T.S. Misra, J.
1. This revision arises in the following circumstances. Ved Prakash, Plaintiff-opposite Party, filed a suit against the Nagar Mahapalika Lucknow, the defendant-applicant for a peuranent injunction restraining the Nagar Mahapalika from removing the stall constructed by him on the plot of land which he alleged to have obtained on rent from the Nagar Mahapalika. The plaintiff also obtained an interim order against the Nagar Mahapalika on 14th May, 1971 for maintaining status quo. That order was confirmed on 30th November, 1971. The Nagar Mahapalika filed its written statement in the suit on 5th February, 1972. The suit was however dismissed for default on 27th April, 1973. But on the motion of the plaintiff the order of dismissal was set aside and the suit was restored to its original number on the same date namely, 27th April, 1973. While the suit was still pending the Nagar Mahapalika removed the stall from the land in question on 7th October 1974 and dispossessed the plaintiff from that land. The plaintiff then moved an application before the trial court on 19th October 1974 for a direction to the Nagar Mahapalika to restore the stall and the possession of the land to him so that he may do his business and earn his livelihood. This application was moved under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notice was issued to the defendant but no objection was filed by it The learned Munsif relying on the uncontroverted affidavit of the plaintiff held that the defendant had disobeyed the court's order; hence the plaintiff was entitled to get back the possession. He therefore ordered that the defendant should restore the possession to the plaintiff of the disputed plot and the stall which had been removed illegally. Against that decision the Nagar Mahapalika filed a revision in the court of the District Judge Lucknow. That revision was dismissed by the First Additional District Judge, Lucknow. Aggrieved, the Nagar Mahapalika has preferred this revision.
2. For the applicant Nagar Mahapalika it was urged that on dismissal of the suit for default on 27th April, 1973, the temporary injunction did not survive. Hence the defendant had not committed any breach of the injunction order. Consequently the tidal Court had no jurisdiction to direct the defendant under Section 151 of the Code of the Civil Procedure to restore the possession of the land in question and the stall. For the plaintiff-opposite party relying on Hari Nandan v. S. N. Pandita : AIR1975All48 it was urged that the trial court could pass an order under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to undo the wrong done to the plaintiff in whose favour the temporary injunction order had been issued.
3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it would be useful to recall that the order granting interim injunction was passed on 14th May, 1971 and it was confirmed on 30th November, 1971. The suit was, however, dismissed for default on 27th April, 1973. The order of dismissal for default was set aside and the suit was restored on 27th April, 1973. The Nagar Mahapalika removed the stall and dispossessed the plaintiff from the land in question on 7th October, 1974, when the suit was pending. Hence it on the setting aside of the dismissal order and the restoration of suit to its original number the interim injunction order stood revived, the Nagar Mahapalika acted in disobedience of the injunction order. But if the injunction order did not revive on the setting aside of the dismissal order and the restoration of the suit, the Nagar Mahapalika cannot be said to have committed breach of the injunction order. The basic question for determination, therefore, is whether the temporary injunction order revived on the setting aside of the order of dismissal for default and on the restoration of the suit to its original number.
4. As long ago as 1887 a question of similar nature arose for consideration before this Court in Chunni Kuar v. Dwarka Prasad, (1887 All WN 297). It was observed therein that an attachment before judgment like a temporary injunction becomes functus officio as soon as the suit terminates. Again, a question pertaining to attachment before judgment came up for consideration before this Court in Ram Chand v. Pitam Mal, ((1888) ILR 10 All 506). Relying on Chinni Kuar's case (supra) that principle wasreiterated with approval. The other High Courts also considered this question in a number of cases. Finally, the question was raised in Abdul Hamid v. Karim Bux before this Court as to whether on the dismissal of a suit in default in attachment before judgment automatically lapsed and a fresh attachment was necessary on the restoration of the suit, or whether on the restoration of the suit the attachment previously made is revived or is survived. This question was referred to a Full Bench of the Court. The majority view was that on the dismissal of suit in default the attachment before judgment automatically ceases and a fresh attachment is necessary on the restoration of the suit (see Abdul Hamid v. Karim Bux : AIR1973All67 ). The Full Bench quoted with approval a Full Bench decision of Mysore High Court in Gangappa v. Boregowda, (AIR 1955 Mys 91) (FB) wherein it was laid down that:
'An attachment before judgment is in the nature of an order. It is an extraordinary relief granted to a plaintiff even before his claim is adjudicated upon and found to be true and if a suit is dismissed either for default or on its merits by the trial Court and the attachment before judgment has therefore to cease, he can certainly have not as much grievance as a person who has obtained a decree and attached property of the judgment-debtor whose right to attached property has been questioned and decided in summary proceedings and which are made expressly subject to a decision in a regular suit. Moreover, it cannot also be urged that all interlocutory orders like say those passed on applications for temporary injunction the operation of which would have to cease on the dismissal of a suit, would automatically be revived or can be deemed to be in force without any further orders by an appellate Court or by the same Court after the suit is dismissed. To hold so would lead to obvious and real difficulties. It is not also as though the plaintiff in such a case has no remedy. He could always apply to the same Court if a suit which has been dismissed for default is restored to file or to an appellate Court which has also ample powers to grant an order of attachment before judgment under the provisions of Section 107(2), Civil Procedure Code.'
