Hari Swarup, J.
1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge by which he allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the Deputy Director of Education, Gorakhpur passed in appeal under Section 16-G (c) of the Intermediate Education Act (U. P. Act II of 1921) hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.
2. The petition was filed by the Managing Committee, Narendra Deva Higher Secondary School, Jalalpur district Faizabad. According to the petitioner the respondent No. 3 had been serving as the Principal of the Institution but as his conduct was not satisfactory, after taking disciplinary proceedings a resolution was passed for removing him from service. Papers were sent for approval of the District Inspector of Schools, but he did not accord his approval. The Managing Committee then preferred the appeal. The appeal was dismissed. A point was raised on behalf of the employee before the learned single Judge that the Managing Committee not being a legal entity had no right to maintain the appeal. It was also contended that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education was a speaking order and could not be challenged as invalid. The learned single Judge did not accept either of the two contentions. The learned single Judge further held that Regulation 95 framed under the Act was applicable and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Education was not in accordance with that Regulation. Regulation 95 provides:
'The decision of the Regional Appellate Committee shall be in writing. It shall concisely state the points for decision, the decision thereon and the final order.'
3. As regards the contention of the appellant about the non-maintainability of the petition it is urged by the learned counsel that the jurisdiction of this court can be invoked only by a living person, or by a juristic person if it is a statutory body and not by a Managing Committee which is not a statutory body. Learned counsel has not been able to cite before us any authority in support of this contention. Article 226 of the Constitution does not expressly place any restriction on the jurisdiction of the court being invoked by a body which is not a statutory body, or which is not a living person. The right of a person, therefore, to move the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will have to be inferred from the purpose for which the Court's jurisdiction has been invoked. A person has been defined in the General Clauses Act in Section 3 (42) as follows:
'Person shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.' The Managing Committee is constituted in accordance with the provisions of the 'Act'. Section 16-A thereof provides for a Scheme of Administration for every institution. It further requires:
'The Scheme of Administration shall, amongst other matters, provide for the constitution of a Committee of Management vested with authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. ' Section 16-E and Section 16-F deal with the appointment of teachers including the principal and the appointment has to be by the Committee of Management. Section 16-G provides for conditions of service of teachers and the removal of teachers including the principal. The Committee of Management being the appointing authority is also the dismissing authority and this is further clear from the Regulation framed with respect to Section 16-G of the Act. If the Inspector accords or refuses the approval, Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 16-G provides for an appeal against it to the Regional Deputy Director of Education by a 'party' meaning thereby the party before the Inspector of Schools. The parties before him are the Committee of Management and the teacher. The Committee of Management accordingly has a right to file an appeal against the Inspector's refusal to accord approval. The Committee of Management is thus recognised as a body competent to act under the statute and there appears no reason why it cannot come to this court for a mandamus in case the appellate authority does not decide the appeal in accordance with law. Even by implication, therefore, it cannot be held that the court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked by a person who is not a statutory body or a living person. It is always the person aggrieved who can come to the court. A Committee of Management being a person within the meaning of the General Clauses Act, if aggrieved, will therefore, have a right to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. In Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller Imports (AIR 1974 SC 1539) it was held that a firm can file a writ petition. It was observed:
'We find no merit in the preliminary objection that the writ petition on behalf of the 'firm' is not maintainable. Since 'firm' stands for all the partners collectively, the petition is to be deemed to have been filed by all the partners who are citizens of India. We therefore negative this objection.'
In the present case also the Committee of Management will be deemed to represent all the persons constituting the Committee. What we have to see is whether the person who invokes the jurisdiction of this court is the person aggrieved. If the Committee of Management is a person aggrieved, then it will have a right to invoke this court's jurisdiction. In the instant case the Committee of Management had a right to file an appeal and if the appellate authority does not decide the appeal in accordance with law it would be a person aggrieved and thus authorised to invoke the jurisdiction of this court to compel the authority by a writ of mandamus to decide the appeal in accordance with Law. We accordingly overrule the preliminary objection that the writ petition was not maintainable at the instance of the Committee of Management.
5. It is urged that Regulation 95 is not attracted because it gives direction for the judgment by the Regional Appellate Committee and the Deputy Director of Education is not the Regional Appellate Committee. By U. P. Act 35 of 1958 Section 16-C was introduced in the Act. Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 16-G provided for an appeal against the order of the Inspector to the Regional Appellate Committee. The Regional Appellate Committee was to consist of the Regional Deputy Director of Education as President of the Committee and a member of the State Managers' Association and a member of the U. P. Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh. Sub-section (3) of Section 16-G was subsequently amended and substituted by the present section. It provides now for an appeal not to the committee but to Regional Deputy Director of Education. The learned single Judge held that because of the Regulation being preserved and continued by Section 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, it will be applicable. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if the Regulations continued, the direction under Regulation 95 is about the decision of the Regional Appellate Committee and not by the Regional Deputy Director of Education even though he be an appellate authority. We need not in the present case go to decide this controversy, because in our opinion, the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Education is by no standard a speaking order. Regulation 95 contains nothing else than the ingredients of a speaking order. Every speaking order has to state the points for decision, and the decision thereon. The purpose of a speaking order is to let a party know why his appeal is being dismissed. In the present case, even though a large number of grounds pertaining to facts, law and the procedure adopted by the Inspector of Schools were raised in appeal, the Deputy Director of Education has, after stating that the appeal had been filed against the order of the District Inspector of Schools disapproving the proposal of the Committee of Management to dismiss B. P. Pandey, Principal, has disposed of the appeal with the following statement:--
'I have come to the conclusion that the points raised in the appeal do not have any weight and as such the order of the Distt. Inspector of Schools, Faizabad dated 27-10-1966 is confirmed. The appeal is therefore rejected.' He has not mentioned any of the points which had been raised in appeal, nor has he given his decision on any of those points. He has not even mentioned in hia order the facts which may have been found by the Inspector of Schools and with which the 'Director may be in agreement. Even a judgment of affirmance needs to say the points raised, or which arise in the case and that the appellate authority is in agreement with the findings of the authority against whose order the appeal is preferred. The present judgment of the Deputy Director of Education cannot pass the test of being a speaking order even though it is a judgment of affirmance. We, therefore, find no error in the operative judgment of the learned single Judge.
6. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.