P.N. Bakshi, J.
1. Smt. Champa Devi filed a suit under Section 20.2 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against the petitioner. That suit was decreed, Consolidation operations started thereafter. Objections were filed by Imam Uddin claiming to be Sirdar of the disputed land. Smt. Champa Devi claimed to be the Bhumidhar of the said land. On 16-8-1960 the Consolidation Officer rejected the objection of Imam Uddin. On 1-10-1960, appeal filed by Imam Uddin was dismissed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Thereafter, on 29-1,2-1960 the Deputy Director dismissed the second appeal filed by Imam Uddin. A revision was again filed before the Joint Director (C) by Imam Uddin which was dismissed on 29-5-1962. It appears that after the decision of the Joint Director dated 29-5-19&2 the village was denotified under Section 52 of the Consolidation of the Hold-Ings Act. On 20-5-1970 Smt. Champa Devi again filed a suit under Section 229-B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for the declaration that she was the Bhumidhar of the land in suit. In the alternative a prayer was mada for possession. This suit was contested by Imam Uddin who claimed to have become Bhumidhar by virtue of his long standing possession for the last 30 or 40 years. A plea was also taken that the suit was barred by limitation. The Assistant Collector First Class decreed the suit of the plaintiff vide his judgment dated 11-9-1972, Aggrieved thereby, an appeal was filed by Imam Uddin which was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner on 30-4-1973. A second appeal was filed thereafter by Imam Uddin which has also been dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 31-8-1973 hence this writ petition.
2. I have heard counsel for the parties and have also perused the impugned orders. The sole question which has been argued before me by the petitioner's counsel is that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The view taken by the revenue courts is that the period of limitation for the filing of the suit in question would accrue from the date of decision of the writ petition by the High Court that is on 18-9-1967. They have repelled the contention of the petitioner that the period of limitation would commence from the date of denotification that is from the year 1962. From a perusal of the pleadings of the parties as they emerge on a consideration of the impugned orders (the original pleadings not having been filed before this court by any of the parties) it appears that the plaintiff has alleged that in spite of the decision of the Consolidation Courts in her favour, the defendant in collusion with the patwari has got the incorrect entries made in the revenue papers and was asserting his title over the land in suit. A relief for declaration, was sought in this suit and in the alternative a prayer for possession was also made. On the face of it, the suit having been instituted on 23-5-1970 there can be no doubt that the case of the plaintiff pertained to the period of time after denotification of the village in question. Section 52 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act runs as follows:--
'(1) As soon as may be after fresh maps and records have been prepared under Sub-section (2) of Section 27, the State Government shall issue a notification in the official Gazette that the consolidation operations have been closed in the unit and the village or villages forming part of the unit shall then cease to be under consolidation operations.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) any order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Constitution of India, or in cases or proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under Sub-section (1) shall be given effect to by such authorities as may be prescribed and the consolidation operations shall, for that purpose be deemed to have not been closed.'
3. A perusal of this section indicates that on the issue of a notification under Section 52 of the Act the consolidation operations pertaining to a particular unit comprising of village or villages shall be closed and it shall cease to be under consolidation operations. An exception however, has been made in Sub-section (2) with respect to writs which have been filed under the provisions of the Constitution obviously before the High Courts. This exception is limited to the extent that if any order is passed in a writ petition it shall be given effect to by the consolidation authorities, and for that purpose the consolidation operation shall be deemed not to have been closed. This section is not an absolute fetter on the rights of a person to file a suit for declaration after the close of consolidation operations by virtue of the issue of a notification under Section 52 of the Act. The case of Smt. Champa Devi appears to be that in spite of the decisions of the consolidation courts Imam Uddin has colluded with the patwari and has got incorrect revenue records prepared and was asserting his title over the land in suit. There is nothing on the record to indicate that a suit of this nature could not be instituted after the close of the consolidation operations in the village. Section 52 of the Act would have a bearing only to the extent that when the High Court modifies an order passed by the consolidation authorities, the consolidation authorities have to give effect to it in its records. This section to my mind, cannot be stretched to mean that a declaratory suit in respect to a cause of action accruing after the issuance of a denotification under Section 52 cannot be filed merely because a writ petition is pending disposal in the High Court in computing the period of limitation for any suit the institution of which has been stayed by an injunction order the time of the continuance of the injunction order can be excluded under Section 15 of the Limitation Act. Such is not the case here. The High Court had decided the writ petition on 18-9-1967. The village had been denotified in the year 1962. It is not the case of the parties that any interlocutory orders had been passed by the High Court which restricted the rights of Smt. Champa Devi to institute a suit for the declaration of her rights under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that even though there can be no specific direction by the High Court yet the dispute pending before it related to the same subject-matter, that is the same plot in question in which the parties were claiming Bhumidhar rights on the one hand and Sirdari rights on the other. I am not inclined to accept this submission for two reasons. In the first place, even if we assume the dispute to be the same, in the absence of any specific prohibition in the nature of an interlocutory stay order passed by the High Court, no advantage can be given to the plaintiff under Section 15 of the Limitation Act; secondly, the nature of the case indicates that the dispute was not the same. The grievance in the instant suit under Section 229-B of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act filed by Smt. Champa Devi was that Imam Uddin had got incorrect entries made in collusion with the patwari and was thus asserting his title to the plot in dispute on the basis of these entries. These entries which have been made obviously after the denotification of the village could not possibly form the subject matter of dispute in the earlier consolidation proceedings out of which the writ petition was pending in the High Court. For these reasons I do not agree with the submission of the respondent's counsel. In my view too period of limitation in the circumstances of the present case would commence from the date on which the village in question was denotified that is from the year 1962, Admittedly, as the law stood at that relevant point of time, six years limitation was provided for filing a suit of the nature filed by the plaintiff Smt. Champa Devi. Since this suit has been filed on 23-5-1970 much beyond the six years period of limitation, it is clearly barred by time. Thus the impugned orders which are being challenged in this writ petition are legally erroneous on the face of the record.
5. This writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned judgments and orders passed by the Assistant Collector dated 11-9-1972, Additional Commissioner dated 30-4-1973 and the Board of Revenue dated 31-8-1973 are hereby quashed. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs.