1. This is an application in revision against an order by which the District Judge of Cawnpore refused to entertain a petition of appeal presented to him against the decree of an Assistant Collector in what was, beyond question, a suit under the Local Tenancy Act No. II of 1901. The suit, as originally brought, was a suit of the description covered by serial No. 36, group C, of the fourth schedule to the said enactment, and under the provisions of Sections 150 and 154 of the said Act. It is possibly an arguable point whether the decree, against which the petition of appeal was presented in the court of the District Judge, was in reality a decree in the suit as originally instituted, or whether it could be treated as a decree in a separate suit or proceeding which had arisen out of the former one and fell under the purview of serial No. 38 of group C of the schedule already mentioned, being governed by the provisions of Section 150/158 of the Tenancy Act.. In any event, the petition of appeal to the District Judge invited him to take cognizance 'in the way of appeal,' within the meaning of Section 167 of the Local Tenancy Act No. II of 1901, of a matter in respect of which a suit of the nature specified in the fourth schedule of the Act, not only might have been brought, but had actually been brought. The District Judge held that the provisions of Section 177 of the aforesaid Tenancy Act No. II of 1901 did not give him jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
2. The application before me is in revision against an order returning the petition of appeal, which followed upon the above-mentioned decision.
3. A preliminary objection is taken that this Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this matter by way of a petition of revision. I stand committed to the view that the cognizance of this Court is barred by Section 167 of the Local Tenancy Act already referred to. I gave my reasons for this conclusion in the case of Parbhu Narain Singh v. Harbans Lal (1916) 14 A.L.J. 281 at 290 291. My view was subsequently adopted by another learned Judge of this Court in a decision which has found its way into the authorized reports, vide Jamna Prasad v. Karan Singh (1918) I.L.R. 41 All. 28. On the other side, my attention has been drawn to a number of instances in which this Court has assumed jurisdiction to interfere in revision with orders such as the one now before me. Most of these cases are unreported and I do not find any of them in the authorized reports. I am, however, referred to the case of Kesho Das v. Murat (1914) 12 A.L.J. 367. The jurisdiction of this Court to interfere in revision was in this, and in similar cases, taken for granted, but not judicially affirmed upon objection raised. In this state of the authorities, I might have felt disposed to refer the question of jurisdiction to; a Bench of two Judges, but I find that this has already been done. The case of Gaj Kumar Chandar v. Salamat Ali (1919) I.L.R., 49 All. 83 is one in which the question of principle, about which another learned Judge of this Court had dissented from me in Parbhu Narain's case (1910) 14 A.L.J., 281 at 290, 291, was expressly referred to a Bench of two Judges for determination. The learned Judges have in terms adopted the view affirmed by me in Parbhu Narain's case (1910) 14 A.L.J., 281 at 290, 291. I feel bound, therefore, to hold that the question of the enter-tainability of this application is concluded by authority. I hold that it is not entertainable and on this ground dismiss it with costs.