1. This special appeal is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge, dated January 10. 1968, whereby he allowed writ petition No. 619 of 1963.
2. One Roshan Lal was a sirdar of the land in dispute. On July 18, 1955, he deposited Rs. 340/- which, according to him, was ten times the land revenue and applied for a declaration that he had, become a bhumidhar of the land. On July 20, 1955, he executed a sale deed in favour of one Basdeo and another sale deed on October 30, 1955 in favour of one Puranmal. Before an order could be passed on his application and the issuance of bhumidhari sanad. Roshanlal died on December 30, 1956. During consolidation operations, an objection was filed under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by the collaterals of Roshanlal who were the petitioners in the writ petition. They claimed that the plots in dispute were wrongly recorded in the names of the vendees as Roshanlal had no power to execute sale deeds on the dates on which the sale deeds were executed. The objection was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer and that order was affirmed on appeal by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and on revision by the Joint Director of Consolidation.
3. The respondents Nos. 8 and 9 then filed the writ petition out of which this appeal has arisen. They prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the consolidation courts.
4. The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the objections taken by the petitioners before him, were well founded and that until the certificate had actually been issued. Roshanlal had no right to execute the sale deeds mentioned above. He allowed the writ petition and remanded the case for decision afresh in accordance with law. The vendees have filed this appeal.
5. Mr. S. N. Kacker, learned counsel for the appellants, has relied upon Kulan Jan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, 1967 All WR (HC) 609. This decision is by a learned Single Judge of this Court and it fully supports the contention of Mr. Kacker, namely, that Roshanlal had full power to execute the sale deeds. There is, However, one vital difference. In Kulan Jan's case, the amount which had been deposited was the full amount, that is to say, ten times the land revenue payable. In the present case, the amount deposited on July 18, 1955, was Rs. 340/-which was undoubtedly ten times the land revenue payable. A certain cess at the rate of 0.54 P. Per annum was also payable and this case by virtue of Section 247-A of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') must be deemed to be part of the land revenue payable within the meaning of Sections 245, 246 and 247 of the Act. It should be borne in mind that Section 134 of the Act does not define what land revenue is. In order to find out what those words exactly mean, we have to go to Sections 245, 246 and 247 of the Act. The result is that there is no escape from the conclusion that the cess payable was part of the land revenue payable. It is undisputed in the case before us that the deficiency of Rs. 5.40 (ten times the cess payable) was made good on January 28, 1957, that is to say, after the death of Roshanlal. On the same date, an order granting bhumidhari sanad was passed and the sanad was also issued. It is, therefore, futile to contend that once the order was passed and the certificate was granted in pursuance of it, Roshanlal must be deemed to have acquired bhumidhari rights on July 18. 1955, that is to say, the date on which he deposited Rs. 340/-. No right could accrue at all until the entire amount payable was deposited and this was really done on January 28. 1957.
6. There is one other reason why It is not possible to accept the argument of Mr. Kacker. In Banshidhar v. Smt. Dhirajdhari, 1971 All LJ 937 = (AIR 1971 All 526) (FB) it has been held that a sirdar, who has made an application under Section 134 of the Act and has made the necessary deposit, acquires the status of a bhumidhar when the Assistant Collector makes the order of the grant of a certificate and that the event of actual issuance of the certificate is immaterial. Admittedly, in the case before us, the order granting the certificate was passed on January 30, 1957, this is to say after Roshan Lal's death and that certificate could confer no right upon Roshan-lal to execute the sale deeds in dispute.
7. In our view, the decision under appeal is perfectly correct and this appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.