1. I have no doubt that this contention is perfectly sound and must prevail. It has been found by the Munsif that Musammat Rupo was married to Pat Ram in one of the four approved forms of marriage, and this finding was not disturbed in the Lower Appellate Court. Indeed, in the Court of First Instance, no allegation was made on behalf of the defence to the effect that the marriage of Rupo was in an unapproved form; and this being no, the observations of the Lords of the Privy Council in Thakoor Deyhee v. Baluk Ram 11 Moo. I.A. 135 seem to me to dispose of the point raised in this appeal. Their Lordships observed: 'The devolution of stridhan from a childless widow is regulated by the nature of the marriage. There is nothing here to show that, Choteh Bebee was not married according to one of the four approved foims. In that case her stridhan would, according to the Mitakshara (chap. ii, Section xi, Article 11), go to the respondents as the collateral heirs of her husband. This view of the law is confirmed by two cases in 2 Strange's 'Hindu Law,' pp. 411 and 412, and the comments of Mr. Colebrooke and others thereon, at p. 175'
2. This passage leaves no doubt upon the question now before us, and indeed the learned pleaders for the respondents have not contested it, nor have they contended that the marriage of Musammat Rupo was in one of the inferior forms which would render her stridhan heritable by her parental family. All that the learned pleader have asked us on behalf of the respondents is, that we should remand the case to the Lower Appellate Court for a finding as to the adoption of Kewal by Musammat Rupo. But the plea was distinctly given up in the Lower Appellate Court, and, under the circumstances, I do not think we should make a remand for a finding upon the issue, the Munsif, after a careful consideration of the evidence, having recorded a distinct finding against the alleged adoption.
2. I would decree this appeal with costs, and, reversing the decree of the Lower Appellate Court, restore that of the Court of First Instance.
3. But I wish to add that the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Munia v. Puran I.L.R. 5 All. 310 which WHS referred to at the hearing, is clearly distinguishahle from this case, because all that was ruled there was that a woman's siridhan, being property over which she had absolute control, her husband's relations have no reversionary interest in such property so as to be entitled to set aside any acts of transfer made by her during her lifetime. There is nothing in that case to warrant the conclusion that upon the death of a widow, when the question of devolution arises, her husband's relations would not be her heirs.
4. I concur.