Omprakash Trivedi, J.
1. This Civil Revision has been filed by the Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P. under Section 6-B of the Court Fees Act and arises from an order dated 21-8-1968 passed by the Civil Judge, Unnao, rejecting his opinion on the question of deficiency in court-fees by holding that the court-fees paid on the plaint by the opposite party was sufficient. The suit out of which the present revision arises was filed by the Zila Parishad, Unnao, against the State of U. P. and another. The subject-matter of dispute is open land with a building, well etc. According to the plaintiff the building on the disputed land was constructed with funds belonging to the erstwhile District Board of Unnao and the land as well as building and well in dispute have been and are in the plaintiff's possession. The plaintiff has received a notice of resumption of this property from the defendants who claimed that the land is Nazul property and the building was constructed with public donations. The plaintiff denied that this is Nazul property and, contested that it could not be resumed and alternatively they contend that work of permanent character having been put up, land could not be resumed under law even if the Zila Parishad was not found to possess any right or title thereto. On these facts the plaintiff claimed a decree for declaration that it is the owner of the suit property and permanent injunction by which the defendants may be restrained from interfering with its possession.
2. The plaintiff paid maximum court-fees prescribed by law on the relief of declaration and separate court-fee on the relief of injunction on the ground, as stated in the plaint itself, that injunction was being claimed as an independent relief. During the trial the Chief Inspector of Stamps raised an objection that the plaintiff-opposite party had not paid the court-fees required by law. In his opinion the relief of injunction was consequential to the relief of declaration and, therefore, court-fee was liable to be paid under Section 7(iv)(a) of the Court Fees Act on the market value of the immovable property in suit. This opinion of the Chief Inspector of Stamps was not accepted by the Civil Judge who relied upon the case of Murli Dhar v. Bansidhar : AIR1963All86 and distinguished the case of Vibhuti Narain Singh v. Municipal Board, Allahabad : AIR1958All41 on which reliance was placed by the Chief Inspector of Stamps.
3. I have heard for the State the learned Chief Standing Counsel and for the opposite party-plaintiff Sri Umesh Chandra Srivastava, learned Advocate for the Zila Parishad. The question for determination it whether the relief of injunction was a consequential relief within the meaning of Section 7(iv)(a) of the Indian Court Fees Act. The Full Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the case of Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P., Allahabad v. Mahanth Laxmi Narain : AIR1970All488 overruled the earlier Full Bench case of this Court in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal : AIR1932All485 and laid down that in order to ascertain the real nature of the reliefs claimed, the substance of the plaint has to be considered. It was further held that the words 'consequential relief imply that the other relief should be one which flows directly from the declaration which the plaintiff desires to be made which means that the plaintiff should be entitled to the other relief only as a necessary consequence or result of granting of the declaratory relief. The other relief must be so dependent on the declaratory relief that it cannot be allowed if the principal relief is refused.
Applying this test, It is clear to me that the relief for injunction claimed by the opposite party could not be held to be 'consequential relief' within the meaning of Section 7(iv)(a) of the Court Fees Act. No doubt the plaintiff asserted his own right or title to the disputed property denying that the property was Nazul, but the plaintiff also raised an alternative plea that even if the land was not found to belong to it and was Nazul building of permanent character having been put, the property was no longer resumable. It is on this second alternative plea also that the plaintiff claims relief of injunction. If the plaintiff had not raised an alternative plea and it had claimed injunction only on the basis of ownership then certainly the relief of injunction could be regarded as consequential relief inasmuch at the relief of injunction could not be granted Unless the plaintiff was found to possess title or in other words relief of injunction would have flowed from a declaration of title in its favour. But this cannot be said when the plaintiff may ask for the relief of injunction on the second ground, having failed to establish its title or right in the property. If the plaintiff succeeds in the second alternative plea then it will be entitled to injunction independently of any declaration of right in its favour. In that view of the matter and having regard to the pith and substance of the plaintiff's claim the relief of injunction, cannot, to my mind, be held to be consequential relief as urged for by the petitioner. The lower court appears to be right in the view that the case of Vibhuti Narain Singh : AIR1958All41 (Supra) did not apply for in that case there was a positive finding that the relief of injunction could not be granted in the absence or Independently of, the declaration of existence of right in favour of the plaintiff.
In the present case, upon the view which I take, injunction can be granted independently of any declaration of right in favour of the plaintiff. The decision in the case of Murlidhar : AIR1963All86 (Supra) appears to apply to the case. In that case the plaintiff had claimed injunction on the ground that certain resolutions passed by the defendants in a meeting held in its absence were ultra vires ab initio void and without jurisdiction. As the relief of injunction could, therefore, be granted on the success of this plea independently of any declaration of right in favour of the plaintiff, it was held that injunction was not consequential relief and court-fees could be payable in terms of Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, as here.
4. I, therefore, find that there is no substance in the petition which is liable to be dismissed and held that the court-fees paid by the plaintiff-opposite party is sufficient and in accordance with law. The petition is dismissed. There shall be no order, as to costs.
5. The record of the case shall be sent down at a very early date to the Civil Judge, Unnao.