1. This is an application in revision by the defendant from an order setting aside a dismissal for default of appearance in a suit for profits in the Revenue Court. The Assistant Collector rightly or wrongly came to the conclusion that there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the plaintiff, and has there fore ordered that the dismissal for default be set aside and the original suit be restored to its number. It is quite clear that no appeal lies from an order setting aside such a dismissal. Section 248(3), Agra Tenancy Act, makes only such orders as are mentioned in Sections 47, 104 and Order 43 appealable. This is not such an order. It follows therefore that although if a decree were passed in a suit, an appeal might have laid to the District Judge, no appeal lies to him from the order in question. The language of Section 253, Agra Tenancy Act, which has replaced the provisions of Section 115, Civil P.C., therefore precludes us from entertaining a revision, because no appeal lies to the District Judge from the order sought to be revised. The language of the section is in clear contrast with the language of Section 252 where the Board may call for the record of any case which has been decided by a subordinate Revenue Court in which no appeal lies either to the District Judge or to the Board.
2. The learned advocate for the applicant relies strongly on the case of Krishna Saroop v. Raj Bahadur Singh : AIR1931All452 , in which a revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., was entertained by another Bench of this Court. A preliminary objection does not appear to have been taken, and the question therefore was not expressly decided. It also appears that the attention of the Bench was not drawn to an earlier case of this Court, namely, Jagdeo Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh : AIR1929All735 , where it was clearly held that Section 115 does not apply to Revenue Court cases at all. Our jurisdiction in revision is confined strictly within the four corners of Section 253. In the circumstances, we do not think that that case is any binding authority upon us. The language of Section 253 is quite clear. It cannot mean that in a suit in which, if a decree were passed ultimately, an appeal would lie to the District Judge, the High Court can interfere with every interlocutory order passed by the subordinate Court. The jurisdiction is confined to cases where when a suit or application has been decided, an appeal lies from that order to the District Judge and no appeal lies to the High Court. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion whether the Board of Revenue can entertain a revision under Section 252 by holding that a case has been decided by a subordinate Revenue Court. The application is accordingly dismissed, We direct that the parties should bear their own costs of this revision.