M.P. Mehrotra, J.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit for possession which was filed by the plaintiff-respondent On the allegation that the defendant-appellant had been induct-ed as a licencee by the former and the licence had been revoked. Despite the revocation of the licence, the defendant did not vacate and, therefore, possession was sought along with a claim for damages for unauthorised use and occupation, past, pendente lite and future. Both the courts below have decreed the suit. In this second appeal, Shri Markandey Katju, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the plaintiff was only one of the co-owners of the property and his own brother Nokhe Lal, who was another co-owner, had entered the witness box on behalf of the defendant-appellant and thus it should be held that the said co-owner wanted the defendant-appellant to remain in occupation of the accommodation. In this situation, the learned counsel contends that the suit could not be decreed at the instance of only one of the co-owners of the property. In my opinion, this contention is untenable. The finding of both the courts below is that the defendant-appellant had been inducted as a licensee by the plaintiff alone. Subsequently, it seems that Nokhe Lal raised some dispute about the title of the house in dispute. The plaintiff denied that Nokhe Lal had any right or interest in the said property. However, the defendant-appellant as a licensee, who had been inducted by the plaintiff alone, could not take advantage of this dispute between the plaintiff and Nokhe Lal. It did not lie in his mouth to deny the title of the plaintiff to eject him when it has been found that it was the plaintiff alone who had inducted the defendant-appellant. Merely, because a third party seeks to raise some controversy about the plaintiff's title could not entitle a licensee who has been inducted by a licensor to question the title of the licensor. The licensee would be estopped from doing so. Section 116 of the Evidence Act lays down as under :--
'No tenant of immoveable property, or person claiming through such tenant shall, during the continuance of the lenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the lenancy, a title to such immoveable properly; and no person who came upon any immoveable properly by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.'
2. This provision is a complete answer to the contention which has been raised by Shri Kafju. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.