1. The question raised by this reference is, whether the terms of the order of the Munsif which was passed on the 2nd August 1884, amounted to a 'sanction' or to a 'complaint' under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It seems that in the course of a suit which had been heard before him, and which had closed, the Munsif was of opinion that certain persons had committed offences under Sections 193, 463, and 471 of the Penal Code, and, having all the materials before him, he came to the conclusion that a prosecution should be instituted. He accordingly directed that they should be sent to the Magistrate of Etah under bail, and the Magistrate should inquire into the matter.
2. It is said on behalf of the persons prosecuted that the Munsif s order was a 'sanction' and not a 'complaint' under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Upon this point I may observe that every such order must in a sense be a sanction, because it implies that the Judge wishes and authorizes that a prosecution should take place. The law does not require that the sanction should be expressed in any special terms. It need not (though it is desirable that it should) expressly name the person at whom it is directed so long as its meaning and intention are clearly shown. It does not appear to me that the order in the present case must necessarily be construed to be a sanction within the meaning of Section 195. The question then arises whether or not the order amounted to a 'complaint.' During the argument I 'intimated my opinion that the words in Section 195--'except with the previous sanction or on the complaint of the public servant concerned'--must be read in connection with Section 476, and Section 476 affords a clear indication of what was contemplated by the Legislature regarding the nature of the complaint of a Civil Court under Section 195. It is easy to imagine the inconvenience which might be caused if a Munsif, or a Subordinate Judge, or a Judge were obliged to appear before a Magistrate and make a complaint on oath in order to lay the foundation for a prosecution, and for this reason the Legislature thought it desirable that the procedure to be followed in case of complaint by a Court should be different from that which has to be observed by an ordinary complainant. Section 476 is in the following terms: 'When any Civil, Criminal, or Revenue Court is of opinion that there is ground for inquiring into any offence referred to in Section 195, and committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, such Court, after making any preliminary inquiry that may be necessary, may send the case for inquiry or trial to the nearest Magistrate of the first class, and may send the accused in custody or take sufficient security for his appearance before such Magistrate, and may bind over any person to appear and give evidence on such inquiry or trial.' In the first place, there is here a distinct reference to Section 195, and therefore a complaint under that section must be shaped according to the provisions of Section 476. The Munsif in the present case did comply with those provisions. It is true that he refers to Section 643 of the Civil Procedure Code, but I think that this circumstance is of no great importance; and that, considering that Section 643 of the Civil Procedure Code is closely similar to Section 476, the order may be taken as having been passed under the latter section; and, looking at the matter in this way, I think that the Munsif's order, whether it was or was not a sanction, was a sufficient 'complaint,' and satisfied the requirements of the law under Sections 195 and 476. In my opinion the language of such last-mentioned section indicates that where a Court is acting under Section 195, a complaint in the strict sense of the Code is not required, and that the procedure therein laid down constitutes the complaint mentioned in Section 195. This being so, there is nothing to prevent the prosecution being proceeded with, and the Magistrate, with reference to the last paragraph of Section 476, should entertain and dispose of the matter.
3. I am of the same opinion.
4. The grounds for revision are, in my opinion, invalid. The Munsif's proceedings were taken under Section 643 of the Civil Procedure Code; no inquiry other than was made was required by law; and the limitation period referred to by Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to this case.
5. The case would in all probability have been decided long ago, had it not been for the delay that occurred in the Judge's Court in disposing of the petitioner's application.
6. The District Judge's view of the law is correct, and his order is a proper one. I would reject the application.
7. Chapter XV of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down rules governing proceedings in prosecutions. Part B prescribes the 'conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.' Section 191 gives the general rule that 'any ' offence may come to the cognizance of the Criminal Court: (a) by complaint of individuals, (b) by police report, (c) or by other information. But this rule is specially limited by Section 195, which prohibits the prosecution of certain specified offences, except (a) on the complaint of certain Courts, or (b) on sanction given to individuals by such Courts. In the latter case, the individual would proceed to lay his complaint under Section 191; in the other case, the Court contemplated by Section 195 would take action by way of 'complaint,' and the procedure to be followed by such Court is prescribed in Chapter XXV, Section 476, referred to by my learned brother Straight.