It has thus been a consistent view of this court that an interlocutory orderlike an order passed on an application for temporary injunction or for attachment before judgment would cease on the dismissal of the suit and would not automatically be revived nor can be deemed to be in force without any further order by the court after the suit is dismissed. It is always open to the plaintiff to move the court if the suit which had been dismissed for default is restored, to grant temporary injunction. But the earlier interim injunction order which had ceased to be operative on the dismissal of the suit for default, would not automatically revive on the setting aside of the dismissal order and the restoration of the suit. In the instant case, the interim injunction order passed on 14th May, 1971, and confirmed on 30th November, 1971, ceased to be operative on 27th April, 1973, when the suit was dismissed for default. That injunction order did not automatically revive when the suit was restored to its original number. That being so, it could not be urged that the Nagar Mahapalika acted in violation of the said interim injunction order while it demolished the stall of the plaintiff and dispossessed him from the land in question. Since the defendant had not committed breach of any interim injunction order, there was no occasion for the trial court to exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in directing the Nagar Mahapalika to restore the possession of the land and the stall in question to the plaintiff. It can scarcely be disputed that if there was a subsisting interim injunction order and the Nagar Mahapalika had acted in disobedience thereof, the trial court had the jurisdiction to undo the wrong and order the restoration of the land and the stall in question to the plaintiff under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Hari Nandan v. S. N. Pandita : AIR1975All48 (supra) there was an operative interim injunction order and the defendant had wilfully disobeyed the same. It was, therefore, laid down therein that where the plaintiff has been dispossessed by the defendants by wilfully disobeying the interim injunction order restraining them from dispossessing the plaintiff, the Court which issued the order can be in exercise of its inherent power after considering the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties pass such order in the ends of justice as would undo the wrong done to the plaintiff in whose favour the injunction order had been issued. In the case at hand, there was no operative interim injunction order on 7th October, 1974. The trial Court therefore, in the circumstances of this case, had no jurisdiction to direct the defendant to restore the possession to the plaintiff of the disputed plot and the stall which had been removed therefrom. Even if the stall had been removed illegally from the land in question, the plaintiff could not seek the restoration of its possession by moving the court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as there was no subsisting interim injunction order against the Nagar Mahapalika and the action complained of was not in wilful disobedience of any injunction order issued by the court against it. The order of the trial court was, therefore, unsustainable.
5. The learned Additional District Judge fell in error in holding that the ancillary order of injunction 'will revive with the suit itself, as the Court had no intention of withdrawing the injunction at the time of the dismissal of the suit with a view of not reviving it with the revival of the suit'. He was also wrong in distinguishing the cases of Abdul Hamid v. Karim Bux : AIR1973All67 (supra) as also the case of Raj Chander v. Ramesh Kishore : AIR1965All546 and in placing reliance on Shivaraya v. Sharnappa, (AIR 1968 Mys 283). The learned Additional Judge was bound to follow the decisions of this Court. The order passed by him affirming the order of the trial court is also not sustainable.
6. In the result, the revision is allowed with costs and the order dated 6th February, 1975, passed by the First Additional District Judge as also the order dated 22nd November, 1974, passed by the learned Munsif are set aside.