Skip to content


Mt. Duiji Kunwar Vs. Mt. Baila Kunwar and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1932All460
AppellantMt. Duiji Kunwar
RespondentMt. Baila Kunwar and ors.
Excerpt:
- - as the appeal has substantially failed, we allow costs, including counsel's fees in this court on the higher scale, to the respondents......occupancy tenants and that defendant 1 has made without the consent of the plaintiff a perpetual lease to defendants 2 and 3. we consider that under section 121, agra tenancy act, it is open to the plaintiff to sue defendant, for a declaration in regard to plaintiff's rights in this tenancy. it is further open to the plaintiff to sue under section 44 of that act for the ejectment of persons such as defendants 2 and 3 whom she alleges to be occupying the plots of land without her consent. as the plaintiff does not definitely say that defendants 2 and 3 are i in possession through a lease, the plaint could allege, as the present plaint does, that the relief of ejectment of defendants 2 and 3 should be granted if they are found to be in possession. we consider 'that this would.....
Judgment:

Bennet, J.

1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by the lower appellate Court on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The plaint set forth that the plaintiff was the daughter of one Earn Shukul who died some 13 years ago and his brother Deo Saran had previously died. The plaintiff claimed that she had entered into possession of certain occupancy plots which had originally belonged to the two brothers. The plaintiff stated that defendant 1 Mt. Baila Kunwar, widow of Deosaran had been entered for the occupancy holding. Further that on 18th September 1918 zamindars of the mahal admitted the rights of the plaintiff and defendant 1 as occupancy tenants. Para. 5 set forth that on 3rd August 1927 defendants second party Nand Kishor and Ram Adhar instigated Mt. Baila Kunwar to give them a perpetual lease which she did in respect of the plots mentioned in the plaint, and that the plaintiff had not consented to that lease. The plaint further set forth that defendants 2 and 3 had not obtained possession of any of the plots and that the plaintiff was still in possession. The relief asked for was that:

on establishment of the plaintiff's rights a decree invalidating the perpetual lease, dated 3rd August 1927, registered on 7th September 1927, may be passed in favour of plaintiff, and her possession over the plots, specified below may be maintained and in case of proof of dispossession a decree for possession may be passed.

2. The principal question before us is whether the suit of the plaintiff should be brought in the Revenue Court or in the civil Court. It was filed in the Court of the Munsif who decreed the suit in part. Both parties appealed and on first appeal the lower Court adopting the plea of the defendant in appeal held that the Revenue Court alone had jurisdiction. Under Section 230, U.P. Act 3 of 1926 if the cause of action is one in respect of which adequate relief might be granted by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked from the civil Courts may not be identical with that which the Revenue Court could have granted. We therefore have to see whether the Revenue Court could substantially grant the relief for which the plaintiff asks. To ascertain jurisdiction, as has been frequently held, we should regard allegations in the plaint. The allegations are that the plaintiff and defendant 1 are joint occupancy tenants and that defendant 1 has made without the consent of the plaintiff a perpetual lease to defendants 2 and 3. We consider that under Section 121, Agra Tenancy Act, it is open to the plaintiff to sue defendant, for a declaration in regard to plaintiff's rights in this tenancy. It is further open to the plaintiff to sue under Section 44 of that Act for the ejectment of persons such as defendants 2 and 3 whom she alleges to be occupying the plots of land without her consent. As the plaintiff does not definitely say that defendants 2 and 3 are I in possession through a lease, the plaint could allege, as the present plaint does, that the relief of ejectment of defendants 2 and 3 should be granted if they are found to be in possession. We consider 'that this would substantially cover all the reliefs for which the plaintiff' asks. Under Order 1, Rule 3, Civil P.C., which applies to revenue suits under general provisions in the Tenancy Act (Section 264), all persons might be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction is alleged to exist. In the 'present case the cause of action is the perpetual lease and the remedies against all the defendants arise out of that one transaction. We consider therefore that ion the allegations in the plaint adequate remedy can be granted by the Revenue Court. We therefore hold that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain 'this suit, and we direct that the plaint 'should be returned to the plaintiff to file in the proper Court if so advised. As the appeal has substantially failed, we allow costs, including counsel's fees in this Court on the higher scale, to the respondents.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //