A. Banerji, J.
1. Two contentions have been raised by the learned counsel for the applicant : Firstly, that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to entertain or allow a revision against an order passed under Order 21, Rule 100 of the Civil P. C. and, secondly, that even on the merits the order was without jurisdiction, as the Court below misread and misconstrued the evidence on record and thereby erroneously set aside the order of the execution Court.
2. To appreciate the contentions, it will be relevant to set down a few facts, Smt. Brahma Wati filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,090/- and for possession over two shops. This suit was filed against one Om Prakash. The suit was decreed on the 29th Sept., 1969 and the appeal filed by Om Prakash was dis-missd by the District Judge, Bijnor, by his order dated 22nd Oct., 1970. The decree was put in execution and Smt. Brahma Wati got possession over the property in question. The present applicant, Ghasita moved an application under Order 21, Rule 100 of the Code claiming that he had been illegally dispossessed and prayed for being put back in possession of the shops in question. This application was allowed by the execution Court. Smt. Brahma Wati filed a revision, which was allowed by the II Additional District Judge, Bijnor by his order dated 8-11-1975, holding that Ghasita had failed to establish his rights in the shops and the objection ought to have been dismissed by the execution Court. This revision is directed against the above order.
3. In support of his contention that the revision was not maintainable, learned counsel for the applicant referred to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 103 of the Code before its amendment by the 1976 Amending Act, which provided for the filing of a suit to establish the right and the words 'subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive.' It is true that a party other than the judgment-debtor aggrieved by an order made under Rr. 98, 99 or 101 may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the present possession of the property. The execution court in the present case had passed an order under Rule 101 ordering Ghasita to be restored to possession. Therefore, a suit could be instituted by Smt. Brahma Wati, but it will be noticed that Rule 103 uses the words 'may institute a suit' and not the words 'shall institute a suit.' The question arises whether in every case where an order is passed under Rr. 98, 99 or 101 the only remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a suit or can he take recourse of Section 115 of the Code. In my opinion, it will not be correct to hold that the suit is the one and the only remedy in such a case.
Any order passed under the Code, which is not amenable to appeal, is revis-able under Section 115 of the Code, provided the requirements of the said section are fulfilled. If the order is without jurisdiction or if the order has been passed as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction or where the order has been passed with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction, the Court can certainly interfere with the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The revisional jurisdiction has been given to a superior Court for the purpose of seeing that the lower Courts keep within bounds of their jurisdiction and do not in the course of proceedings pass orders, which are palpably erroneous because of wrong exercise of jurisdiction. Why should a party be relegated to a long drawn process of a suit when the error can be corrected by the superior Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction? If an order is patently erroneous because of an illegal exercise of jurisdiction, it ought to be corrected at the first opportunity. Why should the matter be left to be corrected in the suit or in the appeal therefrom. Of course, it goes without saying that the order can be revised, provided it comes within the four corners of Section 115 of the Code. Where the case is decided without considering the material placed or in disregard of the evidence or where the Court takes a patently mistaken. view or omits to decide relevant points or decides points which do not properly arise or where the Court pursues a procedure which results in failure of justice or in an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, the order can certainly be interfered in a revision, notwithstanding that there is a provision for the filing of a suit under Rule 103 of Order 21 of the Code. I am supported in this view by the decision of K. B. Asthana, J. (as he then was) in Hira Lal v. Hari Narain, (AIR 1964 All 302). It was observed (at p. 307) :
'As I have found above that in the present case the Court below has not at all properly approached the case and has in arriving at the result in favour of the objector Hari Narain omitted to take into consideration several pieces of evidence filed on behalf of the auction purchasers applicants or at any rate has not given sufficient and proper consideration to the same and has taken into consideration materials which could not be legally taken into consideration in arriving at a finding in favour of the objector Harj Narain it does appear to me that in exercise of this jurisdiction the Court below has acted with material illegality and irregularity vitiating the result.'
There was an interference in the revisional jurisdiction by the Court in the above case notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 103 of Order 21 of the Code.
4. In the present case also the approach by the execution Court has not been proper and material pieces of evidence have not been considered by the execution Court. That Court had not considered the fact that Jai Prakash was the own brother of Om Prakash and Ghasita claimed to be a tenant of Jai Prakash. The execution Court failed to consider that the lease deed on which reliance was placed by Ghasita was not the deed which was mentioned in his objection. The description of the shops was patently wrong. Further, the execution Court had not compared the boundaries of the premises to see whether they tallied. The execution Court has not considered the matter which has been traversed in the judgment in suit holding that Jai Prakash had absolutely no rights in the property. It was not held that Jai Prakash was in possession or had any rights in the same. Ghasita claimed his rights through Jai Prakash, but Jai Prakash was not shown to have any rights in the property. The failure of the execution Court to consider these matters certainly vitiated its conclusion. It certainly had placed heavy reliance on the date of taking possession. That, in my opinion, would not be very material. An execution Court considering the application under Order 21, Rule 100 of the Code must consider the matter carefully and properly and not casually. Valuable rights of the parties are involved in that adjudication and it is, therefore, necessary that the relevant material is considered before a decision is given. In the present case, it appears that the execution Court had not applied its mind as was required and failed to consider material pieces of evidence pointed out above. Consequently, its order could be revised. Even on the merits, the order of the execution Court was liable to be revised and corrected.
5. Section 115 of the Code is discretionary. It is not necessary for the revi-sional Court to exercise its jurisdiction in each and every case where it finds an illegality in exercise of jurisdiction. If the Court comes to the conclusion that substantial justice has been done, it may decline to interfere. Having considered the orders passed by the Courts below and the contentions raised at the Bar, I am satisfied that even otherwise this is not a fit case in which the powers of this Court under Section 115 of the Code should be exercised. Substantial justice has been done. The decree-holder ought not to be deprived of the fruits of his decree, and particularly by a person, who does not appear to have any right in the property in dispute. In the circumstances of the case, I would decline to interfere with the order passed by the Court below.
6. In the result, therefore, the revision fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.