kara dijiye......aur baad guzarnemiyad aap ke khilaf charajui vaste bedakhli wa baqaya kiraya rupia ke ki javegi Takeed janiye. Faqat.'
It is clear from the above recital that the plaintiff-respondents gave a notice to defendant No. 1 that they were no longer willing to continue his tenancy and that he should vacate the premises on the expiry of 30 days failing which they shall file a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent. In my opinion this indicates a clear intention to terminate the tenancy on the expiry of the period of thirty days and is a valid notice of termination. No particular words have been prescribed under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by the U. P. Legislature which merely provides :--
'A lease.....shall be terminable on thepart of either lessor or lessee by one month'snotice.'
Section iii (h) of the same Act provides:--
'A lease of immoveable property determines......... (h) on the expiry of a noticeto determine the lease, or to quit or of intention to quit the property leased, duly given by one party to another.'
In the commentary of D. F. Mulla on theTransfer of Property Act it was observed :--
'.....the notice to quit must indicatein substance and with reasonable clarity an intention on the part of the person giving it to determine the existing tenancy at a certain time.'
The same author has observed:--
'A liberal construction is therefore put on a notice to quit in order that it should not be defeated by inaccuracies either in the description of the premises or the name of the tenant, or the date of expiry of notice.'
In my opinion the notice given by plaintiffs respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was valid and the tenancy of defendant No. 1 was legally terminated.
11. Even assuming that the notice was invalid, since it has been accepted and acted upon by the party to whom it was given, the tenancy would be determined. It was held in Calcutta Credit Corporation v. Happy Homes (P) Ltd., 1968 SCR 20 = (AIR 1968 SC 471) that a notice which does not comply with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act may still be accepted by the party served with it and if that party accepts and acts upon it, the party serving the notice will be estopped from denying its validity. It was further observed:--
'A tenancy is determined by service of the notice in the manner prescribed by Section iii (h) read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the notice is duly given, the tenancy stands determined on the expiry of the period of the tenancy. Even if the party served with the notice does not assent thereto, the notice takes effect. If the notice is defective, it does not operate to terminate the tenancy by force of the statute. But a tenancy is founded in contract, and it is always open to the parties thereto to agree that the tenancy shall be determined otherwise than by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, or by a notice of a duration shorter than the period provided by the Act. If the parties so agree, the tenancy will come to an end.'
In the instant case respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and respondent No. 3 (defendant No. 1) have compromised the case and it was mentioned in the compromise that defendant No. 1 was the tenant and defendants Nos, 2 and 3 were the sub-tenants that defendant No. 1 had no concern with the shops in dispute and that the plaintiffs would take possession of the shops. It was contended by the counsel for the appellants that the compromise was collusive and the courts below were not justified in holding on its basis that defendant No. 1 was the tenant in chief and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were the sub-tenants. I do not agree with this contention. It cannot be contended that the findings of the courts below are based on this compromise. The courts below have considered all the evidence on the record and the compromise seems to be the reiteration of the real position which has independently emerged from the evidence on the record. The appellants who have been proved to be sub-tenants are not entitled to any protection under the law. The sub-tenancy is without the permission of the landlord or of the District Magistrate and it violated Section 7 (3) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act which says:--
'No tenant shall sublet any portion of the accommodation in his tenancy except with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate previously obtained.'
There is neither permission in writing of the landlord nor of the District Magistrate. An agreement which violates the provisions of any law is illegal and void. It might be contended that there is no clear finding by the two courts below that sub-letting was without the permission of the landlord Indra Narain Khanna but the first appellate Court has held that there was no material on the record to show that prior to 1-5-1968 Indra Narain Khanna knew that the appellants were the sub-tenants of defendant No. 1. This impliedly means that the appellants were subtenants of No. 1 without the permission of the landlord.
12. In the result there is no force in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.