Wali Ullah, J.
1. This is an application in revision under Section 276, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. It arises under the following circumstances: The applicant, Chhote Lal, obtained a decree in respect of the arrears of land revenue against one Mt. Munia, widow of Narpat deceased. It appears that the applicant Chhote Lai was a lambardar of the Mohal and Mt. Munia was in possession holding a widow's estate of the share of her husband Narpat, in this village. The lambardar paid the land revenue to Government in respect of the share held by Mt. Munia as well Thereafter, as mentioned already, he obtained a simple money-decree for recovery of the amount said to have been paid as land revenue on behalf of Mt. Munia. Mt. Munia then died and Bholar alias Pehlwan succeeded to the property of Narpat deceased as a reversioner. The applicant decree-holder proceeded to execute the decree which he had obtained against Mt. Munia by attachment and sale of the property of her husband in the hands of the reversioner, namely Bholar. Bholar raised objections to the effect that the decree obtained against Mt. Munia was essentially a personal simple decree and therefore it could not be executed against the property of Narpat in his hands. The reply to the objections of Bholar was that there was a charge created in favour of the lambardar decree-holder and the decree could therefore be executed by way of an enforcement of the charge. Reliance was also placed on Section 141, Land Revenue Act. The learned Assistant Collector dismissed the objections and held that the decretal amount could be realised from the estate of Narpat in the hands of the reversioner Bholar alias Pehlwan. Bholar went up in appeal to the learned Civil Judge who was of the opinion that the decree obtained by Chhote Lal was a personal decree against Mt. Munia and it could not be executed and the amount realised from the estate of Narpat in the hands of Bholar, the reversioner. In this view of the matter he allowed the appeal with costs throughout.
2. I have beard learned Counsel for the parties. It is strongly contended on behalf of the applicant that the payment of land re-venue by Mt. Munia was a matter of legal necessity. It must, therefore, be held that the decree obtained by the applicant - which undoubtedly was in respect of the sums paid by the applicant as lambardar to Government as land revenue in respect of the share held by Mt. Munia - must be considered to be binding upon the property of Narpat in the hands of the reversioner which undoubtedly Bholar is. My attention has also been invited to the provisions of Sections 141, 142 and 143, Land Revenue Act. It seems to me, however, clear that the provisions of these sections do not help the applicant. Section 141 which provides for the land revenue of a Mohal being the first charge on the entire Mohal and on the rents, profits or produce thereof, does not govern a case like the present. As has been held by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in Mallaha Khan v. Gulab Singh : AIR1936All184 , Section 141, Land Revenue Act, applies when the revenue is payable to Government or when the Collector takes proceedings under Section 184 of that Act on behalf of a lambardar. It is not intended to apply to a decree-holder under Section 221, Agra Tenancy Act, 3[III] of 1926' On the main question whether a charge of any sort or kind would arise, in view of the ruling of this Court cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent in favour of the decree-holder, in circumstances like the pre-sent, I am of opinion that the answer to this question must be clearly in the negative. In Dhiraj Singh v. Manga Ram ('97) 19 All. 300 it has been held that the creditors of a Hindu widow cannot after her death have recourse to ancestral property in the hands of the reversioners, in respect of which property the widow had enjoyed only a widow's life-estate, if in fact no instrument charging the property beyond the widow's lifetime has been executed by the widow, even though the debt sued upon was incurred for legal necessity and was one in respect of which such property might have been made liable beyond the widow's lifetime. The learned Judges pointed out that the creditor if he had chosen could, before lending his money, have obtained from the Hindu widow the security of the ancestral property by obtaining a mortgage. But this he failed to do. Their Lordships repelled the contention advanced on behalf of the creditor to the effect that the advance made by him to the Hindu widow of money for the payment of Government revenue was an advance made for such necessary purposes as would have enabled the Hindu widow to have made a mortgage of the ancestral property, which would not have been limited to her own interest. It was pointed out in that case that the creditor lent his money on the personal liability of the widow and the defendants (the reversioners) having no assets of the widow in their hands, the plaintiff (the creditor) could not get a decree against them. Again, in Shiamanand v. Har Lal ('96) 18 All. 471, two learned Judges of this Court in a case very similar to the one before me held in effect that the lambardar could proceed to recover the amount paid by him as Government revenue on behalf of the widow in possession of her husband's estate, against the reversioner as widow's representative out of the assets, if any, which had come to the reversioner from the widow. In that case one Gauri Dat, a separated sonless Hindu, died possessed of certain zamindari property, which passed to his widow Janki (sic : whose) name was also recorded in the revenue papers. During Mt. Janki's possession the lambardar of the village paid certain Government revenue due by Mt. Janki in respect of the property left by Gauri Dat. Mt. Janki died and the property in question passed to Shiamanand as the reversioner of Gauri Dat. The lambardar thereupon sued Shiamanand for the recovery of the money which he had paid on behalf of Mt. Janki. On these facts it was held that the only decree to which the lambardar was entitled was a decree against Shiamanand, the reversioner, as widow's representative payable out of the assets, if any, which came to the reversioner from the widow. In the course of this judgment their Lordships referred to Full Bench case in Chitor Mal v. Shib Lal ('92) 14 All. 273, where it was held by a majority of the Fall Bench that a payment by a lambardar or other third person of the Government revenue of a eosharer who was in default did not give the person who paid a charge on that cosharer's property. In view of the principles enunciated in the authorities mentioned above, it must be held that Chhote Lal had in effect nothing but a personal decree against the widow and such a decree could be executed and the decretal amount realised only from the assets of Mt. Munia, if any, which came into the hands of Bholar alias Pehlwan; in other words the decree could not be executed against Narpat's property to which Bholar alias Pehlwan succeeded as a reversioner after the death of Mt. Munia. Learned Counsel for the applicant has invited my attention to a ruling of two learned Judges of this Court in Parathnath v. Rameshweer Pratap Sahi : AIR1938All491 in which it was held at p. 838:
If a Hindu widow acts expressly or by implication on behalf of her husband's estate and as representing it, and borrows money for legal (necessity and the creditor deals with her on that footing and obtains a decree against her, the decree is, in substance, a decree against her husband's estate and it is capable of execution by attachment and sale of his property even where she has contracted a simple loan.
Even where a widow has contracted a simple loan and has not specifically charged her husband's estate, the creditor may so frame his suit as to make it clear that he is suing the husband's estate represented by the widow who had contracted the debt in suit for legal necessity and therefore for the estate. If the creditor so frames his suit it is open to the reversioners to intervene and to contest his claim if it is put forward in the lifetime of the widow. If they do not do so, the decree obtained against the widow in the absence of fraud and collusion is virtually a decree against the estate and is binding not only on the widow but on the reversioners also. The test, therefore, is whether the widow was sued as a representative of the estate of the last male owner or in her personal capacity.
3. Judged in the light of the principles enunciated in the last mentioned case, it appears to me, on an examination of the present case, that the question of legal necessity was never raised in either of the two Courts below nor is there anything to indicate that the suit filed by the applicant Chhote Lal wherein he obtained the decree in question against Mt. Munia was so framed as to make it clear that he was suing the husband's estate represented by the widow who had incurred the liability with regard to the payment of land revenue in respect of her share in the zamindari property. The test laid down by their Lordships in the last mentioned case is, therefore, not satisfied in the present case. I, therefore, do not see how this ruling can assist the applicant in the present case.
4. In view of the above, I am clearly of the opinion that there is no force in this application. It is accordingly dismissed with costs.