Piggott and Walsh, J.
1. In our opinion this appeal must be dismissed. A question of principle has been raised apparently for the first time in this Court, namely as to whether an unpaid call, due from a share-holder of a company, which has become statute-barred under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, and has therefore ceased to be a recoverable debt by the company, may yet be recovered if at any date subsequent to its having become time-barred the company is wound-up. That question really depends upon the nature of the liability of a contributory and the provisions of the Indian Companies Act relating to winding-up. We entirely agree with the contention put forward by the appellant's counsel that so far as the recovery of the original debt based upon calls made by the company which has become time-barred is concerned, the liquidator has no higher right than the company. The company could not sue for these calls, no more can the liquidator. But the proceeding before us, as has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent, is not a suit at all. What has happened is that in the performance of his duty the liquidator has put the appellant on the list of contributories. Once a member of the company is upon the list of contributories,--unless he succeeds in showing as against the liquidator that he should not have been put on the list of contributories,--he is liable for all those matters in respect of which he may be charged in the event of a company being wound up, that is to say, to the extent of his original share held in the company which remains unpaid, he is liable to contribute to the assets of the company for payment of the debts due to creditors and the expenses of the winding up under Section 61 of the Indian Companies Act, No. VI of 1882. Now it is necessary to refer to Section 125 of that Act in order to ascertain the nature of that liability. Section 125 provides as follows: 'The liability of any person to contribute to the assets of a company under this Act, in the event of the same being wound up, shall be deemed to create a debt accruing due from such person at the time when his liability commenced, but payable at the time or respective times when calls are made, as hereinafter mentioned, for enforcing such liability.' Now it is quite clear that the contribution dealt with under Section 61, which is in itself a sort of correlative duty to the right which a share-holder has to have his liability, for any debt or expense of the winding up which the company may have incurred, limited to the amount of his original subscription, is not in itself a debt. But the Act says that for the purpose of recovery the amount shall be deemed to be a debt payable at the time or respective times when calls are made, and Section 151 gives a court, power to make calls from persons on the list of contributories for the amount for which they are shown as liable in the list prepared by the liquidator; so that really it is not even the right of a company which is being enforced by a liquidator. It is a statutory right of the creditors of a company to enforce against the contributories of an insolvent company through the court the obligation which the share-holders took upon themselves when they originally subscribed in the event of insolvency subsequently overtaking the company. In our opinion the two decisions in Sorabji Jamsetji v. Ishwardas Jugjiwandas Store (1895) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 651 and in Vaidiswara Ayyar v. Siva Subramania Mudaliar (1907) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 66, referred to in the Judgment appealed against were right, and were in accordance with the principles on which this question has always been considered under the English law and ought to be followed by us. We dismiss this appeal with costs.