Satish Chandra, J.
1. This is an application under Section 561-A Cr. P. C., which prays that this Court may, in the ends or Justice, order that criminal Revision No. 1247 of 1964 (Ganga Prasad v. State and another) be heard at Allahabad and be not sent to the Lucknow Bench of the High Court.
2. The petitioner filed the criminal revision on 3-8-1964, before the Bench entertaining fresh matters at Allahabad. The same day the record was ordered to be summoned. Next day the petitioner deposited the costs of summoning the record which was accepted by the office of the Court.
3. It appears that on 5-8-1964 the Hon'ble the Chief Justice passed the following order on the criminal revision:
'List the case before the Lucknow Bench for order. Transfer it to Lucknow.'
On 10-8-1964 the petitioner filed the present application. It states that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has passed the following administrative order on 29-7-1964:
'Lucknow Bench exists for trying cases pertaining to Oudh and even if a case is filed at Allahabad there is no reason why it should not be listed for hearing before the Lucknow Bench, so those cases will always be listed before the LUCknow Bench for hearing and should be transferred there. Whenever such a case is filed there should be endorsed on it the following order: 'List the case before the Lucknow Bench for order. Transfer it to Lucknow.' and it should be got signed by me.'
4. In pursuance of this general order, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice passed the aforementioned order dated 5-8-1964 in the petitioner's Criminal Revision No. 1247 of 1964.
5. The Criminal Revision aforesaid is directed against the appellate order of the Temporary Sessions Judge of Sultanpur. The district of Sultanpur was within the jurisdiction of the Oudh Chief Court. The U. P. High Courts (Amalgamation) Order 1948 amalgamated the Allahabad High Court and the Oudh Chief Court and created a new court designated as the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The new High court has been vested a jurisdiction running throughout the territories of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Clause 14 of the Amalgamation order states that:
'the new High Court and the Judges and the division Courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places ....... as the ChiefJustice may .... . appoint.'
The first proviso to this clause provides that normally such Judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice, may from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time vested in the New High Court.
6. This proviso confers powers on the Chief Justice to nominate the Judges who will sit at LUCKNOW, it also authorises the Chief Justice to indicate the classed of cases as also the particular areas of Oudh in respect of which the Judges Bitting at Lucknow shall exercise Jurisdiction and powers of the High Court.
7. In union of India v. Chheda Lal Ram Autar : AIR1958All652 a Full Bench of this Court held that the Bench at Allahabad was competent to entertain an appeal in respect of a case arising in the district of Bara Banki, though it was an area in Oudh wherefor the Bench at Lucknow could also exercise Jurisdiction.
8. On 5-5-1961 the Chief Justice in exercise of his powers conferred by Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order 1948, directed that with effect from July 8, 1961 the Bench of the High Court at Lucknow, shall exercise jurisdiction and power in respect of all cases . . ... . arising within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the District and Sessions Judge, Failzabad.
9. In Shital v. State of U. P., 1964 All L. J. 448 the competency of the order dated 5-5-1961 was challenged. a Single Judge of this Court referred to a larger Bench the question whether the said order was ultra vires and without jurisdiction. Before the larger Bench it was conceded that if it was held that the Impugned order does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Lucknow Bench, its vires would not seriously be challenged. The Division Bench of this Court interpreted the order dated 5-5-1961, as follows:
'All that the order dated 5-5-1961 lays down is that cases from district Faizabad can be heard at Lucknow. That order does not touch the jurisdiction of the Bench at Allahabad. In spite of the order dated 5-5-1961, it would he open to the Bench at Allahabad to dispose of the application dated 2-12-1963 from district Faizabad under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C.'
Ultimately the Bench held that the order dated 5-5-1961 was neither ultra vires nor without jurisdiction as it did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Lucknow Bench and in spite of that order it is possible to have an application under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. from district Faizabad disposed of by the Court at Allahabad.
