Walsh and Wallach, JJ.
1. The plaintiffs in this case sue for a declaration that they are in possession of plot No. 351 in mauza Sukhpura and that they are the muafidars of that holding. In the alternative they sue for possession. At the last settlement in the year 1883 the plot was entered as the fixed rate tenancy of defendants Nos. 1 to 9, who sold their rights and title in the plot to defendant No. 10, who resisted the suit and is appellant in this Court. The plaintiffs had applied in the Revenue Courts to have the entry altered, but were unsuccessful. Both the lower courts held that as a matter of fact the entry in the year 1883 was due to a mistake and they further held that they were not prevented by Section 9 of the Tenancy Act from going into this matter. They based their decision on the ruling in the case of Jai Nath Pathak v. Kalka Upadhya (1912) I.L.R. 34 All. 285. Section 9 lays down that every entry at the last revision of records before the commencement of this Act, recording a person as a fixed rate tenant, shall be conclusive proof, and so on. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs in this Court that that Section has only application in suits between zamindars and tenants and that it has no application to the present case as the zamindar is not a party to the suit. The learned vakil relies in support of the contention on the ruling already referred to, as well as on Selected Decisions of the Board of Revenue, No. 2 of 1909. In these cases there was no dispute as to the nature of the tenancy which has been entered at the time of settlement. The dispute was as between persons who claimed to be entitled to the tenancy as entered in the record of rights. We fully agree with the general principles laid down in these cases, and even if we did not agree, we would be bound to follow the decision in the case of Jai Nath Pathak v. Kalka Upadhya (1912) I.L.R. 34 All. 285. But the present case differs from cases cited in that in these cases there was no dispute as to the nature of the tenancy in the village papers, whereas the whole point in the present case is that the plaintiffs claim that the nature of the tenancy as entered in the last settlement was wrongly entered and that it should be declared that that entry was a mistake. The section may, and undoubtedly on occasions does lead to hardship when there are cases of admitted mistakes, but when a section clearly lays down that an entry is conclusive proof, we are precluded from going behind it or even deciding whether the original entry is due to a mistake or not. In the view we have taken of the applicability of Section 9 to the facts of the case, it is not necessary to consider the other point which has been argued. Having regard to what has been said above the appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs' claim is dismissed with costs in all courts.