Pramada Charan Banerji and Ryves, JJ.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit for redemption brought under the circumstances mentioned in detail in the judgment of the court below. It is unnecessary to repeat all the facts, and it h sufficient to say that on the 21st of December, 1864, one Iradat-ullah made a usufructuary mortgage of certain shares in four villages, one of which was the village Gangapur. The present suit is for the redemption of that village. The equity of redemption in one of the mortgaged villages, namely, Pul Ratni, was sold by auction and purchased by one Mazhar Ali in 1874. He sold it in 1882, and the share which he purchased ultimately came to one Sarju Singh. In 1887, Sarju Singh brought a suit for redemption and got a decree for redemption of all the four mortgaged villages and obtained possession in 1891. The present appellant, Wazir Ali, is the purchaser of the rights of Sarju in Gangapur and he is in possession by virtue of his purchase. In 1873 the share in Gangapur was purchased at auction by Kali Charan, defendant No. 15, who sold it to the plaintiff on the 11th of October, 1913. By virtue of this purchase the plaintiff brought the present suit on the 18th of May, 1915, for redemption of Gangapur as against Wazir Ali, who is in possession of that village. He has made other persons parties to the suit, and one of these is Musammat Saidan Bibi, the second appellant, the widow of Iradat-ullah, the mortgagor. The court of first instance decreed the claim and the degree of that court was confirmed by the lower appellate court.
2. The first contention raised before us on behalf of the appellants is that the claim is time-barred. This point is concluded by the authority of the Full Bench decision in Aahfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali (1889) I. L. R., 14 All., 1. This case has been followed in subsequent cases by this Court, and we as a Divisional Bench are bound by it. Following that ruling, we must hold that the limitation applicable to a suit of this description is that provided by Article 148, namely, sixty years from the date on which the mortgage became capable of redemption. It is contended that the word 'co-mortgagor' should not be extended to a purchaser of the equity of redemption. We are unable to agree with this contention. All persons who have stepped into the shoes of the original mortgagor are 'co-mortgagors' for all purposes, and therefore the rule laid down in the Full Bench case is applicable to the present case, which is that of a purchaser of the equity of redemption in a part of the mortgaged property.
3. Tue learned Counsel for the appellant referred to the case of Jai Kishan Joshi v. Budhanand Joshi (1915) I. L. R., 38 All., 138. That case, so far from helping him, seems to us to be against his contention. That case was decided mainly on the ground that the representatives of the mortgagor who had redeemed the mortgage had asserted a proprietary title and claimed adversely to the true owner. It was held that in a case of that description Article 144 would apply, but one of the learned Judges who decided the case observed as follows at page 144 of the report:
If Jaidat had not dealt further with the property, but had merely taken possession and held it, the plaintiff would, (under the ruling of this Court in Ashfaq Ahmed v. Wazir, Ali (1889) I. L. R., 14 All., I have had a period of sixty years from the date of the mortgage of 1860 within which to recover his share from Jaidat on payment of his share of the debt.
4. We are accordingly of opinion that the court below was right in holding that the limitation applicable to the case was that provided by article 148 and that the suit was not barred by limitation.
5. It was next contended that, the suit should be deemed to be, one for a declaratory decree as regards the title of the plaintiff or his vendor, Kali Charan. This contention is, in our opinion, untenable, as the suit is not for a declaratory decree but for consequential relief, namely, redemption of the mortgage and possession of the property. For the purpose of maintaining the, suit it was necessary for the plaintiffs to ask the court to declare his title.
6. The last contention put forward was that as Kali Charan did not bring a suit to assert his title within twelve years of the date of his purchase that title must be deemed to have become extinct. This contention has no force, inasmuch as Kali Charan had no occasion to bring a suit to establish his title. The mortgagee: was in possession and the possession of the mortgagee must be deemed to be that of the person entitled to the equity of redemption.
7. For these reasons the appeal must, in our opinion fail. We dismiss it with costs.