Brodhurst and Tyreell, J.
1. We are asked to amend this decree on the ground that it is at variance with the judgment in the appeal, inasmuch as the decree contains an order for the payment of interest from the date of the suit onwards, whereas interest was adjudged by the judgment for the period prior to the institution of the suit only. But no variance with the judgment is involved in this additional order contained in the decree. The decree agrees in all the respects with the judgment, according to the requirements of Section 206. of the Civil Procedure Code. It contains clearly and specifically all the reliefs adjudged by the Court, and the Court is competent under Section 209 to 'order' in its decree that interest at a reasonable rate should be paid on the principal sum adjudged (scil. in the judgment) from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at a reasonable rate on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or such earlier date as the Court thinks fit. The language is similar to that of the Act for the Repeal of the Usury Laws, No. XXVIII of 1855, Sections 2 and 3.
2. In the case before us, the Court has in its decree done no more than it was competent to do under the powers conferred by this section, and the decree has not thereby been made to be in variance with the judgment passed by the Court.
3. We therefore disallow this objection with costs.