D.S. Mathur, J.
1. This is a revision under Section 6-B of the Court-fees Act by me Chief Inspector of Stamps, U. P., against the order of the Additional District Judge of Saharanpur, holding that the Court-fee payable on E. E. Act Appeal No. 3 of 1958 (Ugger Sen v. Inamul Haq and others), was under Schedule II, Article 11 of the Court-fees Act and the Court-fee paid was sufficient.
2. The material facts of the case are that the judgment-debtors, ex-zamindars applied under Section 4 of the U. P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, 1952 (to be referred hereinafter as the Debt Reduction Act) (U. P. Act No. XV of 1953) for the reduction of the amount of decree which the Special Judge II Grade had passed in favour of Ugger Sen. The Special Judge reduced the amount, but before he could transmit Information to the Collector under Section 19-A of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934 (to be referred hereinafter as the E. E. Act), Ugger Sen challenged the order by way of appeal, but the appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was premature and not maintainable. The Special Judge II Grade thereafter took action under Section 19-A and informed the Collector of the reduction made in the decree. He apparently also gave the certificate contemplated by Clause (b) of Section 19-A. Ugger Sen then preferred an appeal against the order under Section 19-A of the E. E. Act and this appeal was registered as E. E. Act Appeal No. 3 of 1958.
3. Ugger Sen affixed a court-fee stamp of Rs. 2.50 Paise on the memorandum of appeal treating it as an appeal from an order covered by Schedule II, Article 11 of the Court-fees Act. The appeal was valued at Rs. 38,172.50 Paise. The Inspector of Stamps raised an objection that the court-fee paid was not sufficient and ad valorem court-fee under Schedule I, Article 1, was payable. The respondents also raised a similar objection. The learned Additional District Judge, who heard the appeal, rejected the objection raised by the Inspector of Stamps and also by the respondents, chiefly on the ground that Ugger Sen had three remedies available, one, to file a revision against the order under Section 4 of the Debt Reduction Act, the other by challenging the order under Section 19-A of the E. E. Act by preferring an appeal, and the third by appealing against the amended decree.
4. The learned District Judge did not consider the provisions of the Court-fees Act, but as he was of the opinion that the amended decree, which came into existence by the fiction of law, was also appealable, he thought that for an appeal against the order under Section 19-A, a fixed court-fee of Rs. 2.50 as for an appeal from an order was payable.
5. For the disposal of the present revision it is not necessary to lay down whether it is necessary for an aggrieved party to prefer an appeal against the amended decree which comes into existence by the fiction of law. If such an appeal lies, court-fee shall be payable as if the appeal is against the amended decree. But if no such appeal is maintainable, the only remedy available to the aggrieved party shall be to challenge in revision the order under Section 4 of the DebtReduction Act soon after such an order is passed, or to wait till the Special Judge communicates the information to the Collector under Section 19-A of the E. E. Act and then to prefer an appeal.
6. Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act lays down the court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal, not otherwise provided for in this Act, presented to any civil or revenue court except those mentioned in Section 3. Section 3 is inapplicable to the Instant case. Consequently, in the absence of any other provision in the Court-fees Act, the court-fee shall be leviable under Schedule I, Article 1. It was conceded by the learned Advocate for Ugger Sen, opposite-party, that no provision other than Schedule II, Article 11, could be applicable to the instant case. In other words, therefore, if Schedule II, Article 11, is inapplicable, court-fee shall be payable on the valuation of the appeal.
7. Court-fee is payable under Schedule II, Article 11, on memorandum of appeal, when the appeal is not from a decree or an order having the force of a decree. The order under Section 19-A of the E. E. Act informing the Collector of the reduction made in the amount of the decree is not a decree. The amended decree comes into existence by the fiction of law, namely, that as a result of the communication of the information to the Collector under Section 19-A, and the grant of the necessary certificate, the decree already transmitted to the Collector under Section 19 stands amended accordingly.
