V. Bhargava, J.
1. These two connected second civil appeals arise out of two separate Suits Nos. 60 of 1943 and 61 of 1943 instituted in the Court of Munsif, East Hardoi for pre-emption of a sale-deed dated 23rd February 1942 executed by two persons, Becha Singh and Chotta Singh in favour of four persons, Anant Ram, Dhani Ram, Hira Lal and Mt. Gaya Kuer. In Suit No. 60 of 1943, the right of pre-emption was claimed by the appellants of these two appeals. In Suit no. 61 of 1943 the right of pre-emption was claimed by respondents 1 and 2, Faqirey Singh and Mang Din. It appears that the appellants and these two respondents had equal and concurrent rights of pre-emption. The trial Court held that Faqirey and Mang Din were estopped from pre-empting the sale on the ground of acquiescence and only the appellants were entitled to a decree for pre-emption. The lower appellate Court differed from the trial Court and held that Faqirey Singh and Mang Din were not estopped from claiming the preemption and, therefore, granted a decree for pre-emption in favour of the appellants as well as the respondents, Faqirey Singh and Mang Din. The appellants in these two appeals only challenge the finding of the lower Court in so far as it granted the right of pre-emption to Faqirey Singh and Mang Din respondents also.
2. The right of pre-emption of Faqirey Singh and Mang Din was contested by the appellants on the ground that they acquiesced in the sale with the full knowledge of its details and, therefore, they could not pre-empt the sale. It appears that Faqirey Singh and Mang Din identified the vendors before the Sub-Registrar when the sale-deed in dispute was registered. The trial Court, from the circumstance of identification of the vendors, inferred that Faqirey Singh and Mang Din had knowledge of the sale deed and, therefore, held that they were estopped from pre-empting the sale. The lower Court has held that the circumstance of identification of the vendors by Faqirey Singh and Mang Din did not lead to the inference that they knew the contents of the sale-deed and, therefore, there-was no question of acquiescence or estoppel. In these second appeals it was contended that, in giving this finding, the lower appellate Court had committed an error of law. This argument does not have any force. There was no direct evidence that the sale-deed was read out to the vendors in the presence of Faqirey Singh and Mang Din. Reliance was placed merely on the endorsement of the Sub-Registrar which said that the vendors had heard the deed read out and had been identified by Frqirey Singh and Mang Din. There is a possibility that, at the time when the document was read out, Faqirey Singh and Mang Din may not have been present while they were present at the time when they identified the vendors. While such a possibility exists, it cannot be held that the lower Court has committed any error of law in drawing the inference that the mere identification of the vendors did not lead to the inference that Faqirey Singh and Mang Din knew the contents of the sale-deed. The question of knowledge of Faqirey Singh and Mang Din was a question of fact and it is concluded by the finding of the lower Court.
3. There is no force in these appeals. The appeals are dismissed with coats.