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Chunni Singh Vs. Lakshpat Singh - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1926All468; 94Ind.Cas.320
AppellantChunni Singh
RespondentLakshpat Singh
Excerpt:
- .....set of vendors. among these vendees was one kanchan singh, who admittedly was a cosharer in the property purchased by him. the plaintiff has brought a suit for pre-emption against the appellant chunni singh only in respect of the item of the property purchased by him under the sale-deed. this property was separately ear-marked as property having been purchased by chunni singh, a separate amount of the sale consideration was mentioned and the other vendees had no joint interest in this property at all. the first court dismissed the claim on the ground that this was a case of partial pre-emption which disqualified the pre-emptor from obtaining a decree. the appellate court, in the view of the specification of the shares in the sale-deed, has come to a contrary conclusion.2. although it.....
Judgment:

Sulaiman, J.

1. This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for pre-emption. By one document, dated 29th January 1924, nine items of properties were sold to nine different vendees for different amounts of considerations; but there was only one document executed and registered, as the entire properties belonged to one set of vendors. Among these vendees was one Kanchan Singh, who admittedly was a cosharer in the property purchased by him. The plaintiff has brought a suit for pre-emption against the appellant Chunni Singh only in respect of the item of the property purchased by him under the sale-deed. This property was separately ear-marked as property having been purchased by Chunni Singh, a separate amount of the sale consideration was mentioned and the other vendees had no joint interest in this property at all. The first Court dismissed the claim on the ground that this was a case of partial pre-emption which disqualified the pre-emptor from obtaining a decree. The appellate Court, in the view of the specification of the shares in the sale-deed, has come to a contrary conclusion.

2. Although it is true that there was only one document executed there can also be no doubt that different items of properties were sold to different persons and, therefore, there were really nine different contracts, although they were all evidenced by one document. It cannot be doubted that, if a suit were brought by the plaintiff against Kanchan Singh, he could successfully resist the claim on the ground that he was cosharer in the property purchased by him. The mere fact that he has allowed the other vendees to be joined in the sale-deed would in no way have deprived him of his right. The contention before us is that it was the duty of the plaintiff to have brought the suit against all the other vendees; that is to say, all the vendees other than Kanchan Singh. This contention cannot be accepted. If this transaction is to be deemed to consist of nine different transactions with nine different persons, then it was certainly open to the plaintiff to object to one vendee and not the others. He would, therefore, have a right to claim pre-emption against Chunni Singh, even though he has chosen not to object to the coming in of other strangers. That this was the view before the new Pre-emption Act was passed cannot be doubted. We may only refer to the case of Lachhman v. Tulsi Ram (1905) 2 ALJ 199 where, although one solitary amount was mentioned in the sale-deed for two items of properties, at the foot of the document details were separately given. It was held by a learned Judge of this Court that it was open to the plaintiff to maintain a claim for pre-emption of either of the two properties, although both had been purchased by the same vendee. The case of Brij Narain Rai v. Ram Dhari Rai AIR 1917 All 101 is distinguishable, because there properties in two mahals were sold for one consideration and there was apparently no specification of the different prices for the two mahals.

3. Lastly it is contended that the enactment of Section 16 of the new Act has altered the position. We cannot accept this contention. The law has in no way been altered. As against the defendants-vendees the plaintiff could not have claimed pre-emption in respect of any property which he has not included in this suit. The provisions of Section 22 also go to suggest that where a purchaser has a defined interest in the sale-dead, he cannot be said to have acquired the property jointly with others. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, Civil P.C.


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