M.P. Mehrotra, J.
1. This second appeal arises out of a suit which the plaintiff filed claiming a declaration that the amount of Rs. 409.44 deposited by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in tehsil Amroha as land revenue payable by them was not really land revenue so payable by them and hence the said sum was liable to be attached in the execution of the decrees in suits Nos. 39 of 1954 and 27 of 1958 passed by the court of Munsif. Amroha. The case of the plaintiff-appellant was that he was the bhumidhar of the plots detailed at the foot of the plaint and had been paying land revenue in respect of the same regularly. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 wrongly deposited the amount in question i. e. a sum of Rs. 409.44 in the tehsil as land revenue in respect of the said plots. The said defendants were not the tenure-holders of the said plots and had no obligation to pay any land revenue in respect of the said land which had been in the possession of the plaintiff and of which he was the tenure-holder. The plaintiff further alleged that as the decree-holder in the aforesaid two suits he sought by his execution application, to attach the said amount deposited in the tehsil by the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who were the judgment-debtors in the said decrees but the execution court held that the said amount was not attachable as it stood deposited in the tehsil as land revenue and rejected the execution application. The plaintiff further alleged that he filed two execution appeals against the rejection of his execution application and the refusal of the execution court to attach the said amount in the execution of the said two decrees but the appellate court directed the plaintiff to file regular declaratory suits seeking a declaration that the amount in question was liable to be attached in the execution of the said decrees. Hence he filed the instant suit. The defendant No. 1 was the State of Uttar Pradesh and the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were the judgment-debtors in the decrees which were passed in his said suits, namely, Nos. 39 of 1954 and 27 of 1958. Defendant No. 3. Heera Singh, died during the pendency of the litigation and his heirs were brought on record The defendants contested the suit. The defendant No. 1 claimed that the moneywas realised from the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as land revenue and, therefore it was not attachable by the execution court in the execution of the decrees which were passed against the defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 contended that they were in possession of the plots in suit and they . deposited the said amount as land revenue due in respect of the said land. The amount in question having been deposited as land revenue was not attachable. A plea was also taken that the suit was not maintainable in view of the bar of Section 47 C. P. C.
2. The trial court framed the necessary issues, tried the same and dismissed the suit, inter alia, on the ground that, it was not maintainable due to the bar contained in Section 47 C. P. C. The lower appellate, court dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff. Now, the plaintiff has come up in the instant second appeal and I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. In my view, this appeal lacks merit. It is obvious that the suit was not maintainable in view of Section 47(1) C. P. C. which lays down that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. When a decree-holder seeks to execute his decree against the judgment-debtor by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's property he moves an application for execution and seeks the attachment of any property which he alleges to belong to the judgment-debtor. It cannot be disputed that before proceeding to attach the property he need not file a suit seeking a declaration that a particular property is attachable in the execution of his decree. Such a suit will be clearly barred under Section 47 C. P. C. In the execution proceedings a dispute some times arises whether the property sought to be attached is liable to be attached or not. The judgment-debtor sometimes despite the decree-holder's claim that a particular property is attachable files objection under Section 47 C. P. C. and such objections are decided by the execution court and the order passed by the execution court used to have the force of a decree and an appeal lay against the same as an appeal from the decree. I am for the time being forgetting the position as it has changed after the amendment of the C. P. C. in 1976 which has amended the definition of the decree in Section 2(2) so as to execlude the orders passed under Section 47. It is not disputed that so far as the present appeal is concerned, it is the old provisions which continue to govern its adjudication. Some times objections are filed under Order 21 Rule 58 C. P. C and the claimant or the objector claims and if he succeeds in proving that the property sought to be attached is not liable to be attached and the objector or the claimant tries to show that the property was in his possession and it was not in the possession of the judgment-debtor or of some person in trust for him or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, or that being in the possession of the judgment-debtor at such time it was so in his possession, not on his own account or as his own property, but on account of or in trust for some other person, or partly on his own account and partly on account of some other person, the Court shall make an order releasing the property, wholly or to such extent as it thinks fit, from attachment under Order 2l Rule 60 C. P. C. When the claim or objection is rejected under Order 21 Rule 61 C. P. C. then the claimant or the objector is entitled to file a suit under Order 21 Rule 63 C. P. C. to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute.
