1. This is an application in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against a decree of the Small Cause Court Judge of Kasganj dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's suit against the defendant-respondent on the basis of a promissory note.
2. The plaintiff was admittedly the holder of the promissory note and Section 78 read with. Section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 26 of 1881 enacts that such a note can only be discharged by payment made to the holder of the instrument. There can be no doubt that the lower Court should not have allowed evidence to show that the promissory note was not really executed in the plaintiff's favour or evidence that the note had been discharged by payment to the person really interested. This was held in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar  30 Mad. 88. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the decision of the suit by the lower Court was not according to law.
3. The question, however, arises whether the mere fact of the decision not having been according to law will justify interference in revision. The power to revise conferred by Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is a discretionary power and it has been ruled by a Full Bench decision of this Court, Muhammad Bakar v. Bahal Singh  13 All. 277, that there should be no interference under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act 'unless it clearly appears that some substantial injustice to a party to the litigation has directly resulted from a material misapplication or misapprehension of law or material error in procedure in the Court of Small Causes.'
4. Now, any decree passed on a wrong view of law must cause a substantial injury to a party whose suit is dismissed by reason of that mistake. But this injury is not necessarily an injustice. In the present case the lower Court found that the plaintiff was not entitled in justice to recover the money as he made no payment to the debtor and as the debtor had paid the real person in consideration of whose loan the promissory note was executed. In these circumstances I am unable to hold that the dismissal of the suit caused a substantial injustice to the applicant. I am bound by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court referred to above to hold that Section 25 of the Act must not be invoked in the absence of such substantial injustice.
5. Accordingly this application is dismissed but as no one appears for the opposite party I make no order as to costs.