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Gulab Dei and anr. Vs. Vaish Motor Company and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtAllahabad
Decided On
Reported inAIR1925All570
AppellantGulab Dei and anr.
RespondentVaish Motor Company and anr.
Excerpt:
- - the mere fact that the decree has been passed in terms of the compromise does not necessarily justify an inference that the court granted leave, or that it was satisfied that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. 378 it was clearly held that even if a guardian of a minor enters into a compromise without the leave of the court but changes her mind before the leave of the court is granted, the compromise cannot be forced on the minor. this follows clearly from the wording of order 32, rule 7 under which no next friend or guardian is permitted without the leave of the court to enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor......it seems to us that so far as the minor is concerned, the compromise cannot be forced on him. the minor's guardian; herself did not enter into the compromise, but some one on her behalf did enter into-it. it is, however, not disputed that no leave of court has up till now been granted and that there is no finding that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. the mere fact that the decree has been passed in terms of the compromise does not necessarily justify an inference that the court granted leave, or that it was satisfied that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. any compromise {without the leave of the court is a nullity. as, before any leave has been granted, the guardian herself does not want the compromise, it is impossible to force the compromise on the.....
Judgment:

Sulaiman, J.

1. This is an appeal from an order of remand in a suit brought by Mt. Gulab Dei, on behalf of herself and as guardian of her minor son, against a motor company for accounts. The case was apparently being looked after by her father as her pairokar, and on-the 2nd of August, 1923, when she was not herself present in the Court, the case was compromised on her behalf and on behalf of her minor son on instructions given by her father, Shankar Lal. The Court recorded this compromise and passed a decree in terms of it. Mt. Gulab Dei, for herself and on behalf of her minor son, appealed to the District Judge from this order recording the compromise and urged that she had never given any authority to the compromise being made, that the compromise was not for the benefit of the minor, and that no leave of the Court having been obtained, it was a nullity. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that it was not clear whether Shankar Lal had authority to enter into the compromise, or that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. He has accordingly remanded the case to the Court of first instance, but has given directions as to how the Court is to proceed in case it came to certain conclusions after further enquiry.

2. It seems to us that so far as the minor is concerned, the compromise cannot be forced on him. The minor's guardian; herself did not enter into the compromise, but some one on her behalf did enter into-it. It is, however, not disputed that no leave of Court has up till now been granted and that there is no finding that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. The mere fact that the decree has been passed in terms of the compromise does not necessarily justify an inference that the Court granted leave, or that it was satisfied that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor. Any compromise {without the leave of the Court is a nullity. As, before any leave has been granted, the guardian herself does not want the compromise, it is impossible to force the compromise on the minor. In the case of Ranga Rao v. Rajagopala Raju (1899) 22 Mad. 378 it was clearly held that even if a guardian of a minor enters into a compromise without the leave of the Court but changes her mind before the leave of the Court is granted, the compromise cannot be forced on the minor. This follows clearly from the wording of Order 32, Rule 7 under which no next friend or guardian is permitted without the leave of the Court to enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor. If, therefore, before any such leave is granted she changes her mind, it cannot be forced on the minor.

3. The case, therefore, so far as the minor is concerned, must be disposed of on the merits unless the guardian chooses to compromise it afresh after having obtained the leave of the Court.

4. As regards Mt. Gulab Dai herself, the question remains whether Shanker Lal or her vakil had authority to compromise the case on her behalf. The case has been rightly remanded in order that this matter may be enquired into. Of course if it is found that neither Shankar Lal nor the vakil had any authority to compromise on behalf of Mt. Gulab Dei, then the case, so far as she is concerned, will also be tried on the merits.

5. We allow the appeal in part, and, modifying the order of the learned District Judge, direct that the case be remanded to the Court of first instance for the enquiry as to whether Shanker Lal or the vakil had authority to compromise the case on behalf of Mt. Gulab Dei. The compromise, so far as the minor is concerned, will, however, be totally ineffective.

6. We direct that the minor appellant will have his costs from the respondent. The other parties will bear their own costs.


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