John Stanley, C.J. and William Burkitt, J.
1. The plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal has arisen sued the appellant, the Maharaja of Jaipur, as also the representatives of his late agent Captain Man Singh, to recover arrears of pay alleged to be due to him as His Highness' agent. The plaintiff in his plaint says that Captain Man Singh, who was the manager of the Maharaja, on the 13th of: January 1895 appointed him agent at a salary of Re. 130 per month to look after the legal work of the temple at Bindraban which belongs to the appellant. His Highness the Maharaja filed a defence to the suit, and amongst other pleas averred that the suit could not be brought against him according to law, and that the Government of India could not grant sanction under Section 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the institution of a suit for money against his state. The defence of His Highness was struck out under Section 136 of the Code on the ground that he had not complied with certain directions of the Court, and the suit was proceeded with ex parte, with the result that a decree was given against His Highness alone, the other defendants being exempted from liability to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. From this decree the present appeal has been preferred, and amongst other grounds the following has been pressed before us, namely, that 'the sanction granted for the institution of the suit was illegal, inasmuch as the claim being for money due on account of salary not charged on immovable property, did not come within the category of suits for the institution of which sanction could be granted under Section 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure.' It appears that sanction was granted on the 24th of December 1903 in these terms: 'This is to certify that under the provisions of Section 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Governor General in Council consents to a civil suit being instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Agra against His Highness the Maharaja of Jaipur by Lalji Sahai for the recovery of arrears of pay alleged to be due to him as His Highness' agent.' This purports to be signed by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. It will be observed from this certificate that the consent was for the institution of a suit for the recovery of arrears of pay and for no other purpose. Section 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which this consent is expressed to have been given, provides for the institution of suits against Princes or Chiefs and other person, and enables the Governor General in Council to consent to the institution of suit against such persons, providing that such consent may be given with respect to a specified suit or to several specified suits, or with respect to all suite of any specified class or classes, and may specify in the case of any suit or class of suits the Court in which the Prince, Chief, Ambassador or Envoy may be sued. But there follows this important restriction, vis., 'the consent shall not be given unless the Prince, Chief, Ambassador or Envoy (a) has instituted a suit in the Court against the person desiring to sue him, or (b) by himself or another trades within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or (c) is in possession of immovable property situate within those limits and is to be sued with reference to such possession or for money charged on that property.' As to (a), no suit such as is referred to in it has been instituted by the defendant appellant. As to (b), there is no allegation in the plaint that the defendant appellant either himself or by another trades within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, and as to (c), although the defendant appellant is in possession of immovable property situate within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Agra, the suit is not with reference to such possession, or for money charged on the property of which he is so in possession, He is simply sued in this case for arrears of pay said to be due to the plaintiff as his servant. Under these circumstances it is clear that the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, inasmuch as it was not one falling within the purview of Section 433 and could not be maintained by virtue of the consent given by the Government of India. It is unnecessary for us to consider the other grounds of appeal. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and dismiss the suit as against the appellant with costs in both Courts.