O.H. Mootham, C.J.
1. I agree with' the judgment of Raghubar Dayal, J., but as I was a party to the decision in Badri Prasad Rastogi v. President, District Board, Mirzapur, 1952 All LJ 56 : (AIR 1952 All 681), I think it proper to state shortly the reasons which have led me, on further consideration, to the conclusion that that case was not correctly decided.
2. Section 90, Sub-section (3) of the U. P. District Boards Act provides that the power of dismissal shall be deemed to include a power to suspend the person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised. Schedule I to the Act, read with Section 67(1), specifies the powers which (subject to those against which an entry is shown in the third column) shall be exercised by the Board, and not otherwise; and the Schedule includes among .such powers, the power conferred on the Board under Section 71 to dismiss its Secretary, The crucial word (and this I think was overlooked in Badri Prasad Rastogi's case, 1952 All LJ 56 : (AIR 1952 All 681)) is 'power'. The Schedule specifies 'the power to dismiss', and that power, by virtue of Section 90(3), must in my opinion, be deemed to include the power to suspend.
3. An examination of the judgment in Badri Prasad Rastogi's case, 1952 All LJ 56 : (AIR 1952 All 681) shows, I think, that the Court proceeded on the basis that the power to dismiss and the power to suspend were separate and independent powers. The Court was, it would appear -- and that such was the case is frankly admitted by learned counsel for the appellant who was also the counsel appearing for the appellant in Badri Prasad Rastogi's case, 1952 All LJ 56 : (AIR 1952 All 681) --invited to hold that the power to dismiss and the power to suspend constituted one power; and it is that argument which was rejected by the Court, The Court was right in doing so, but if I may say so with respect to Sapru, J. the Court was in error in failing to appreciate that, although separate, the power to suspend was by virtue of Section 90(3), always included in the power to dismiss.
4. The question referred to the Full Bench is whether the case of 1952 All LJ 56: (AIR 1952 All 681) was rightly decided. It was held in that case that the President of the District Board can suspend the Secretary of the Board pending enquiry as the power of suspension is separate from the power of dismissal which cannot be exercised by the President but is to be exercised by the Board itself.
5. Section 70 of the District Boards Act (hereinafter called the Act) empowers the District Board to appoint by special resolution its Secretary. Section 71 of the Act empowers the Board by special resolution to punish or dismiss its secretary.
6. Section 40 of the Act provides that the powers, duties and functions of the Board mentioned therein may be exercised and shall be performed or discharged by the President of the Board and not otherwise. Clause (d) of that section mentions all other duties, powers and functions of a Board with the exception of those specified in the second column of Schedule I and those delegated by the Board under Section 68. The second column of Schedule I mentions against Section 71 'to punish or dismiss a secretary' which expression, in view of the heading, means the power to punish or dismiss a Secretary. It is clear therefore that the power to punish or dismiss a Secretary does not come within the powers of the President under Clause (d) of Section 40 of the Act.
7. Sub-section (1) of Section 67 provides that the powers specified in the second column of Schedule I with the exception of those against which an entry is shown in the third column of that Schedule may be exercised and shall be performed or discharged by a Board by resolution passed at a meeting of the Board and not otherwise. There is no entry in the third column against Section 71. It follows that the power to dismiss a Secretary shall be exercised by the Board by a resolution and not otherwise.
8. Section 90 of the Act is :
'(1) Suspension may be of two kinds :
(a) suspension as a punishment;
(B) suspension pending inquiry or orders.
(2) Where a general power to punish is conferred by this Act, it shall be deemed to include a power to suspend as a punishment for a period not exceeding three months.
(3) Where a power of dismissal, whether subject to the sanction of any other authority or not, is conferred by this Act, it shall be deemed to include a power to suspend any person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised, pending inquiry into his conduct or pending the orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal.
(4) Where suspension is ordered pending inquiry or orders and the officer suspended is ultimately restored, it shall be at the discretion of the authority ordering his suspension whether ho shall get any, and, if so, what, allowance during the period of suspension; but in the absence of any order to the contrary he shall be entitled to the full, remuneration which he would have received but for such suspension.'
'It is in view of Sub-section (3) of Section 90 that it is urged for the appellant that the power of suspending a Secretary can be exercised by the Board itself and not by the President as the power to suspend is deemed to be included in the power of dismissal conferred on any authority. Mr. Khare's reply to this contention is that Sub-section (3) of Section 90 does not; state who is to exercise the power of suspension, that therefore the power of suspension is the power of the Board and as it is not mentioned in column 2 of Schedule I of the Act, the President can exercise it in view of his power under Clause (d) of Section 40. I do not agree with the contention for the respondent. The power of suspension is not conferred on the Board by Sub-section (3) of Section 90.
