John Stanley, C.J. and Karamat Husain, J.
1. The facts of this case are these. The plaintiffs are the owners of a share of a village called Chingauri in the district of Mirzapur. On the 16th of June, 1900, they executed a lease of this property in favour of the defendant Raghunath Singh for a term extending from 1308 to 1314 Fasli at an annual rent of Rs. 395. Subsequently, on the 12th of April, 1904, the plaintiffs executed another lease of the same property in favour of the defendant Shankar Singh for a term extending from 1312 to 1320 Fasli at the same rent, namely, Rs. 395. Under this lease Shankar Singh was authorized to realise the rent from the defendant Raghunath Singh. This was what is known as a concurrent lease. Shankar Singh failed to pay the rent for the years 1312--1313 Fasli; and hence the suit was brought out of which this appeal has arisen. The Court of first instance decreed the plaintiffs' claim, but upon appeal the learned District Judge reversed the decision of the Court below and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that as long as the lease of 1900 subsists the plaintiffs have no right to maintain a suit for rent against Shankar Singh. He says in his judgment: 'As Raghunath Singh's lease was not cancelled, and as he was not ejected, he remained in possession as thekadar in 1312 and 1313 Fasli, and Shankar Singh was not in possession in those years. I therefore do not see how Shankar Singh can be held responsible for the rent for 1312 and 1313 Fasli.' In this view the learned District Judge was in error. The lease of 1904 operated as an assignment of the landlord's interest during the term of the earlier lease of 1900, and thereafter as a lease for the residue of the term granted by it. As assignee of the landlord Shankar Singh was entitled to collect the rent from Raghunath Singh. In the Law of Landlord and Tenant by Mr. Woodfall we find the law thus stated: 'A concurrent lease is one granted for a term which is to commence before the] expiration or other determination of a previous lease of the same premises to another person. If under seal, it operates as an assignment of part of the reversion during the continuance of such previous lease, and from henceforth as a lease in possession during the residue of the term therein expressed to be granted. It entitles the lessee as assignee of part of the reversion to the rent reserved in the previous lease and to the benefit of the covenants therein contained which are to be respectively paid and performed during the then residue of the term granted by the first lease and the continuance of the concurrent lease' (17th Ed., 235). In support of this statement the learned author quotes the decision of a very eminent English Judge, Baron Parke. In the case of Harmer v. Bean (1853) 3 C. and K. 307 the learned Baron held under very similar circumstances that the operation of a concurrent lease of the kind was to transfer part of the reversion of the landlord to the lessee, and that the landlord after the execution of such concurrent lease could not recover as against the first lessee any rent due after the execution of the concurrent lease. The facts in that case were these: the defendant rented a house from the plaintiff at a rent of 20 quarterly; afterwards the lessor granted a lease by deed to a third party of the house in question and other property for 21 years. It was held that the landlord could not recover the rent due under the first lease after the execution of the second lease. For these reasons we think the learned District Judge was in error, and we therefore, allowing this appeal, set aside his decree and restore the decree of the Court of first instance with costs in all Courts.