1. This appeal arises out of a suit under Section 164 of the Tenancy Act. The plaintiffs are admittedly recorded as having the proprietary right entitling them to institute the suit. The Court below, how ever, was of opinion that they were not in possession of the property of which they were recorded as the proprietors and dismissed the suit. Section 201 of the Tenancy Act provides (1) for the case of a plaintiff who is not recorded and (2) for the case of a plaintiff who is recorded. In the case of a plain-tiff who is recorded the section provides that the Court 'shall presume' that he has proprietary title according to the record. The effect of this provision has been before this Court for consideration on several occasions. The views which I hold will be found fully set forth in the ruling; Bechan Singh v. Karan Singh 30 A. 447 : A.W.N. (1908). 186 : 5 A.L.J. 495. I am quite satisfied that the Revenue Court before whom a suit comes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Tenancy Act, where the plaintiff is recorded as having the proprietary right is bound to presume that the plaintiff has such proprietary title and that the Revenue Court is not entitled in that suit to go into any evidence to contradict the record. Under the provison to the section the defendant has a right to go to the Civil Court for a declaration of his title. He has, of course, also a right to apply to the Revenue Court in a proper way to have the record corrected. I wish to point out that in the present appeal I am not deciding that the plaintiff has any proprietary title. I only decide that the Revenue Court, was bound to give the plaintiffs a decree when it found that they were duly recorded as having a proprietary right which would entitle them to maintain the suit. It may be open to a Revenue Court in a proper case to adjourn the hearing of the suit or application in order to give a party an opportunity of making an application to have the record corrected. I would allow the appeal and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate Court restore the decree of the first Court,
2. I agree with the order which my learned colleague proposes to pass in this; case I do so because in my opinion the correct interpretation to be put. upon Section 201 is the interpretation which was put on that section in the case of Bechan Singh v. Karan Singh 30 A. 447 : A.W.N. (1908) 186 : 5 A.L.J. 495. The whole phraseology of Section 201 points to the decision in that case being correct. I can, moreover, see nothing strange in the view that the legis-lature intended that an entry in a Revenue record should be binding on a Revenue Court.' If, in a case where the plaintiff is -recorded as having a proprietary right, the Revenue Court went behind the record and questioned the plaintiffs' title, its decision would not be binding upon the defendant who would still have the right to go to the Civil Court under the latter paragraph of Clause (3). The result might be contradictory decisions by different Courts both entitled to try the question-a state of things which I believe the legislature intended to avoid in enacting Section 201.
3. Order of the Court.-We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore the decree of the Court of first instance with costs in all Courts.