3. Now, in the facts of the instant case, it is obvious that the objection to the attachment of the amount in question was upheld by the execution court. It is not clear as to whether any formal objections were filed to the execution applications. It seems when the execution applications were moved seeking the attachment of the said sum, the execution court was intimated from tehsil Amroha (where the money stood deposited as land revenue) that the amount could not be attached at is stood deposited as land revenue. Thereupon the execution court rejected the execution applications. It is. therefore, not clear from the record that any separate objections under Section 47 were filed by the judgment-debtor. It is also not clear whether any objections under Order 21 Rule 58 C. P. C. were filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. If objections under Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. had been filed and they were allowed under Order 21 Rule 60 C. P. C. then the decree-holder would have been bound to file a suit under Order 21 Rule 63 C. P. C. within a periodof one year from the date of the order whereby the property is released from attachment. However, when there is no attachment of the property then Order 21 Rule 58 C.P.C. is not applicable.
In the facts of the instant case, there was no attachment at all. The execution court refused to allow the decree-holder's prayer for attachment of the amount in question and rejected his execution application. The order in such a case clearly fell under Section 47 C.P.C. and, therefore, it was appealable as decree and decree-holder did file an appeal. The appeal also however was dismissed. The appellate court wrongly observed that the decree-holder could file a separate suit to seek a declaration about the attachability of the amount in the execution of the decree. However, such wrong observation will not allow the plaintiff to claim in favour of the maintainability of the suit if in law such a suit is not otherwise maintainable. However, for the sake of argument, even if it were held that such a suit could be treated to be one as maintainable under Order 21 Rule 63 C.P.C. on the ground that the refusal of the execution application to allow the amount to be attached was equivalent to an order passed under Order 21 Rule 60 C. P. C., still, the suit would be barred by time as the execution applications were rejected on 29-3-1962 and the suit was filed in Dec. 1963 i. e. more than a year after the decision of the execution court. The plaintiff sought to bring his suit within limitation on the ground that the appellate court had dismissed his two appeals in Feb. 1963 but this is not permissible because if the suit were to be really treated under Order 21 Rule 63 C. P. C. then the impugned order which should provide the starting point of limitation would be the order passed or deemed to be passed under Order 21 Rule 60 C. P.C. Against such an order no appeal lay. Such an order is final subject to the decision in a suit filed under Order 21 Rule 63 C.P.C. In this view of the matter, the suit, if treated to be under Order 21 Rule 63 C. P. C., was barred by time. However, as I have stated above, in my opinion, the order whereby the execution applications were dismissed on the ground that the amount in question was not attachable was really an order under Section 47 C. P.C. and against that the decree-holder had a right of appeal which he did exercise and he could file a second appeal on the questions of law. He, however, did not do soand filed the instant suit which, in law, was not maintainable.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the order dismissing the execution applications could not operate as res judicata on the basis that if the amount sought to be attached were really land revenue payable by the judgment-debtor, only then the order passed under Section 47 would amount to res judicata in reference to the subsequent suit but if the amount was not land revenue legally payable by the judgment-debtor to the State then the said order under Section 47 could not be res judicata in reference to the subsequent suit. I am unable to accept this contention. Strictly, we are not concerned with res judicata. It is the bar contained in Section 47 C. P. C. with which we are concerned. The suit was barred because the question of the attachability or otherwise of the amount in dispute could be raised in the proceedings under Section 47. The dispute related to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree. Hence, a regular suit was barred. Moreover, even on the question of res judicata learned counsel seems to suggest that the doctrine of res judicata is dependent on a correct decision being delivered in the earlier proceedings. This is not so. Even if the decision in the earlier proceedings be wrong, still it will operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceedings provided the necessary conditions for the applicability of the principle are satisfied. In the execution proceedings it was held that the amount was not attachable on the ground that it had been deposited as land revenue it was held that irrespective of the question whether the amount could validly be deposited as land revenue by the judgment-debtors, the fact that it was deposited as land revenue was held sufficient for the finding that the amount was not liable to be attached. The approach and the finding of the execution court might have been wrong but then the remedy was to go up in appeal and not file an independent suit to question the correctness of the said finding.
5. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.