S.S. Dhavan, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the legality of an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Morada-bad, dated 28th July, 1956, directing the petitioner to vacate a particular shop in Moradabad or in default, directing his eviction by the use of Police force.
2. The case of the petitioner as stated in the affidavit supporting the petition is this: One Smt. Sundaria was the tenant of shop No. 22, Railway road, Moradabad for a long time. The petitioner entered into partnership with her in May, 1955, and ever since that date he and Smt. Sundaria were in joint possession. She died on 2nd May 1958 leaving a son Balbir. The petitioner continued the partnership with Balbir and has been in possession of the shop. The partners are running a hotel business there.
3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer served a notice on the petitioner under Section 7-A of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The petitioner was not given any opportunity to prod'uce evidence in the ensuing proceedings. By his order dated 28th July, 1956, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the petitioner an illegal occupant and directed him to vacate the shop, or in default directed his eviction by the use of Police force. The petitioner filed a revision before the Commissioner of Bareilly, which was rejected. The petitioner states that he is still in possession of the shop and he is in imminent danger of being evicted. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the petitioner has filed the present petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner pressed one point before me in support of the petition. He contended that proceedings under Section 7-A can be initiated only if either of the two conditions specified in Sub-section (1) is fulfilled. The first is that the vacancy of any accommodation is required to be reported but was not so reported. This does not apply in the present case, because the vacancy of shop in dispute was duly reported by the landlord. Alternatively, an order requiring the accommodation to be let or not to be let should have been duly passed under Section 7(2). This too does not apply to the present case as no allotment order has been passed in respect of this shop. As neither of the two alternative conditions precedent exists in this case, the entire proceedings against the petitioner ending in the order dated 28th July, 1956 are without jurisdiction. This in brief is the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
5. The language of Section 7-A shows that it is intended to deal with unauthorised occupiers in two situations. First, if an accommodation falls vacant and neither the landlord nor the tenant informs the authorities, but the tenancy is filled up by a private unauthorised arrangement, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has the power to initiate the proceedings under Section 7-A against the unauthorised occupants. Secondly, after the passing of an allotment order the allottee may find some person in unauthorised occupation of the premises allotted to him. In this situation too the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has been given the power to turn out the unauthorised occupier and put the allottee in possession. In the present case the vacancy has been duly reported by the landlord to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It was open to him to allot the shop to a person of his choice and then put him in possession with the aid of Section 7-A if necessary. It appears that the proceedings under Section 7-A (1) were prematurely taken.
6. But this is not the only aspect of the case. Sri Gyanendra Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent brought to my notice the fact that the petitioner at the time of moving the petition suppressed material facts and misled this court. He stated that he made a partnership with Smt. Sundaria in May 1955. He further alleged that, after her death on 2nd May 1956, Sundaria's son Balbir continued the partnership with the petitioner, and the petitioner thus continued in possession of the shop. Thus the partnership with Balbir was a material fact as the petitioner's right to occupy the shop was founded on it. In the absence of any partnership with Balbir he had no rights on the basis of which he could reinvoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
7. It is note-worthy that the petitioner did not implead Balbir either as a co-petitioner or as a respondent in this petition.
8. When Balbir heard about this petition, he made an application to this court for permission to be impleaded as a respondent. This permission was granted by Mehrotra, J. by his order dated 11-12-56, Balbir also filed a counter affidavit in which he stated that the petitioner's allegation about any partnership between him and the petitioner was absolutely false. He pointed out that on 27th June, 1956, he (Balbir) made an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Moradabad complaining that Roop Kishore, the petitioner in this petition, had illegally occuoied the shop. In that application Balbir accused the petitioner of having set up a false story of partnership.
9. When the petitioner moved his present petition on 1st November, 1956, he was aware of the fact that his story of partnership with Balbir had already been repudiated by the latter. In spite of this knowledge, he made an allegation that Balbir and he had entered into partnership, as a result of which the petitioner continued in possession of the shop. Thus, he related the story of partnership in a manner which was unfair and not candid. He misled the Court by suppressing the vital fact that the story of partnership had been denied by the alleged partner as. a fabrication.
10. The petitioner has not filed any rejoinder to Balbir's counter affidavit. It is therefore presumed that the statements made by Balbir are correct.
11. Mr. Gyanendra Kumar pointed out that the petitioner had, contrary to the rules of this court, not filed with bis affidavit even a copy of the impugned order. Mr. Gyanendra Kumar's explanation for this omission is that the text of the order would have revealed to this Court, that on the date when the petition had been filed, his story of partnership with Balbir was denied by the latter.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner was not able to explain why the petitioner had made the false allegation that he had entered into a partnership agreement with Balbir.
13. This Court has held again and again that a petitioner, who invokes the aid of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution must state the facts correctly and fairly. He must not suppress material facts. Moreover his presentation of facts must be candid. He must show the utmost good faith. But if the misleads the court, he will be disentitled to be heard on merits when his fraud or mis-representation or lack of candidness is revealed at the time of the final hearing. In my view the petitioner, whatever be tha merits of his case, by his conduct has disentitled himself to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. The stay order obtained by the petitioner is discharged.