R. Dayal, J.
1. This is a special appeal against an order of Mr. Justice Mathur allowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. M/s. Rama Shankar Misra and Bros, (hereinafter called the respondent firm) filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of resolution No. 11 (e) dated 1-11-1956, of the Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur, cancelling permanent permit No. 374 for the Mahoba Rajnagar route held by the respondent firm and for the issue of writ of mandamus directing the Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur, and the State Transport Authority, Lucknow, not to interfere with its right of running the stage carriage on that route under that permit. Ahmad Husain, the appellant, on his application was made a party in the writ petition.
3. The facts leading to the writ petition are as follows: The respondent firm held stage carriage permit No. 374 for running their stage carriage on the Mahoba-Rajnagar route. The permit was valid up to the 4th October, 1958. Originally the permit related to vehicle No. U. P. R. 4801 but in July, 1952, the respondent firm got that vehicle replaced by another vehicle No. U. P. R. 6962. This vehicle met with an accident. The respondent firm then with the help of a loan from the appellant purchased vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 and got it substituted in the permit No. 374 in September, 1955.
On the 15th October, 1955, Rama Shankar Misra and Girja Shankar Misra (proprietors of the respondent firm) signed a receipt at the request of the appellant. The receipt stated that a three-fourths share in vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 had been sold to the appellant, that a three-fourths interest in the permit also had been given to him and that the appellant would from that date be the owner of a three-fourths share in the vehicle and in the permit. It also stated that the vehicle had been given over to the appellant. On the 27th June, 1956, it was agreed that the vehicle should be handed over to the appellant in full and final satisfaction of his dues.
4. Meanwhile, on 23-6-1956, the respondent firm applied for replacement of vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 by another vehicle No. U. S. H. 166 in permit No. 374 and stated in the affidavit accompanying that applicaiton: 'Neither they have sold the present existing vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 nor they intend to sell it with the benefit of the permit. The prayer was allowed by the Regional Transport Authority and the replacement actually took place on 2-7-1956.
5. On the 2Sth June, 1956, the registration certificate of vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 was surrendered and that vehicle was handed over to the appellant in full settlement of. his account.
6. On the 9th July, 1956, the appellant complained to the Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur, that the respondent firm had agreed to sell vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 to him and had obtained replacement in the permit without his knowledge. In spite of this objection the replacement of vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 by vehicle No. U. S. H. 166 was confirmed by the Regional Transport Authority on 25-7-1956.
7. In the meantime on 14-7-1956, the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur, issued a notice to the respondent firm to show cause why its permit be not cancelled under Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act on the ground of the complaint made by the appellant on 9-7-1956. The res-non-dent firm filed its objection narrating the facts mentioned above, but the Regional Transport Authority, Kanpur, on 1-11-1956, by its resolution No.11 (e.) cancelled the permit of the respondent firm. This resolution is:
'Permit of M/s. Rama Shankar Misra and Bros, be cancelled for misrepresenting facts by concealing the fact of partnership with Sri Ahmad Hussain. Application of M/s. Rama Shankar Misra and Bros, for extension of route is rejected as the permit has been cancelled'.
Thereafter the respondent firm filed the writ petition on the grounds, among others, that the permit could not have been cancelled under Section 60[l)fc) of the Motor Vehicles Act in the absence of a finding that the respondent firm had ceased to possess the vehicle covered by the permit, that Section 60(1)(d), allowing the cancellation of a permit if the holder of the permit has obtained it by fraud or misrepresentation, was inapplicable to the facts of the case and that the partnership or transfer of ownership in the vehicle was no ground for the cancellation of the permit.
8. The learned Judge did not allow the appellant's preliminary objection that the writ jurisdiction be not exercised in this case as the respondent firm had the remedy of preferring an appeal to the State Transport Authority against the order cancelling its permit as the cancellation of the permit affected the respondent firm's! fundamental right. He also rejected the objection that the respondent firm was no longer interested as the period of the permit expired on 4-10-1958, as if the cancellation of the permit was bad, the respondent firm would have a preferential claim to the renewal of the permit.
9. In the course of his order the learned Judge expressed the view that,
'.....the obtaining of an order for replacement of the old vehicle and also securing the suitable amendment of the permit will, in the eye of law, amount to the obtaining of a permit.' Me further held: 'If the permit was so obtained by misrepresentation, the Regional Transport Authority shall have the power under Clause (d) of Section 60(1) of the Act to cancel the permit.'
The learned Judge was also of opinion that the respondent firm avoided to make reference to the agreement executed on 15-10-1955, but came to the conclusion that the omission to state the true facts did not amount to a misrepresentation; and that, even if those facts had been mentioned, the Regional Transport Authority could not have refused the replacement of the vehicle. He accordingly quashed the order of the Regional Transport Authority cancelling the permit of the respondent firm,
10. With all respect we do not agree with the view of the learned Judge that a permit, when amended to give effect to the replacement of a vehicle in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act, becomes a new permit. We are of opinion that the old permit continues with the only difference that it first covered another vehicle and after replacement covered a new vehicle. Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act is:
'The holder of a permit may, with the permission of the authority by which the permit was granted, replace by another vehicle of the same nature and capacity any vehicle covered by the permit.'
If it be held that the permit had become a fresh permit, other conditions with respect to the permit will come into existence, the most important of which will be that the permit will get a fresh start of life, This is not contemplated by any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act. A permit-holder cannot in effect extend the period of his permit by replacing, even with the permission of the Transport Authority, the vehicle in respect of which the permit was originally granted.
11. The respondent firm's permit as already mentioned, was cancelled on the ground that the firm had misrepresented facts by concealing its partnership with Sri Ahmad Husain. This misrepresentation, if any, was made at the time the respondent firm applied for permission to replace vehicle No. U. S. C. 266 by vehicle No. U. S. H. 166; it was not made at the time when the cancelled permit No. 374 was originally granted in 1951 or when it was renewed subsequently in 1955. It follows therefore that the respondent firm could not be said to have obtained permit No. 374 by fraud or misrepresentation and that the order of the Regional Transport Authority cancelling this permit in the exercise of its powers under Section 60(1)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act on the ground of misrepresentation was bad in law. In these circumstances the order of the learned Judge setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority is correct.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent firm had ceased to possess the vehicle which had been transferred to the appellant, and that therefore the permit could be cancelled in accordance with Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The permit was not cancelled for this reason. No such ground in support of the order of the Regional Transport Authority was taken in the memorandum of appeal. The decision of this question depends on the fact whether the respondent firm had ceased to possess vehicle No. U. S. C. 266. We therefore do not consider this contention any further.
13. We are therefore of opinion, though for a different reason that the order of the learned Judge is correct. We accordingly dismiss the appeal.