10. In the present petition it is stated that the petitioner filed the Criminal Revision at Allahabad on the basis of the Full Bench decision in Chheda Lal's case : AIR1958All652 as also the Division Bench decision in the case of 1964 All LJ 448 as a result whereof the position was that Benches of the High Court sitting at Allahabad had jurisdiction to entertain and to finally dispose of cases arising in areas of Oudh. The petition goes on to state that in Criminal Appeal No. 616 of 1964, Nanku v. State, Hon'ble Mr. Justice D. S. Mathur by his order dated 16-3-1964 (All) at the time of the admission of the appeal observed that 'when the appeal has been filed at Allahabad it can be heard here.'
11. The petition further states that on 5-8-1964 Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. K. Verma in a civil revision arising from district Rae-Bareli which is admittedly situate within Oudh, overlooked the administrative order of the Hon'ble the Chief justice and at the time of its admission, passed an order that the revision shall be heard at Allahabad.
The petition characterises the Chief Justice's order dated 29-7-1964 as an administrative order and asserts that it is illegal and without jurisdiction as it seeks to override the judicial pronouncement of a Division Bench in the case of 1964 All LJ 448. In substance the petition seeks to challenge the validity of the administrative order dated 29-7-1964 passed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
12. At the hearing learned counsel urged that the impugned order dated 29-7-1964 in effect circumvents the decision of the Division Bench in Shital's case 1964 All LJ 448. It is also urged that the impugned order attracts the provisions of Ch. III Rule 8 Sub-rule (e) of the Rules of Court. Ch. III is headed 'Executive and Administrative business of the Court.' Rule 8 says that on the following matters all Judges shall be consulted, namely-
(e) important questions of policy or those affecting the powers and status of the Court :
13. It is urged that the impugned order was one relating to an important question of policy and it also affected the powers and status of the Court. A long and sinuous argument was advanced to the effect that Ch. v. Rule 1 of the Rules of the Court, which authorises the Chief Justice to constitute Benches and to allot them work, and Ch. VI Rules 5 and 6 of the Rules of the Court which authorises the Chief Justice to issue directions in respect of preparation of the list of cases ready for hearing as also the daily cause list containing the list of cases which may be heard by the different Benches of the High court as also stating the hour at which and the room in which each Bench should sit, do not entitle the Hon'ble the Chief justice to pass the impugned order. Several other submissions were also made. It is not necessary to enumerate them all or express any opinion on their merits, in the view that I have taken as to the maintainability of the petition.
14. This application is under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. This Section preserves the inherent powers of the High Court for the purpose of giving effect to any order under the Cr. P. C. , or to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of Justice. It means that the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary for the aforementioned purpose.
15. The question is whether a Bench of the High Court can pass an order under this Section, an order touching the executive and the administrative business of the Court. The High Court can pass an order under this Section acting as a Court. It can pass a Judicial order; an administrative direction is foreign to the purview and scope of Section 561-A Cr. P. C. The prayer in the petition is that this Court be pleased to order that the revision should not be sent to Lucknow but be heard at Allahabad. To me it appears to be plain that the petitioner seeks an order which touches the executive and the administrative business of the Court.
16. In substance the petition seeks the setting aside of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice's order dated 29-7-1964 for lack of competence. The impugned order is admitted to be an administrative order. In Kula Chandra Dutt v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Pat 191, Hon'ble B. P. Sinha, J. (who rose to be the Chief Justice of India) held that:
'Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. comes into operation when the impugned order is passed by a Court. If the order moved against in the High Court is one passed by an executive officer of the Crown in his administrative capacity, Section 561-A is not attracted.'
17. If the High Court cannot, under Section 561-A Cr. P. c. Interfere with administrative orders passed by the subordinate executive officers. It seems still more difficult to hold that the High Court caln interfere, revise or review administrative orders passed by a Bench or by the Chief Justice of the High Court.
18. Section 561-A Cr. P. C. confers no new powers on the High court. It only preserves its pre-existing inherent powers. Inherent powers of the High court are as much controlled by precedent and principle as are its express powers by statute.
19. The abovementioned decision by Hon'ble S. K. Verma, J., was given in a civil case--not under Section 561-Cr. P. C. It does not recite or discuss the provision under which it purports to have been made, it seems to be an order given per incurium. It, to my mind, does not have any efficacy as a precedent.
20. In my opinion, this application under Section 561-A Cr. P. C is not maintainable. It is accordingly rejected in limine.