H.N. Kapoor, J.
1. This is a defendant's appeal against the decree and judgment dated 5-12-1963 of the Civil Judge, Mainpuri in civil appeal No. 98 of 1960 confirming the decree and judgment dated 25-1-1960 of the Munsif Shikohabad in original suit No. 119 of 1958 by which the plaintiff's suit for possession of the property in suit was decreed.
2. The plaintiff brought the suit on the allegations that the land in dispute belonged to Sri Ram Chandra Maharaj Birajman Mandir Ram Chandraji and Harbilas was its sarbarakar. The property was given to Chiranjilal defendant No. 2 (respondent) in 1951 by means of a lease deed dated 1-9-1951. He was allowed to make additions and alterations but he was not allowed to sub-let or transfer the property. He could, however, remove the material at the time of vacating the possession. Initially the lease was for one year only. It was alleged that Chiranjilal defendant No. 2 vacated the property and put defendant No. 1 in possession by executing a sale deed in his favour in January, 1956 which was against the conditions of the lease. Defendant No. 1 was in unlawful possession since then. He did not vacate the premises though he was asked to do so, hence the suit.
3. Defendant No. 2 (respondent) did not contest the suit, Only defendant No. 1 (appellant) contested the suit on the ground that his predecessor-interest, i. e., defendant No. 2 was the owner of the property in suit and as a result of transfer, defendant No. 1, became the owner. It was claimed that there were no constructions on the land when it was taken by defendant No. 2, who made constructions. It was further claimed that defendant No. 1, also made construction to the knowledge of Harbilas and as such he was estopped. It was also contended that defendant No. 2 had not vacated the premises in terms of the conditions of the lease deed and defendant No. 1 had succeeded to all the rights of ownership of defendant No. 2. There were some other pleadings also.
4. The trial court framed issues on the pleadings of the parties and arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner of the properly and that Harhilas was the sarbarakar. It further held that defendant No. 2 was a lessee and not a licencee and. that the suit was not barred by estoppel and acquiescence. It also held that the suit was maintainable even without getting the sale deed cancelled. It also observed that the plea of Section 41 Transfer of Property Act was also taken half-heartedly but it was not proved that defendant No. 1, was a bona fide purchaser. The following two points only were argued, before the lower appellate court.
'1. On the allegations in the plaint, defendant No. 2 was a lessee. He sold the property treating it as his own, as such he incurred forfeiture. When forfeiture came about, the plaintiff ought to have given a notice under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act and in absence of such a notice, the suit for possession is not maintainable.
2. The learned Munsif ought not to have granted decree for possession along with the materials when the constructions were made by defendant No. 2 who sold his property to the defendant-appellant.'
The lower appellate court held that under the circumstances of this case notice under Section 111(g) Transfer of Property Act was not necessary as the suit was brought against the person by the owner who was not the lessee and that person also did not claim to be holding under the lessee of the plaintiff. But he set up a case that he himself was the owner and his predecessor-in-interest too was the owner and not the lessee of the plaintiff. On the second point- it held that the learned Munsif was perfectly justified in not allowing the defendant-appellant to remove the material before his ejectment with these findings, the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved, defendant No. 1 has filed this appeal.
5. Both these points have been reagitated before me. So far the second point is concerned, even the learned counsel for the respondents found it difficult to support the findings of the lower Court. Under the lease, it was clearly provided that the lessee would be able to remove his material whenever he surrendered possession or he had to give possession. The defendant-appellant who was, in any view of the matter, transferee of the materials should have been allowed an opportunity to remove the materials before giving possession of the property to the plaintiff.
