1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for the recovery of revenue. The plaintiff-appellant is the assignee of the revenue from the Government and the defendant-respondent is a person in the position of the zamindar who is liable to pay the revenue. One of the defences was that the plaintiff had borrowed some money from the defendant and had entered into a specific agreement that his debt should be repaid by setting it off against the revenue as the revenue fell due. The defendant alleged on the basis of the agreement that his liability for the payment of revenue had been discharged. His contention was upheld by the Courts below. Two arguments have been addressed to me. One is that the learned Assistant Collector, who tried the suit, relied upon the evidence of the defendant's account books which were produced only on the date when the other evidence in the case was produced. The suggestion is that the plaintiff-appellant had no sufficient opportunity to meet this evidence. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has pointed out that he did not protest at the time against the production of the account books and that he made no application to produce any further evidence to rebut the evidence of the account books although he did ask for an opportunity to produce further evidence to rebut some other evidence which had been produced by the defendant. In these circumstances there is no force in the contention that the plaintiff-appellant was prejudiced by the production of these account books at a stage of the proceedings.
2. The other argument is that there can be no set off in a Revenue Court. There seems to be underlying this argument a confusion about the exact meaning of the term set off.' When it is said that there can be no set off in the Revenue Court, the meaning is that a set off allowed under Order 8, Rule 6, Civil P. C, in a Civil Court cannot be allowed in a revenue Court under the provisions of Sch. 2, Agra Tenancy Act. The term 'set off' used in this sense means a counter-claim which the defendant to a suit is entitled to make in the course of the suit. The provisions of Order 8, Rule 6 amount only to this, that a defendant instead of filing a separate suit can set off a claim in his capacity as a defendant in certain circumstances. The sense in which the term 'set off' has been used in the case before me is quite different. The defendant alleged that he had under the agreement set off the amount due under the debt against the amount due as revenue before the suit was instituted, or in other words he was not making a counter-claim against the plaintiff but was alleging that the plaintiff's claim against him had been discharged. There is nothing to prevent a defendant in a Revenue Court from saying that the liability incurred by him has been legally discharged. It may be discharged by payment in cash or by an agreement which amounts to an acceptance of payment by the person making the claim. The finding of fact is that the discharge did take place. The result is that there is no force in this appeal and I dismiss it under Order 41, Rule 11, Civil P.C.