Henry Richards, Kt., C.J. and Banerji, J.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff sought to set aside a deed of gift executed by her. She based her claim upon undue influence and fraud. The courts below, however, have found against her upon these grounds. It was contended, however, on her behalf that the deed was not registered at her instance or with her consent, and that registration was brought about compulsorily. The sole question to decide, therefore, is whether or not it is necessary in order that there should be a valid gift of immovable property not only that the instrument should be duly executed and attested in the manner provided by Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, but also that the registration should be either at the instance of or at least with the consent of the donor. The section merely provides that the gift should be effected by an instrument executed by the donor, attested by two witnesses and registered. In our opinion a document registered in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act is a registered instrument, and if the document is in fact duly registered in accordance with those provisions the gift is complete and valid. The law does not require that the registration should be at the instance of or with the consent of the donor. The appellant relies upon the case of Ramamirtha Ayyan v. Gopala Ayyan (1806) I.L.R., 19 Mad., 433. It is true that the learned Judges in that case held that it was necessary that the document should be registered with the consent of the donor. They say: 'We are further of opinion that a deed of gift being a voluntary transfer remains nudum pactum until the donor has done all that is necessary to make it legally complete.' We do not quite understand what the learned Judges meant by saying that 'the transfer remained nudum pactum until the donor had done all that was necessary to make it legally complete.' The transaction remained nudum pactum even after registration, that is to say, there was no consideration for it. It was a voluntary transfer. It must be remembered too that at the time this suit was instituted nothing remained for the donor to do. She had executed the deed in the presence of two witnesses and the donee had had the document registered in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act. Of course, if the plaintiff could have proved that she was induced to execute the deed by fraud or undue influence, this would be a good ground for setting the document aside quite irrespective of whether it was registered or unregistered. In our opinion the judgment of our learned brother Chamier was correct. We dismiss the appeal with costs.