8. The point for consideration is whether the order under Section 19-A of the E. E. Act is an order having the force of a decree. A similar question was raised in an appeal under the Indian Succession Act, and was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Panzy Fernandas v. M. F. Queoros, 1962 All LJ 1135 : (AIR 1963 All 153). The principle laid down in the Full Bench case can, without any hesitation be applied to the instant case. Whether the order is one having the force of a decree, cannot be determined on the basis of the executabillty of the order. The order shall have the force of a decree if it finally adjudicates upon the right of the parties in controversy in the proceeding. The matter in controversy in the instant case was whether the amount of the decree already passed by the Special Judge and transmitted to the Collector could be reduced. When the Special Judge passed an order reducing the amount of the decree and communicated this information to the Collector under Section 19-A of the E. E. Act, the decree already transmitted stood amended accordingly. The effect of the communication of the order is that the decree already transmitted stands amended; in other words it has the force of finally adjudicating upon the rights in controversy in the proceeding. Consequently, the action taken under Section 19-A which is in substance an order, has the force of a decree. An order is distinct from decree but where the order has the force of a decree it stands at par with a decree for purposes of court-fee.
9. it was strongly contetnded on behalf of Ugger Sen that there was a difference between theterm 'having the force of a decree' and the words 'having the effect of a decree' and they must be given a different meaning, considering that in the first case, there would be no further decree and only the order shall serve the purposed of the decree, while in the other, as in the Instant case, there would exist a decree also. This contention is based upon, I may say with respect, not proper consideration of the wording of Section 19-A of the E. E. Act. After the communication of the information to the Collector under Section 19-A, it is not necessary for the Collector or for the Special Judge to amend the decree which had already been transmitted to the Collector under Section 19. Without amendment of the decree, the decree, in the eye of law, stands amended in the sense that the decree subject to the subsequent order of the Special Judge is executable. When it la not necessary to bring on record an amended decree, the difference sought to be Introduced by the learned counsel cannot he said to exist. In fact, the order under Section 19-A has the force of a decree and the effect of this order is that the original decree, as amended by virtue of the order under Section 19-A, la capable of execution.
10. During the pendency of the revision, apposite parties Nos. 5 and 8 had died and their legal representatives were not brought on the record. The interested party in the revision is the creditor, who had preferred an appeal before the District Judge. The others were not necessary parties and they were persons who had, like the Inspector of Stamps, raised an objection as to the sufficiency of court-fee. The revision thus can be disposed of without their legal representatives being brought on record.
11. The revisional Jurisdiction under Section 6-B of the Court-fees Act is much wider than the jurisdiction under Section 115 C. P. C. This Court can interfere if it is of opinion that proper court-fee had not been paid on the memorandum of appeal to which the order under revision relates. For reasons already indicated above. It must be held that court-fee was payable under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act, and not under Schedule II, Article II thereof. The memorandum of appeal was presented before the District Judge on 23-8-1958 and in accordance with the law then in force, ad valorem court-fee payable conies to Rs. 2025/-. Ugger Sen has already paid a court-fee of Ra. 2.50 paise. The deficiency in court-fee comes to Rs. 2022.50 Paise.
12. The revision is hereby allowed and it is declared that court-fee on the memorandum of appeal presented before the District Judge of Saharanpur was payable under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court-fees Act, and not under Schedule II, Article 11, thereof. The Court-fee already paid is insufficient By Rs. 2022.50 Paise. Three months and no more are allowed for making good the deficiency in court-fee. In case of default. It shall be brought to the notice of the Bench hearing S. A. F. O. No. 7 of 1962 Ugger Sen v. Inamul Haq that the deficiency in court-fee of the lower appellate court has not been made good by Ugger Sen. In sucha case, it shall also be open to the State to take such steps for the recovery of the deficiency in court-fee as may be permissible under the law. Costs on parties. Before listing S. A. F. O. No. 7 of 1962 for hearing the office shall verify the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal thereof is sufficient.