6. The first point was argued at considerable length by learned counsel for both the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant had first argued that Defendant No. 2 held possession of the land in dispute as licencee and not as a lessee and that the licence was irrevocable as permission was given for making permanent constructions. He subsequently gave up that argument. I have myself examined carefully the lease deed. There can be no doubt that the lease was created by means of the document dated 1-9-1951. It was for one year. The rent for the entire year was Rs. 100/- and the monthly rent was Rs. 8/4/5 pies which was payable monthly. This was a bilateral transaction. As such the lease could have been created by an unregistered document. Defendant No. 2 was given permission to re-erect shops and to construct a shed for running a chakki. It would not become a licence simply because permission was given to the lessee to raise constructions on the land even if some constructions may be of a permanent nature.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant next argued that it was a case of holding over under the lease and that lease was not determined by means of a notice as contemplated by Section 111(g) or Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In my opinion, there is force in this contention. It is not disputed that even in the case of holding over the lease is to be determined by giving notice under Section 106 of the said Act. It was so held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kishan Chand v. Sheodatt (1958 All LJ 427) : (AIR 1958 SC 879). Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly provides that the effect of holding over would be that the lease is renewed from year to year or from month to month according to the purpose for which the property is leased out as specified in Section 106. In the present case, because the monthly rent was payable, it would be deemed that the lease was renewed from month to month after the expiry of the stipulated period of one year. Defendant No. 2 was allowed to remain in possession of the property till January, 1956 when he transferred the property to defendant No. 1. Thereafter, defendant No. 1 was allowed to remain in possession of the property, till the suit was brought in March, 1958. Such a notice is a must under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as under Section 111(h) of the said Act. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that in the present case there was a breach of the condition of tenancy and the property was sold although it was specifically provided in the lease deed that the property could not be sub-let or sold and as such the lease stood determined by forfeiture, He has also argued that defendant No. 1 was claiming ownership of the property and was setting up ownership in the hands of his predecessor-in-interest, i. e., defendant No. 2 and as such it was not accessary to determine the lease by means of a notice but the same stood determined by forfeiture. He has laid great stress on the fact that defendant No. 2 did not contest the suit nor filed appeal and that practically no relief was claimed against him because possession of the property could be taken from the hands of defendant No. 1. I do not agree with this contention. Defendant No. 2 was a necessary party and the suit had been decreed against both the defendants. The contesting defendant claimed under defendant No. 2. There can be no doubt that he succeeded to the rights of defendant No. 2. It was, therefore, not possible to bring a suit for possession without determining the lease. It is significant that under Section 111(g) the lease is required to be determined even when the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title. That clause may be reproduced with advantage.
'111. A lease of immoveable property determines-
(g) by forfeiture; that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease.'
8. It is thus clear that even when the lessee sets up title in himself or in third person, the lease is to be forfeited by means of notice, and does not stand automatically forfeited. In the present case, it is certainly not possible to claim relief against defendant No. 1 without determining the lease of defendant No. 2 as defendant No. 1 can easily take the plea that he was holding the property through defendant No. 2.
9. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that this clause could have applied when the lessee himself set up a title in himself or in a third person but not when a third person was resisting the suit and setting up a title in himself or in the original lessee. He has also placed reliance on the proviso to Section 114-A which provides that notice under Section 114-A is not necessary when there is a breach of an express condition against the assigning, disposing of the property leased etc. In my opinion the notice contemplated under Section 114-A is not the same as contemplated under Section 111(g). Section 114-A is as follows:
'Where a lease of immoveable property has determined by forfeiture for a breach of an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, no suit for ejectment shall lie unless and until the lessor has served on the lessee a notice in writing-
(a) specifying the particular breach complained of; and
(b) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach; and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time from the date of the service of the notice, to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy.
Nothing in this section shall apply to an express condition against the assigning, under-letting, parting with the possession, or disposing of the property leased, or to an express condition relating to forfeiture in case of non-payment of rent.'
10. Section 114-A clearly provides for a notice under certain circumstances when the breach of an express condition can be remedied so that a further opportunity may be allowed to the lessee to remedy the breach. But the notice under Section 111(g) is necessary for determining the lease even if it is deter-mined by forfeiture. Similarly, notice is necessary under Section 111(h) read with Section 106 of the Act. In my opinion, it makes no difference whether the lessee himself renounces the character as such by setting up a title! in a third person or by claiming in himself or puts another person in possession of the property through whom the character of the lessee as such is renounced and a title is set up in him as well as in that third person. In my opinion, the lease was not properly determined and was still subsisting and the suit could not have been decreed without determining the lease. The suit fails on this ground alone.
11. In the result the appeal is allowed and the decrees and judgments of the lower courts are set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
12. The appellant was directed to deposit the security amount at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month on 7-5-1965 by this Court. It will be possible for him to recover the amount in excess after adjusting the rental amount at the rate of Rs. 100/- per year or Rs. 8/5/4 pies per month.