R.S. Pathak, J.
1. The petitioner was allotted chak No. 61 in proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Respondents Nos. 4 to 6 were allotted chak No. 44. They filed an objection under Section 20(2) but the objection was dismissed. Then an appeal was filed before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the appeal was partly allowed and the chak was altered. The order of the Settlement Officer was made on March 14, 1963. A second appeal was then filed by the respondents before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It was treated as a revision application and resulted in further modification of the chaks. The order of the Deputy Director disposing of the revision application is dated June 21, 1963. The petitioner Mas challenged that order by the instant petition for certiorari.
2. The first question agitated before me is that the revision application before the Deputy Director was liable to be governed by Section 48 as it stood before its amendment on March 8, 1963 and consequently the Deputy Director had no jurisdiction to go into questions of fact and decide whether one chak or another had been properly constituted. The answer to this question is to be found in Section 47 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963. This Act substituted a new jurisdiction in Section 48 in place of the old. Whereas formerly the revisional jurisdiction extended only to errors of jurisdiction and to procedural irregularities or illegalities in the exercise of that jurisdiction, it was now considerably enlarged. If the case falls for consideration under the provisions of Section 48 as they stood before March 8, 1963, when the amendment Act came into force, the impugned order of the Deputy Director is clearly without jurisdiction. It is however, immune from challenge on the ground of want of jurisdiction if the conclusion is that the new section 48 applied.
Now, Section 47 (1) of the Amendment Act declares that in units notified under Section 4 of the principal Act prior to the date on which the Amendment Act comes into force, all work in regard to, or connected with, consolidation operation beyond the stage of publication of the statement of proposal under section 20 of the principal Act, where on or before the said date that statement had already beenpublished shall be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act (namely, the unamended Act) as if the Amendment Act had not come into force. Then there is a proviso which reads:
'Provided that, as respects second appeals and revisions, which lay under the provisions of the principal Act, as it stood prior, to its amendment by this Act but had not been instituted before the said date, the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply and be deemed always to have applied as if this Act had been in force on all material dates.'
Now it seems to me, upon a consideration of the aforesaid provisions of Section 47 (1), that where an order disposing of a first appeal has been passed before March 8, 1963 and a second appeal has also been filed before that date, the unamended Act will apply, but where the orderdisposing of the first appeal was made before March 8, 1963 and a second appeal or revision lay against that order but was not filed before March 8, 1963. then the case must be disposed of under the amended Act. There is no dispute between the parties so far. But where the order disposing of the first appeal is made after March 8, 1963, the petitioner says that the unamended Act applies while the case of the respondents is that it is the amended Act which comes into operation. The question must be determined by reference to the meaning of the expression 'second appeals and revisions, which lay under the provisions of the principal Act, as it stood prior to its amend ment by this Act' in the proviso to Section 47 (1). In my opinion, that expression points to those provisions of the statute which provide for second appeals and revisions. It cannot he confined to cases where a second appeal or revision is provided for by statute and the order proposed to be challenged in second appeal or revision has been made before March 8, 1963 and although such second appeal or revision could have been filed before that date, it was not instituted before that date If the broader interpretation is given to the expression set out above, it will be more in accord with the general intention behind section 47 (1).
To my mind, the intention appears to be that only in those cases where the first appeal had been decided before March 8, 1963 and a second appeal or revision had been filed before that date the unamended Act applied; because, in the contemplation of the Legislature, the proceedings had moved to a stage of sufficient maturity so as to justify the continuation of the application of the unamended law. The Legislature was, it seems, reluctant to disturb the even application of the law to those proceedings. But in proceedings which had not reached that stage, for example where although the order disposing of the first appeal had been made before March 8, 1963. No second appeal or revision had yet been filed, the amended Act was made applicable The pendency of a first appeal on March 8, 1963 relates to an even earlier stage and consequently, it seems to me, that a proceeding challenging an order upon such appeal would also be governed by the amended Act. Upon such interpretation, any anomaly would be obviated. Accordingly, I hold that the revision application against the order dated March 14, 1963 was governed by Section 48 as it stood amended after March 8, 1963. That being so. the petition must fail.
3. No other point has been pressed before me.
4. The petition is dismissed with costs.