M.C. Desai, J.
1. The applicant was ejected when he was a minor in 1953 under the U. P. Tenancy Act. On attaining majority he filed a suit giving rise to this writ petition for possession under Section 183 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. On that date the suit was time barred. He claimed that the period of limitation for the suit began on the date on which he attained majority. In other words, he sought the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act.
The Board of Revenue held that Section 6 did not apply in a proceeding governed by the U. P. Tenancy Act and that consequently the period of limitation could not be computed from the date on which he attained majority. Sri J. N. Chatterji contends that this view of the Board of Revenue was wrong.
2. The U. P. Tenancy Act is a special or local law laying down its own periods of limitation for the suits brought under it. Under Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply to any suit under the U. P. Tenancy Act, but Section 6 will not apply unless it was made applicable. The U. P. Tenancy Act has not made Section 6 applicable to a suit brought under it. Sri J. N. Chatterji, however, contended that Section 3 itself lays down that subject to the pro-visions of certain sections including Section 6, a suit brought after the expiry of limitation prescribed for it in the schedule shall be dismissed as barred by time.
What he meant was that on account of these words Section 6, as well as other sections enumerated in Section 3, become automatically applicable in a suit to which Section 3 would apply. What Section 3 lays down is that a suit brought after the expiry of period of limitation prescribed for it in the schedule must be dismissed, except in the circumstances mentioned in Sections 4 to 25. The provisions of Sections 4 to 25 are by way of exception to the provisions of Section 3. Section 29 lays down that the provisions contained in Section 3 shall apply, and those of Section 6 shall not apply, to a suit covered by the U, P. Tenancy Act.
There is no conflict between the provisions of Section 3 and of Section 29; while laying down that the limitation for ordinary suits will be governed by the provisions of Section 6, the Legislature could, and did, lay down that limitation for suits under special and local Acts will not be governed by them. The benefit of the exception contained in Section 6 has been expressly withheld by the Legislature from persons proceeding under local and special Acts. Therefore, the exception contained in Section 6 cannot be availed of in a suit under the U. P. Tenancy Act. Any other interpretation of the words 'subject to the provisions' occurring in Section 3 will render meaningless and void of contents the provisions of Section 29 (2). Section 3 of the Limitation Act applies to every suit and if its applicability compulsorily brought with it the applicability of the provisions of Sections 4 to 25, there would have been no sense in enacting the provisions of Section 29 (2). The Board of Revenue rightly held that the applicant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act. In any case the view taken by it cannot be said to be so manifestly wrong as to justify our interference with it.
3. The petition is dismissed.