1. This is an appeal by the General Secretary, Indian Press, Allahabad, Mazdoor Union against the order of the certifying officer, dated 2nd July 1949 by which certain annulments have been made to the standing orders in force in the Indian Press, Allahabad.
2. The facts are that there arose a dispute between the management and the employees of the Indian Press. This dispute was referred to the Labour Commissioner by the Government on 30th April. 1949. The standing orders relating to this establishment were finalised by an order of the appellate authority on 8th March 1948 and this order was served on the parties on 22nd March 1948. In the meantime, an application had been made by the management of the Indian Press to the certifying officer for modification of the standing orders on 6th December 1948. The certifying officer passed an order thereon on 2nd July 1949 making certain amendments while the adjudication proceedings under the orders of the Government dated 30th April 1949 were still pending final orders of the Provincial Government. The award was, however, given on 10th June 1949 in pursuance of the Government's order, dated 80th April 1949. This award was enforced by an order of the Government, dated 2nd August 1949. The award was to remain in force for six months from 2nd August 1949 in the first instance and then was to continue in force for such further period as might be prescribed. The first period of six months from 2nd August 1949 is still turning.
3. The contention of the appellant before me is two fold. It has been urged, in the first place, that in view of Section 10, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act No. XX  of 1946, no amendment can be made to the standing orders except with the consent of both the parties. Secondly, it is urged that in view of Section 17, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act No. XXVIII  of 1947, no amendment could be made to the standing orders in July 1949.
4. I shall first consider the effect of S. 10 of Act XX  of 1946. Section 10(1) of this Act reads as follows :
'Standing orders finally certified under this Act shall not, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, be liable to modification until the expiry of six months from the date on which the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation.'
The argument, on behalf of the appellant, is that the words 'except on agreement between the employer and the workmen' used in this section mean that standing orders which have once been certified cannot be changed except on such agreement. On the other hand, the contention, on behalf of the respondent, is that no amendment can be made within six months except with the consent of both the parties, but that thereafter it is not necessary to have the consent of both parties in order to make any amendment to the certified standing orders. I am of opinion that the contention of the respondent is correct and that consent of both parties is only necessary where amendment is to be made within six months of the certification or last modification, if one leaves out the words on which reliance is placed by the appellant, Section 10(1) will read as under:
'Standing orders finally certified under this Act shall not be liable to modification until the expiry of six months from the date on which the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation.'
If the section had stood like this, it would not have been possible to amend the standing orders at all within the period of six months, but they could be so amended after the period of six months had expired. The introduction of the words 'except on agreement between the employer and the workmen' was clearly meant to remove the bar that there could be no amendment within six months. These words could not have been intended to introduce a further bar that no amendment would ever take place even after the period of six months without the consent of both parties, The natural interpretation, therefore of Section 10(1), as it stands, is that the standing orders cannot be changed within six months of the certification or the last modification unless both parties consent to such an amendment. After the period of six mouths has expired, they are open to amendments in the manner prescribed under the Act. The standing orders finally came into operation, in this case, on 22nd of March
1948. The application for modification was made on 6th of December 1948 more than six months after this date. Therefore, it was not necessary to have the consent of both parties in order to make a modification in the standing orders.
5. The next argument, on behalf of the appellant, is that in view of the proceedings pending on the basis of the order of the Government, dated 30th April 1949 which came to an end on and August 1949, the certifying officer could not amend the standing orders on 2nd July 1949. The Provincial Government can pass an order Under Section 3 (d) of Act XXVIII  of 1947 for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation or adjudication. When such an order is passed, the Provincial Government can also order that any previous condition of service which were in force on the date the order was passed should remain in force till the decision of the dispute referred Under Section 3 (d). In its order of 30th April 1949, the Provincial Government had ordered that during the adjudication proceedings, the conditions of service of the employees of the Indian Press would not be less favourable to them than those existing at the date of this order. On 2nd of August 1949, the Provincial Government enforced the award which had been given on 10th of June 1949 for a period of six months. Reliance is, therefore, placed on Section 17, U. P. Industrial Disputes Act No. XXVIII  of 1947 and it is urged that the certifying officer could not amend the standing orders which were in force on 30th of April 1949 in view of the order of that date and the order of 2nd August 1949 enforcing the award, dated 10th June 1949. Section 17 of the said Act reads as follows:
'Any rule or order made or deemed to be made under this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other enactment or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any other enactment.'
The words of Section 17 clearly show that it does not take away the jurisdiction, which is vested in authorities under other laws, to act in accordance with those laws. It only makes an order under the Industrial Disputes Act paramount so long as it remains in existence. But as soon as the order under the Industrial Disputes Act comes to an end, orders passed under other enactments come into force. If the intention of the Legislature was to take way the jurisdiction of authorties under other laws, Section 17 would have been worded very differently. I am, therefore, of opinion that Section 17 did not take away the jurisdiction, which the certifying officer had under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act No. XX  of 1946, to certify the standing orders and to amend them. The only effect of Section 17 is that any standing orders certified or amended by the certifying officer, if they are inconsistent with the order under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, would be superseded for such time as the order remains in force and would revive as soon as the order comes to an end. As such, the certifying officer had the jurisdiction to make amendments in the standing orders on 2nd July 1949 and his order cannot be set aside on that ground. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. But I would like to make it clear that so long as the order of 2nd August 1949 remains in force any provisions in the amended standing orders which are inconsistent with the order of 2nd August 1949, will be superseded by the provisions embodied in the order of 2nd August 1949.
6. The appeal is, hereby, dismissed. The parties will, however, bear their own costs.