1. The appellant (defendant) Lachman Singh, lambardar and co-sharer in mauza Gujarpur, satisfied arrears of revenue due on the shares of his co-sharers, defendants 2, 3, and 4, and brought a suit against them under Section 93(g) of the Kent Act, to recover the amount he had paid, and obtained a decree, and in execution attached a 2-biawa and 7 1/2 biswansi share on which the arrears had accrued.
2. The plaintiffs-respondents took objections to the attachment, they having, subsequently to Lachman Singh's decree, but prior to attachment, purchased the property from Lachman Singh's judgment-debtors in satisfaction of a mortgage-debt, and they contended that the property was not liable to sale under the decree. This objection was disallowed, and they have brought this suit to have it declared that the property is not liable to be sold in execution of the defendant Lachman Singh's decree, and to remove the attachment.
3. There were several defences to the suit set up by the principal defendant, but the only one with which we are concerned in this appeal is that, by the fact of paying the arrears of revenue due on the estate of the plaintiffs' vendors, he obtained a charge on it, and can bring it to sale to satisfy the Rent Court decree. The first Court dismissed the suit on the authority of a decision of this Court--Wazir Muhammad Khan v. Gauridat I.L.R. 4 All. 412. The Lower Appellate Court has decreed the claim, apparently holding that the appellant Lachman Singh's contention that, by paying revenue, he obtained a charge on the estate, was invalid.
4. We have now an appeal on the part of the defendants. The question we have to decide is, not so much whether the defendant Lachman Singh obtained a charge on the property of the plaintiffs' vendors, as whether he can enforce any such charge in execution of the Rent Court decree which he holds. The decree which he holds is in a suit brought under Section 93(g), Rent Act, in the Revenue Court. It is, and can be, no more than a decree for money against the vendors of the plaintiffs for arrears of Government revenue payable by them through the lambardar. The suit does not, and could not, in a Revenue Court, seek to establish or enforce a charge on property, and neither does the decree give it, nor are there any powers conferred on the Revenue Court in execution of its decrees to enforce charge son immoveable property. Section 171 and the following sections deal with the powers of the Court in execution, which are confined to realization from personal and immoveable property of the judgment-debtors.
5. No doubt, by paying arrears of revenue, which he was bound to do, the defendant would obtain a charge on the estate against all persons interested therein for the sum paid, and this has bean laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nugender Chunder Ghose v. Sreemutty Kaminee Dossee 11 Moo. I.A. 258; but that case is also an authority for the view I take in this ease, that a charge of this nature cannot be enforced under a decree which in merely a personal decree against the judgment-debtors, against whom it was passed by a Revenue Court not competent to do more than pass a personal decree. If the defendant wished to establish a charge against the property in. the hands of the plaintiffs, he should have established the same by suit against them in a Court of competent jurisdiction.
6. The case referred to by the first Court has no bearing on the question before us.
7. Second Appeal No. 379 of 1882 decided by a Division Bench of this Court on the 9th March 1883, was referred to by the pleader for the appellants, to support his contention, and no doubt it does do so; but for the reasons I have stated, I am unable to concur in the view of the law taken in that case. I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
8. I concur.