John Edge, Kt., C.J. and Banerji, J.
1. In this case land was taken under the compulsory provisions of Act No. X of 1870. The parties could not agree as to the amount of compensation, nor could they agree as to the apportionment of the compensation, and accordingly the Collector of Pilibhit referred the matter, under Section 15 of the Act, to the Court of the District Judge of Bareilly for determination. The District Judge settled the amount of the compensation, and he also decided the proportions in which the parties interested, within the meaning of Section 39 of the Act, were entitled to share in such amount. One of the claimants, namely, Musammat Husaini Begara, claimed to be entitled to the whole of the compensation awarded. The District Judge awarded her only a portion of the compensation. From that decision of the District Judge, Musammat Husaini Begam appealed to this Court. When the appeal was called on for hearing before a Division Bench, the learned vakil for the respondents, relying upon the decision of this Court in Kishan Lal v. Shankar Singh Weekly Notes 1888 p. 170, raised an objection to the hearing of this appeal on the ground that the appeal did not lie, as Husaini Begam's right to share in the compensation was not only not admitted, but was disputed. The Division Bench doubting the correctness of the decision in Kishan Lal v. Shankar Singh referred to the Full Bench the question whether the appeal lay. The learned Judges who decided in Kishan Lal v. Shankar Singh that the appeal in that case did not lie were under the impression that no appeal lay under Section 39 of Act No. X of 1870, as to the apportionment, if the title of the appellant to share in the amount awarded was disputed and not admitted. Those learned Judges overlooked the definition of Section 3 of Act No. X of 1870. By that section a 'person interested' is thus defined: 'The expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act.' What the Judge has to do under Section 39, so far as the apportionment is concerned, is to 'decide the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in such amount.' Such amount is the amount of compensation which has been settled, There is nothing in the section to suggest that the Judge should not decide, as between rival claimants to compensation, whether those claimants respectively claim the whole amount or a proportionate part only, all questions of title upon which their right to share in the amount and the proportion to be awarded to them respectively, would depend. The definition clause shows that the words 'person interested' are not confined to persons whose title to share in the amount awarded has been admitted. In our opinion the judgment of the Court in Kishan Lal v. Shankar Singh was wrong. The High Court at Bombay has held in Kashim valad Kamal Naik v. Aminbi kom Gavasumiya and the Collector of Belgaum I.L.R. 16 Bom. 525, that an appeal lay in a case under such circumstances, the case before the Court being one in which each of the claimants laid claim to the entire amount of the compensation, consequently denying the title of the other to any share in the compensation. It is also dear from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rajah Nilmon Singh v. Bam Bundhoo Roy L.R. 8 I.A. 90, that, subject to the appeal given by Section 39 of Act No. X of 1870, the decision of the Judge under that section is final and cannot be questioned by a suit, and that the proviso to Section 40 only applies to the cases of persons whose rights have not been determined under the earlier clauses of the Act, such as minors or persons under disability who did not appear at the inquiry as to the amount to be awarded as compensation. This is a further reason, if further reason were required, why we should interpret Section 39 as giving a right of appeal in such a case as this, and our opinion is that the appeal in this case lay. With this answer to the question submitted to the Full Bench the appeal will go back for disposal to the Bench which referred the case.