Knox, A.C.J., and Pramada Charan Banerji, J.
1. The plaintiff in the court of first instance is the respondent here. He brought a suit in the Revenue Court in which he prayed that he might be declared proprietor of a disputed muafi and that costs, etc., might be granted to him. The court of first instance dismissed his claim altogether. He then went in appeal to the District Judge of Cawnpore who ordered that the decree of the lower court, that is to say, the court of first instance, dated the 13th of March, 1916, be set aside and the appeal be allowed to the extent that the plaintiff was entitled to be declared rent-free grantee of so much of the land in suit as the was then entered in the revenue papers as occupancy tenant of the same. The order, however, did not stop here. It went on as follows:--' That the suit be, remanded to the lower court for determination of the revenue payable by the plaintiff appellant.' The defendant has now come to this Court and asks that the decree of the lower appellate court be set aside and the decree of the Assistant Collector be restored or any other order that may be deemed fit, may be passed. Various pleas were then set out attacking the judgment of the District Judge. Upon the appeal being called on in this Court for hearing a, preliminary objection was at once raised on behalf of the plaintiff respondent, namely, that no second appeal lies from the order of the District Judge. In support of the contention stand was taken upon Section 193 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901; and it was contended on the ground set out in Clause (a) of Section 193, that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the procedure in suits and other proceedings under the Rent Act. Our attention was called to the case of Vilayat Husen v. Maharaja Mahendra Chandra Nandy ((1905) I. L. R. 28 All.), and Gulzari Lal v, Latif Husain ((1916) I. L. R. 88 All 181.). The learned Vakil for, the appellant meets this objection by maintaining that he is not appealing from any order, but from a decree, and so seeks to bring the case away from Clause (a) of Section 193. He dwelt a great deal upon the hardship that, if it was held otherwise, he would have no remedy. Be that as it may, we are here not to make law but to expound it as it stands and it appears to us that the only meaning we can put upon Clause (a) of Section 193 of the Rent Act is that no appeal lies from an order of this kind. He contended that the decision of the District Judge of Cawnpore was in reality a preliminary decree. We have considered this, but we are unable to agree with it. The Tenancy Act says nothing from first to last about preliminary or final decrees. The result is that the objection prevails and the appeal is dismissed with costs. There is a cress-objection but we have heard nothing about it from the beginning of the case up to this moment. It stands dismissed.