1. It is sufficient for the purpose of determining the questions raised in this appeal to say that the learned Judge in the Court below has held that the defendant-respondent was a principal debtor under the bond of the 17th April 1879, and in that capacity liable to the present suit. The contention on behalf of the plaintiff Bank is that the Judge, having formed this opinion as to the character filled by him in respect of that instrument, has erroneously held that the three letters of the 13th July 1881, 6th June 1882, and the 22nd February 1883, did not constitute an acknowledgment so as to save time running against the plaintiff Bank. I am of opinion that the contention for the plaintiff-appellant is a good one, and that these three letters and each of them does constitute such an acknowledgment as is contemplated by Section 19 of the Limitation law, more particularly having reference to the language of the explanation I of that section. Incidentally I may observe that the language of explanation I is exceedingly wide, and that it covers cases which would not be covered by the ordinary rules applicable in the English Courts to acknowledgments which have been set up by the parties for the purpose of saving limitation. I think that those letters were acknowledgments of the right of the plaintiff Bank to the amount of the bond-debt due to them, and that the mere circumstance that the defendant therein mentioned that his liability was of a conditional character only did not make them any the less acknowledgments. They were, in my opinion, sufficient to save time to the plaintiffs and make their present suit unobjectionable upon the score of limitation. This being so, the appeal is decreed, the judgment of the Judge reversed, and the case will be restored to his file of pending appeals and disposed of upon the merits. Costs hitherto incurred will be costs in the cause.
2. I concur.