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Shankar Dial Vs. A.M. Venables - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtAllahabad High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1897)ILR19All121
AppellantShankar Dial
RespondentA.M. Venables
Excerpt:
criminal procedure code, section 195 - sanction to prosecute--'court to which appeals ordinarily lie'--collector--district judge. - - 5. i agree in the order proposed by the learned chief justice and in his reasons for holding that the district judge had jurisdiction to make the order complained of......to interfere, and referred her to the high court for orders. the lady, however, applied to the district judge, who, on the 19th of september 1896, made an order sanctioning the prosecution of shankar dial. shankar dial has now applied to this court to exercise its revisional powers and set aside the order of the district judge.2. the application is based upon two grounds--the one, that the court of the district judge is not the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the court of an assistant collector, and the other, on the merits of the application itself.3. as to the first ground, that depends upon the construction to be put upon the penultimate paragraph of section 195 of the code of criminal procedure, 1882. that paragraph is as follows: 'for the purpose of this section every.....
Judgment:

John Edge, Kt., C.J.

1. Shankar Dial, in a suit in a Court of Revenue made use of a document which is alleged to have been forged. An Assistant Collector of the first class who was trying the case refused to sanction the prosecution of Shankar Dial. However, the same Assistant Collector. At a subsequent date, having changed his mind assumed jurisdiction and granted sanction. He granted the sanction on the 21st of August 1895. On an application in revision in this Court the order granting sanction was set aside on the ground that the Assistant Collector of the first class had, by his refusal of the 1st of August 1895, exhausted his jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. The order of the High Court was passed on the 16th of December 1895. The applicant, who was desirous of bringing Shankar Dial to justice, waited until the 1st of June 1896, when the officer who had been the Assistant Collector of the first class was acting as Collector of the district, and then applied to him for sanction. He declined to interfere, and referred her to the High Court for orders. The lady, however, applied to the District Judge, who, on the 19th of September 1896, made an order sanctioning the prosecution of Shankar Dial. Shankar Dial has now applied to this Court to exercise its revisional powers and set aside the order of the District Judge.

2. The application is based upon two grounds--the one, that the Court of the District Judge is not the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the Court of an Assistant Collector, and the other, on the merits of the application itself.

3. As to the first ground, that depends upon the construction to be put upon the penultimate paragraph of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882. That paragraph is as follows: 'For the purpose of this section every Court, other than a Court of Small Causes, shall be deemed subordinate only to the Court to which appeals from the former Court ordinarily lie' That paragraph does not mean to give the jurisdiction to the Court to which the appeal in the matter in which the false document was used happened to lie. If that construction was put on the paragraph. it might happen that there would be no Court which could exercise the power of revoking or granting sanction which had been given or refused by the lower Court, as no appeal might lie in the particular case in which the perjury was committed or the false document used. It is impossible to say what the Legislature intended by that penultimate paragraph. To take the case of an Assistant Collector of the first class. Where an appeal would lie from his decision would depend upon the nature of the matter before him. The appeal might lie to the District Judge, to the Collector of the district or to the Commissioner of the Division. There are some cases in which no appeal would lie at all. As remarked by me in a somewhat similar case--Hari Prasad v. Debt Dial I.L.R. 10 All. 582--'I doubt whether the framers of Section 195 of Act No. X of 1882 had present to their minds the difficulty or ambiguity in this respect arising out of the provisions of the Rent Act, XII of 1881.' (That is, Act No. XII of 1881.) I might add that a similar difficulty might arise in deciding whether the High Court or the Court of the District Judge is the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The Legislature has placed the Courts in a most difficult position. It is impossible, in my opinion, for a Judge to give any satisfactory reason for holding in this case that the Court of the District Judge was the Court which had jurisdiction, and that the Collector would not have had jurisdiction and yet it was not intended by the Legislature that two Courts should have concurrent jurisdiction, or that the matter should be left in doubt. For reasons of convenience I am of opinion that we should apply the principle of decision of this Court in Hari Prasad v. Debi Dial I.L.R. 10 All. 582. If that decision had been present to my mind or had been brought to my attention in the case of Queen-Empress v. Ajudhia Prasad Weekly Notes 1895 p. 121. I should have followed it. I candidly confess that it is impossible for me to say which of these decisions is right. It is for the Legislature to say that, and by enactment to interpret Section 195 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I would hold accordingly that the District Judge had jurisdiction to make the order sanctioning the prosecution in this case.

4. So much for the legal aspect of the case. As to the merits, it is obvious that this lady, in making these different applications and allowing months to elapse before bringing, the matter to a conclusion, was actuated, not by a desire to further the interests of justice, but by a desire to oppress her opponent through the action of the Criminal Courts. There has been no explanation given of the delay between the 16th of December 1895 and June 1896. I would allow the application on the merits and would revoke the sanction to prosecute which has been granted.

Banerji, J.

5. I agree in the order proposed by the learned Chief Justice and in his reasons for holding that the District Judge had jurisdiction to make the order complained of.

Aikman, J.

6. I am of the same opinion as the learned Chief Justice and I concur in all that he has said.

7. The order of the Court is that the application is allowed and the sanction is revoked.


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