It is conferred, if it can be said to be conferred specifically, on the authority on which the power of dismissal is conferred be it the Board or the President or the Secretary, in view of Section 82 of the Act or other provisions. When the power of suspension is not conferred on the Board as such but can, be exercised by it in view of the power of dismissal conferred on it, the power of suspension cannot be said to bo a separate power of the Board which, can be exercised by the President in view of its being not specifically mentioned in Schedule I.
9. The power to dismiss a secretary mentioned in Schedule I includes the power to suspend him in view of Sub-section (3) of Section 90 and it follows therefore that only the Board can exercise this power and that it cannot be exercised by the President.
10. Mr. Khare submits that Sub-section (3) of Section 90 giving the statutory power of suspending a person does not mention the authority which can exercise this power and does not give the method for the exercise thereof. The provisions do mention the authority which will have the power to suspend pending enquiry, and such authority is the one which has the power to dismiss the person concerned. Sub-section (3) of Section 90 does not lay down any procedure for ordering the suspension of a person. Possibly none is required. A simple order of suspension and its communication to the person concerned is sufficient and therefore no necessity for mentioning any special procedure arises.
11. Mr. Khare further contends that this subsection does not create a composite or inseparable power of dismissal and suspension but creates am additional power of suspension and that the word 'include' enlarges the meaning of the power of dismissal. The submission is correct so far as the enlarging of the power of dismissal is concerned. The power of dismissal is not now restricted to mere dismissing a person but includes in itself the power to suspend him prior to dismissal. It is also partly correct that an additional power is created, but it is created in a subordinate capacity, i.e. the power of suspending a person pending enquiry is not independently created as S power of the Board but is merely included in the power of dismissal and therefore it is inseparable from the power of dismissal in this sense that it will rest in the same authority which has the power of dismissal. Of course it has to be exercised separately and in faet prior to exercising the power of dismissal.
12. The difficulties envisaged by Mr. Khare in connection with the procedure of Section 71 applicable to the cases of suspension do not justify not giving an interpretation of Sub-section (3) of Section 90 and Schedule I with respect to the power to dismiss a Secretary its correct meaning. Those difficulties, if any, are not such as to reduce the creation of this power to suspend to nothing. In fact, these difficulties need not arise as Sub-section (3) of Section 90 does not equate dismissal with suspension but simply provides that the power of dismissal will include the power of suspension; that is to one who has the power to dismiss will have the power to suspend also. How he is to exercise that power and what remedies are available to the person who is suspended are not the matters dealt with Sub-section (3) of Section 90.
13. Sub-section (3) of Section 90 not only provides that the power of dismissal shall be deemed to include a power to suspend any person but further qualifies the person who can be suspended. Such a person is the person against whom the power of dismissal might be exercised. This means that the authority which is to enquire into such conduct of a person as may require the exercise of the power of dismissal will be deemed to have the power to Suspend him. It is only the authority who can dismiss which can enquire into the alleged misconduct. It is during such an enquiry that the person can be suspended. This consideration also leads to the same conclusion that it is the authority which has the power of dismissal that can suspend the person against whom the enquiry is pending. This view finds support from the observations of Bhagwati, J. in Sm. Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1952 SC 362 at page 364 which are :
'The suspension which has been thus provided for is of two categories, (1) suspension as a punishment and (2) suspension pending enquiry or orders. In the case of a suspension falling within the latter category the only power of suspension which is provided is that of suspending any person against whom the power of dismissal might bo exercised pending enquiry into his conduct or pending the orders of any authority whose sanction, is necessary for his dismissal. The power of suspension pending enquiry into the conduct of the person can only be exercised if an enquiry against him has been started and before any order is made for his dismissal as a result of such enquiry.'
14. Lastly, Mr, Khare urges that the power of suspension is a mere incident of the relationship of master and servant and can therefore be exercised by the Board and consequqently by the President when it is not mentioned in column 2 of Schedule I. It was observed in The Management Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 at page 1345 :
'It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a servant to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay wages during the so-called period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relation of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay.'
15. I am therefore of the opinion that the President of the Board has no power to suspend a Secretary, and my answer to the question referred is that the case of 1952 All LJ 56 : (AIR 1952 All 681) was wrongly decided.
16. I agree.
17. BY THE COURT : Our answer to the question referred is that the case of Sri Badri PrasadEastogi v. President, District Board, Mirzapur, (1952ALJR 56) was wrongly decided.