Satish Chandra, J.
1. A learned Single Judge of this Court felt that the decision of another Single Judge in Parmanand v. Smt. Chimmawati : AIR1955All64 requires reconsideration. He referred the case to a Division Bench.
2. The plaintiff-applicants institute ed a suit for a declaration that they are the original owners in possession of the house in dispute and for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant No. 1 from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession either by executing the decree granted to him under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act or through any other means or ways. Along with the plaint the plaintiffs filed an application for an ad interim injunction to restrain the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiffs. The trial Court relying upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in : AIR1955All64 , held that the applicant was not entitled to an injunction and rejected it. This view was confirmed by the Civil Judge on appeal.
3. In Parmanand's case : AIR1955All64 a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act was decreed. The defendant to that suit instituted a regular title Suit praying for an injunction restraining the defendant from executing the decree granted under Section 9. It was held that such a suit does not lie because if the prayer for an injunction is granted the very object and purpose of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act will be defeated. The object and purpose of that suit was that if a person takes the law in his own hands and forcibly dispossesses another otherwise than in accordance with law he must surrender possession irrespective of any title that may vest in him. If a plea of title cannot be set up in the suit itself, it can also not be set up as a bar to execution proceedings. In our opinion this decision does not represent the correct position of law.
4. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 corresponds to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act provides that if any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Such proceedings are summary and are intended merely to adjudicate the question as to which party was in possession on the relevant date and whether the plaintiff was dispossessed without his consent. Questions of title are outside the purview of such a suit. It is specifically provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 6 which says that a decree under Sub-section (1) shall not preclude him 'from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. Section 5 further provides that a person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
5. These provisions contemplate the institution of a title suit in spite of the decision of a suit under Section 6. Since the decree under Section 6 grants possession to the dispossessed plaintiff Sub-section (4) thereof specifically makes it clear that such a decree cannot bar a fresh suit for recovery of possession. The phrase 'and to recover possession thereof occurring in Section 6 does not, in our opinion, preclude or bar a suit for title in which a consequential relief other than the relief for recovery of possession may be taken. It will depend upon the factual position. In a case where the plaintiff is dissatisfied with a decree under Section 6 he can immediately institute a suit for a declaration of his title. He can claim the available consequential relief. If on the date of the suit the plaintiff finds himself in possession of the property, he cannot, legitimately ask for recovery of possession. All that he can pray for is that the status quo be maintained and an injunction be issued restraining the defendant from dispossessing him. This consequential relief naturally follows from his claim on title coupled with the reality and the situation. There is nothing in Sections 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act to debar the plaintiff from claiming an appropriate consequential relief.
6. In Permanand's case : AIR1955All64 it was held that permitting a person to sue to obtain an injunction restraining the other side from executing the decree would defeat the object of Section 9. That may be so. It may also be urged that a suit simpliciter for such a relief, namely, to restrain the respondent from executing the decree, may be barred by Section 41(a) and 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act. Rut the position will not be the same in a suit for declaration of title and consequential relief for preservation of plaintiff's possession. In the present case the relief sought is for a declaration and for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff either by executing the decree or through any other means or ways. This, strictly speaking, is not a suit either to restrain the defendant from prosecuting a judicial proceeding or from instituting the execution application within meaning of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 41. The relief is to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and not for a direction to prevent him from instituting or prosecuting the execution proceedings. From this point of view this case is slightly distinguishable from the facts of Parmanand's case : AIR1955All64 .
7. Our attention is invited to the decision of Mari Doddatamma Markundi v. Santaya Ram Krishna Pai Kolle AIR 1922 Bom 216 wherein it was held that a person in possession against whom a decree under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act has been passed in favour of another person can bring a suit to establish his title to the land, and for an injunction restraining the other person from executing his decree. It was held that such a suit is not barred by Section 56 of the Old Specific Relief Act, which is equivalent to Section 41(a) of the present Act.
8. In our opinion the suit was competent.
9. The question whether on facts the plaintiff was entitled to an interim injunction of the kind prayed for is entirely a different matter. The court will have to apply its mind whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience is in his favour. In that connection the fact that a court has granted a decree directing the other side to be put back in possession is a relevant circumstance. The courts below have, however, not applied their minds to the facts of the case. It is, therefore, necessary to send the case back.
10. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. The matter is sent back to the trial Court for disposal of the application for an interim injunction in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. The parties will however bear their own costs.